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Six essays on the transition to clean capital
Abstract
This thesis shows that while greenhouse gases are a stock pollution that
translate into an increasing shadow carbon price, it may be socially de-
sirable to invest now in the deployment of expensive emission-reduction
measures, in particular in the secotrs that are more difficult to decar-
bonize. This results solely from taking into account inertia in the accu-
mulation of low-carbon capital, absent any other market imperfection.
In this framework, the key is to make sure that short-term abatement
investment in consistent with long-term emission-reduction objectives.
For instance, when computing the marginal abatement cost of replac-
ing coal plants with gas or renewable power, one should take into ac-
count that only renewable power can lead to the full decarbonization
of the power sector. Similarly, the appraisal of electric vehicles should
acknowledge that climate stabilization requires zero carbon electricity
anyway.
This thesis also covers the choice of policy instruments that im-
perfect governments can use to make sure that the market implements
these investments. It suggests that if governments cannot commit cred-
ibly to a carbon price path, or cannot fully compensate those who lose
because of the carbon price, then sector-scale policy instruments that
incentivize investment in clean capital may be more effective (but not
necessarily more efficient) and more acceptable than the carbon price.
For instance a feebate in favor of cleaner personal vehicles does not
require the government to commit to a carbon price over the lifetime of
that vehicles to be effective, and avoids creating stranded assets among
exiting inefficient vehicles.
Éléments sur la transition vers du capital bas
carbone
Résumé
Cette thèse montre que bien que les gaz à effet de serre représentent
une pollution de stock qui impose un cout virtuel du carbone croissant
iii
Directeur de thèse : Jean-Charles Hourcade. Adrien Vogt-Schilb
dans le temps, il peut être socialement désirable d’investir des main-
tenant dans le déploiement de mesures couteuses de réductions de ces
émissions. Ce résultat découle uniquement de la prise en compte de
l’inertie inhérente à l’accumulation de capital bas carbone, en l’absence
de toute autre imperfection de marché. De plus, cette thèse montre que
des gouvernements imparfaits (c’est-à-dire qui ne peuvent pas s’enga-
ger sur une trajectoire parfaitement crédible de prix du carbone, ou ne
peuvent pas compenser parfaitement les perdants de la mise en place de
ce prix) peuvent avoir intérêt à utiliser des instruments de politiques
sectoriels qui influencent directement les décisions d’investissements.
Ces instruments peuvent être plus effectifs et plus acceptables que le
prix du carbone.
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Introduction
Cette thèse contribue à la compréhension de l’écart existant au-jourd’hui entre pratique et théorie des politiques d’atténuation du
changement climatique. Elle pose la question de savoir si une meilleure
prise en compte dans les modèles utilisés en théorie économique de
l’inertie et des irréversibilités, induites notamment par les dynamiques
d’accumulation du capital et du déploiement des infrastructures per-
mettant une transition vers une économie décarbonée, pourrait réduire
l’écart entre compréhension théorique et pratique réelle des politiques
climatiques. Elle s’intéresse plus particulièrement à deux aspects du
problème, qui s’avèrent en fait liés par l’inertie et l’irréversibilité : le
timing optimal des réductions d’émissions de gaz à effet serre (GES),
et les instruments de politiques permettant de mettre en œuvre ces
réductions.
En pratique, face au danger que fait peser le changement climatique,
les pouvoirs publics se sont fixés un éventail d’objectifs intermédiaires,
et ont déployé une variété d’instruments économiques et de réglemen-
tations. En Europe, par exemple, les objectifs dits des trois vingt visent
à réduire les émissions de GES de 20%, augmenter la part d’énergie
renouvelable à 20%, et réduire l’intensité énergétique du PIB de 20%.
Ces objectifs sont à atteindre en 2020, c’est-à-dire à moyen terme, du
point de vue de ceux qui les ont établis en 2007.1 Par ailleurs, l’Union
européenne a mis en place plusieurs instruments pour atteindre ces ob-
jectifs : un marché du carbone, des normes d’émissions kilométriques
pour les véhicules routiers, des normes d’efficacité énergétique pour les
moteurs industriels, l’électroménager, et les ampoules électriques, aux-
quels s’ajoutent, au niveau national, des règlementations thermiques
1En Octobre 2014, la commission européenne a proposé de nouveaux objec-
tifs pour 2030 : réduire les émissions de 40%, augmenter la part du renouvelable à
27%, et améliorer l’efficacité énergétique de 27%. Pour les objectifs de 2020 et de
2030, l’amélioration de l’efficacité énergétique et les réductions d’émissions de gaz
à effet de serre se comprennent par rapport au niveau de 1990.
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pour les bâtiments neufs, des tarifs d’achat bonifiés ou des obligations
de production en faveur de l’électricité d’origine renouvelable, et des
incitations fiscales en faveur des véhicules hybrides ou rechargeables
(IEA, 2015). Au sein de cette panoplie d’instruments, le prix du car-
bone semble finalement relégué à un second rôle.
Pourtant, la théorie économique la plus élémentaire établit que la
meilleure stratégie, pour un gouvernement qui souhaite lutter contre
une externalité comme la pollution atmosphérique, consiste à utiliser
un unique instrument économique (Tinbergen, 1956) : une taxe pigou-
vienne, ou, de façon similaire, un marché de permis d’émissions (Pigou,
1932 ; Coase, 1960). Il doit s’agir en l’occurrence d’un prix du carbone,
s’appliquant à tous les secteurs de l’économie, et croissant dans le temps
(Pearce, 1991 ; Nordhaus, 1991). La discussion de l’instrument à privi-
légier, entre taxe ou quotas, a occupé une place importante dans la
littérature,2 mais est ici laissée de côté. A la place, on s’intéresse aux
interprétations politiques souvent faites du profil temporel optimal du
prix du carbone.
En effet, il est bien établi que le prix du carbone optimal croît dans
le temps. Par exemple, William Nordhaus a développé dans les années
1990 le modèle DICE (Nordhaus, 1991), qui fait depuis référence dans
l’étude du timing optimal des réductions d’émissions de GES (Dietz
et Stern, 2014 ; Espagne et al., 2012). DICE recommande qu’une taxe
carbone soit introduite à un niveau bas puis augmente progressivement
au cours du temps, afin de prendre en compte la préférence pour le
présent des agents économiques, et le moindre regret des générations
futures, plus riches que les générations présentes, à renoncer à de la
consommation au profit de la lutte contre le changement climatique.
Plus généralement, la littérature théorique s’accorde sur le fait que la
concentration atmosphérique de dioxyde de carbone étant une pollution
de stock, le prix du carbone doit croitre progressivement au cours du
2Notamment depuis que Pizer (1999) a relevé l’importance des pentes relatives
de courbes de coûts et de bénéfice associés à la réductions d’émissions de GES,
et de l’incertitude qui pèse sur celles-ci. Goulder et Schein (2013) proposent un
revue récente des différences entre ces deux outils, qui se limitent en théorie à deux
aspects, tous deux en faveur de la taxe carbone : l’interaction avec d’autres politiques
climatiques, et l’interaction stratégique avec les producteurs de pétrole capables
d’influencer son prix sur les marchés internationaux. Il est à noter également que
des contraintes purement institutionnelles peuvent empêcher la mise en place ce
certains instruments, comme le montre l’exemple européen, où toute taxe carbone
devrait être approuvée à l’unanimité des États membres pour pouvoir être mise en
place (Branger, Lecuyer, et Quirion 2015).
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temps (Goulder et Mathai 2000). Dans le cas simplifié d’un budget
carbone, l’air pur est analogue à un dépôt d’une ressource fossile. Son
prix doit donc suivre la règle d’Hotelling (1931), c’est-à-dire croitre au
taux d’intérêt, afin d’égaliser la valeur actuelle d’une tonne abattue
aujourd’hui et d’une tonne abattue dans vingt ans.3
En principe, face à ce prix croissant, le marché lui-même doit arbi-
trer entre des réductions d’émissions dans des différents secteurs (par
exemple bâtiment ou transport). Cet arbitrage se prolonge au choix des
techniques au sein de chaque secteur (par exemple gaz ou énergie re-
nouvelable pour remplacer du charbon dans la production d’électricité).
Enfin et surtout, cet arbitrage doit se faire de façon inter-temporelle ;
le marché doit notamment déterminer la quantité et la répartition des
réductions d’émissions de GES à moyen terme, par exemple la quantité
d’énergie renouvelable à mobiliser en 2020. Un détail, que l’on mon-
trera crucial, est souvent omis dans l’exposition de cette théorie : le
marché doit partir de la donnée de la trajectoire entière du prix futur
du carbone, ou, dans le cas d’un marché, du budget carbone total.
Le point peut-être le plus important pour le débat public est que le
profil exponentiel du prix du carbone optimal a été interprété comme
une raison de différer les efforts de réduction des émissions de gaz à
effet de serre le plus possible. Il s’agirait de se concentrer à court terme
uniquement sur les options de réduction les moins couteuses, laissant à
plus tard la mobilisation d’options couteuses comme l’énergie renouve-
lable ou des réductions d’émissions dans le secteur des transports.
Cette façon de voir les choses est rendue particulièrement saillante,
dans le débat public, par l’utilisation et l’interprétation de courbes de
cout marginal d’abattement, ou MACC par leurs initiales anglaises. Ces
courbes illustrent une série de mesures permettant de réduire les émis-
sions de GES, caractérisées par la quantité de GES qu’elles permettent
de réduire et le cout auquel elles peuvent le faire, et, surtout, ordon-
nées par ordre de cout croissant. Elles ont étés introduites dans le dé-
bat académique dès les années 1990 (Jackson 1991 ; Rubin et al. 1992),
mais ont atteint un public large plus récemment (Enkvist et al., 2007 ;
McKinsey, 2009). Parce qu’elles ressemblent à des courbes d’offre, elles
3Des analyses plus sophistiquées de la dynamique d’accumulation d’une pollution
de stock et de ses conséquences sur l’activité économique montrent que le prix du
carbone ne doit pas croitre indéfiniment (il se stabilise une fois que la concentration
de pollution atteint sa valeur d’équilibre) mais confirment que, dans le cas pertinent
pour analyser le changement climatique, il doit d’abord croitre presqu’exponentiel-
lement (Fischer et al., 2004).
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sont souvent interprétées comme telles, y compris par des académiques
(Wächter, 2013 ; Haab, 2007) et des agences gouvernementales (DECC,
2011), c’est à dire comme montrant qu’il faut mettre en œuvre les me-
sures par ordre de cout croissant.4
De façon plus générale, l’argument de la comparaison des couts
d’abattement est souvent utilisé pour critiquer les politiques clima-
tiques, par exemples en faveur d’un soutien à l’énergie renouvelable
ou aux véhicules électriques : ces politiques favoriseraient un déploie-
ment trop précoce de ces mesures de réductions des émissions de GES.
Et pour revenir à DICE, le modèle de référence évoqué plus haut, il re-
présente de fait les réductions d’émissions à l’aide d’une simple courbe
de coût d’abattement, qui lie dans ce cas pourcentage de réduction des
émissions de gaz à effet de serre et pourcentage du PIB dépensé à cette
fin à chaque instant du temps. DICE conclue donc également que les
efforts optimaux de réduction des émissions de gaz commencent par
mobiliser les options dont le cout d’abattement est le plus faible, et
mobilisent ensuite des mesures de plus en plus couteuses, au fur et à
mesure que le prix du carbone augmente.
La première contribution de cette thèse est de montrer que lorsque
l’on prend en compte explicitement les dynamiques d’accumulation du
capital, les relations entre profil du prix du carbone, cout d’abatte-
ment des mesures à mobiliser, et rythme optimal des réductions des
émissions de GES sont plus complexes. A cause de l’inertie, l’action
à court ou moyen terme ne peut pas être déconnectée de l’objectif de
long terme. Plutôt que de se concentrer uniquement sur les options les
moins chères, une stratégie efficace de décarbonisation de l’économie
doit également privilégier certaines options chères mais inertes, c’est-
4Même Sweeney et Weyant (2008), qui ont par ailleurs passé leur carrière à
analyser la dynamique optimale des réductions d’émissions de GES, font un pas
vers cette interprétation de la MACC qu’ils ont produite pour le gouvernement
Californien. “Once a MAC curve is constructed, one can find the total number of
measures needed to reach the target level of emissions reduction by drawing a line
designating this target. That total reduction will then imply the cost of the most
expensive feasible measure necessary to achieve that reduction in the ordered list
of measures. […W]e can use this description along with the MAC curve to guide
policy : we choose an emission reduction target (e.g., sufficient to bring emissions
to 1990 levels by 2020), estimate the marginal abatement cost for that level of
emissions reductions, and implement all feasible measures to reduce emissions that
cost less than the marginal cost associated with the target emission reduction.”(pages
5 à 6). Cet exemple montre la facilité avec laquelle le dessin d’une MACC mène
naturellement à cette conclusion.
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à-dire dont on aura besoin à long terme pour décarboniser l’économie,
et dont la mise en œuvre complète à un cout raisonnable requiert plu-
sieurs décennies, comme par exemple le déploiement d’infrastructure de
transport propre.
Ainsi, les mesures mises en place en Europe pour atteindre l’ob-
jectif de réduction des émissions de GES de 20% en 2020 doivent être
jugées non seulement sur leur capacité à atteindre ce point de passage
au moindre cout, mais également sur leur capacité à garder l’objectif
de 80% de réduction en 2050 à portée de main. Par exemple, le rem-
placement de centrales à charbon par des centrales à gaz permettrait
de réduire les émissions de carbone à un cout modéré, mais porte le
risque d’un enfermement dans des modes de productions trop inten-
sifs en carbone (carbon-intensive lock-in). L’énergie renouvelable peut
sembler plus couteuse à court terme, mais permet en revanche de pro-
gresser vers la décarbonisation totale. Plus généralement, tout inves-
tissement destiné à réduire les émissions de gaz à effet de serre doit
être évalué à la lumière d’une stratégie entière de décarbonisation de
l’économie (c’est-à-dire à l’aide d’une vision prospective), en s’intéres-
sant aux temps nécessaires à la mise en œuvre de chacune des options
techniques permettant de réduire les émissions.
En particulier, la contribution de technologies particulières aux ef-
forts de réductions d’émissions de gaz à effet de serre ne peut pas s’ap-
précier en dehors du système technique dans lequel elle doit s’inscrire.
Par exemple, le calcul du cout d’abattement derrière le remplacement
d’un véhicule classique par une voiture électrique peut paraitre élevé là
où le contenu carbone de l’électricité est élevé et le bénéfice environne-
mental semble donc faible (Hawkins, Gausen, et Strømman 2012). Mais
la pertinence d’un soutien public à l’électrification des transports ne dé-
pend pas seulement du contenu carbone de l’électricité contemporaine,
mais aussi et surtout de ce qu’il sera dans quelques années, lorsque les
véhicules électriques représenteront une part significative du parc, et
que la production d’électricité aura évolué.5
Cette thèse montre donc que, malgré le prix du carbone croissant
dans le temps, la transition optimale vers une économie bas carbone
démarre par des efforts significatifs, et il peut être optimal de mobiliser
5L’autre élément crucial à prendre en compte est l’évolution future des couts, non
seulement des technologies d’électrification, mais ici aussi du système technique dans
lequel elles s’inscrivent (Gritsevskyi et Nakicenovi, 2000), c’est-à-dire ici centrales
électriques, réseaux de transport et distribution, et peut être smart grids – capacités
de stockage, de gestion de la demande et de recharge intelligente.
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des options techniques relativement plus couteuses dès le début de cette
transition. Ces résultats peuvent rappeler ceux issus de la littérature
sur le changement technique dirigé, qui concluent eux aussi que des
efforts soutenus à court terme sont nécessaires pour mettre l’économie
sur la voie du développement décarboné.6 Toutefois, leur argument est
basé sur la prise en compte d’une deuxième imperfection de marché (en
plus de la pollution causée par les émissions de gaz à effet de serre) : les
externalités liées aux effets d’apprentissage. C’est également l’argument
des effets d’apprentissage qu’utilisent par exemple Rosendhal (2004)
ou Bramoullé et Olson (2005) pour justifier des efforts plus importants
dans les secteurs qui y sont le plus soumis.
Ici, la simple dynamique d’accumulation du capital, en l’absence
de toute autre imperfection de marché ou objectif politique, se traduit
par des efforts transitoires substantiellement différents dans différents
secteurs. En cela, les travaux présentés ici s’inscrivent dans la litté-
rature qui étudie l’impact de l’inertie technique sur la transition vers
une économie bas carbone, dans la tradition de Grubb et al. (1995),
Ha-Duong et al. (1997), Lecocq et al. (1998), Jacoby et Wing (1999),
van der Zwaan et al. (2002) et Gilotte et Fortin (2004). Les travaux
exposés dans cette thèse sont les premiers à étudier analytiquement le
tempo optimal d’investissement propre dans plusieurs secteurs, à pro-
poser une distinction claire entre inertie causée par l’accumulation du
capital et effet d’apprentissage,7 et à séparer analytiquement le prix du
carbone, les réductions d’émissions, le déploiement de capital propre,
et le cout et la quantité optimale des investissements dans ce capital
6(André et Smulders, 2014 ; Acemoglu et al., 2012 ; Gerlagh et al., 2009 ; Grimaud
et Lafforgue, 2008)
7Bien que l’inertie due à l’accumulation du capital et les effets d’apprentissage
aient un effet similaire sur la distribution optimale des efforts entre secteurs, ce sont
deux phénomènes différents. Certains secteurs, comme peut-être la construction
d’infrastructure de transports, peuvent être soumis à l’inertie induite par l’accumu-
lation lente de capital, sans être soumis aux effets d’apprentissage. L’implication
opérationnelle des deux phénomènes est également différente : les externalités de
connaissance appellent à subventionner la recherche, une activité de bureau ou la-
boratoire, alors que l’inertie due à l’accumulation de capital invite à commencer la
construction de capital propre au plus vite, sur le terrain. Enfin, l’ampleur quantita-
tive des deux phénomènes n’a pas de raison d’être comparable. Par exemple, Fischer
et al. (2012) trouvent que les effets d’apprentissage justifient une subvention opti-
male de l’ordre de 1 à 6 c$/kWh pour l’électricité renouvelable, très inférieure aux
tarifs de rachat pratiqués, alors que dans une application au secteur de l’électricité
(Lecuyer et Vogt-Schilb, 2014), nous trouvons que l’inertie justifie un coût de dé-
ploiement des centrales renouvelables à un cout initial de l’ordre de 20c$/kWh plus
élevées que le prix de l’électricité.
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propre. Parce qu’on y modélise explicitement l’investissement, ces tra-
vaux sont les premiers à mettre en avant le fait qu’un prix du carbone
qui croît dans le temps est compatible avec un investissement soutenu
à court terme, concentré sur les secteurs où les réductions d’émissions
sont les plus difficiles à mettre en œuvre.
Cette clarification théorique de l’importance de la prise en compte
de l’inertie sur l’ordonnancement optimal des efforts de réduction des
émissions de gaz à effet de serre n’a un intérêt pratique que s’il conduit
à réviser la conception des instruments économiques utilisés par les
pouvoirs publics pour les mettre en œuvre. C’est l’objet de la deuxième
contribution cette thèse, qui porte sur les conséquences de l’inertie et
de l’irréversibilité sur le choix d’instruments en présence de défaillances
de l’État. Elle mobilise deux arguments.
Le premier argument est la crédibilité limitée des prix du carbone
à long ou même moyen terme. Pour déclencher les bonnes décisions
d’investissement dans des secteurs inertes, comme celui de la production
d’électricité, où la durée de vie du capital varie entre 30 et 60 ans,
un prix du carbone doit être crédible sur 30 à 60 ans. Les décisions
touchant à la forme des villes et aux infrastructures de transport, elles,
doivent considérer que le prix du carbone est donné pour les cinq à vingt
prochaines décennies. Même dans le secteur automobile, les voitures
personnelles sont utilisées près de dix ans. Ce besoin de crédibilité des
signaux prix sur le long terme contraste avec les exemples Australien et
Canadien, qui montrent que les gouvernements peuvent à tout moment
défaire ce qu’ont fait leurs prédécesseurs. Les prix du carbone, qu’ils
proviennent d’un marché ou d’une taxe, peuvent alors être considérés
par le marché comme des contraintes temporaires, qu’il conviendrait de
satisfaire en investissant uniquement dans les mesures les moins chères.
Or, cette stratégie (menant par exemple à remplacer les centrales à
charbon par des centrales à gaz, sans s’intéresser aux renouvelables)
peut conduire à s’enfermer dans un système de production trop carboné.
Au contraire, des politiques comme les normes d’efficacité énergé-
tique dans le bâtiment, les bonus/malus pour influencer l’achat d’équi-
pements plus propres, ou la planification urbaine ont l’avantage d’influ-
encer directement l’investissement contemporain. Couplé à des objectifs
sectoriels, comme les 20% d’énergie renouvelable en 2020, ils permettent
de s’assurer que les réductions à court terme sont réalisées grâce à des
mesures qui permettent de progresser vers une économie décarbonée.
Ce type d’instruments peut donc être utilisé par un gouvernement im-
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parfait (incapable de s’engager sur plusieurs décennies) pour réduire
les émissions et influencer durablement la structure de l’économie – au
prix d’une transparence réduite quant au cout marginal d’abattement,
et donc probablement d’une efficacité économique réduite.8
Le second facteur est l’acceptabilité sociale d’un changement sou-
dain des prix induit par la mise en place d’un prix du carbone. Ici, l’iner-
tie et l’irréversibilité jouent un rôle clé. À chaque instant, le système
de production économique est donné, et dépend de décisions d’inves-
tissements passées. Un prix du carbone redirige l’investissement, et per-
met donc de progressivement modifier la structure de l’économie. Mais
à court terme, certains agents sont quasiment contraints, pour s’y adap-
ter, de réduire leur production. Le propriétaire d’une centrale à charbon
ne peut pas transformer sa centrale en parc éolien, et doit donc ajuster
sa production à la baisse, voire fermer entièrement la centrale, si un
prix du carbone est mis en place. Pareillement, un ménage ayant élu
domicile loin de son lieu de travail et ayant acquis une voiture gour-
mande en énergie ne peut pas déménager près d’une ligne de transport
en commun ou changer de véhicule dès qu’un prix du carbone est mis
en place. Face à une montée des prix de l’énergie, ce ménage va peut-
être choisir de réduire ses déplacements de loisirs. Plus généralement,
les propriétaires du capital intensif en carbone (et les travailleurs qui
en dépendent) paient une part disproportionnée du cout total d’un prix
du carbone.
Le prix du carbone, dont les bénéfices sont étalés dans le temps et
sur l’ensemble de la société (mondiale), impose donc un cout immédiat
et disproportionné sur des intérêts acquis (dans le pays où il est mis en
œuvre), qui peuvent être en mesure de bloquer sa mise en place (Olson,
1977 ; Trebilcock, 2014). Idéalement, le gouvernement devrait être en
mesure de séparer équité et efficacité des politiques climatiques, et de
compenser les perdants de la mise en place d’un prix du carbone en
utilisant des transferts monétaires purs, des transferts en nature par
exemple sous formes de prestations sociales (Combet 2013), voire des
baisses de taxes ciblées (Metcalf, 2014).9 En pratique, un gouvernement
8D’autres études ont mis en avant le problème causé par l’incapacité du gouver-
nement à s’engager sur des politiques climatiques, mais en se concentrant là encore
sur l’interaction avec les externalités d’apprentissage (Golombek et al., 2010 ; Ulph
et Ulph, 2013)
9Goulder et al. (2010) montrent qu’une autre politique, la distribution gratuite
d’une fraction des permis d’émissions, permet de compenser les propriétaires du ca-
pital polluant. Cette stratégie ne permet toutefois pas de compenser les travailleurs
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non omniscient aura du mal à identifier chaque perdant de la mise en
place d’un prix du carbone, incluant par exemple chacun des acheteurs
récents d’un véhicule polluant, les travailleurs qui dépendent du capital
polluant (par exemple les employés d’une mine) ou des agents dont
l’activité n’a pas de rapport direct avec les émissions de gaz à effet de
serre, comme un prestataire de service travaillant pour le fournisseur
d’une centrale à charbon devant fermer.
En revanche, des instruments de politiques alternatifs, qui se conten-
tent de rediriger l’investissement vers du capital propre dans chaque
secteur (comme, ici encore, le bonus/malus automobile, les normes d’ef-
ficacité énergétique sur les bâtiments neufs, ou des projets pilotes pour
développer l’énergie renouvelable), n’ont pas d’effet direct sur le capital
polluant préexistant. Ces instruments repartissent le cout de la transi-
tion vers une économie décarbonée sur une population plus large et une
période de temps plus longue. Ils sont donc peut-être plus socialement
acceptables qu’un prix du carbone, bien qu’en termes de pure efficacité
économique ils lui soient inférieurs.
Cette deuxième contribution enrichit donc la littérature qui étudie
les raisons que les gouvernements peuvent avoir à utiliser plusieurs ins-
truments de politiques climatiques. Le principe de Tinbergen (1956)
établit qu’une unique externalité, ici l’accumulation dans l’atmosphère
de GES, doit être réglée par un unique instrument, ici un prix du car-
bone. La littérature existante reconnait toutefois l’intérêt d’autres ins-
truments de politique venant s’ajouter au prix du carbone, afin de rem-
plir des objectifs politiques complètement différents, comme la sécurité
énergétique (Fischer et Preonas, 2010) ; ou afin de corriger d’autres
défaillances de marché que l’externalité carbone, comme les effets d’ap-
prentissage sur les nouvelles technologies propres (Fischer et al., 2012 ;
Jaffe et al., 2005), le manque d’information, notamment sur la consom-
mation énergétique de l’équipement (Davis et Metcalf, 2014 ; Gillin-
gham et Palmer, 2014 ; Allcott et Greenstone, 2012), ou les problèmes
de principal-agent, notamment en ce qui concerne l’isolation des bâti-
ments (Gillingham et al., 2012 ; Giraudet et Houde, 2014). Ici, ce sont
l’incapacité des gouvernements à s’engager sur des prix du carbone, et
leur capacité limitée à compenser les perdants d’un prix du carbone,
qui tendent à justifier l’utilisation d’instruments alternatifs.
En résumé, cette thèse montre que bien que les gaz à effet de serre
représentent une pollution de stock qui impose un cout virtuel du car-
qui dépendent directement ou indirectement de ce capital.
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bone croissant dans le temps, il peut être socialement désirable d’in-
vestir des maintenant dans le déploiement de mesures couteuses de
réductions d’émissions de GES. Ce résultat découle uniquement de la
prise en compte de l’inertie inhérente à l’accumulation de capital bas
carbone, en l’absence de toute autre imperfection de marché. De plus,
pour mettre en œuvre ce déploiement, des gouvernements imparfaits
(c’est-à-dire qui ne peuvent pas s’engager sur une trajectoire parfaite-
ment crédible de prix du carbone, ou compenser parfaitement les per-
dants de la mise en place de ce prix) peuvent avoir intérêt à utiliser des
instruments de politiques sectoriels, plus effectifs et plus acceptables
que le prix du carbone, afin de s’assurer que le marché mette en œuvre
ces investissements.
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Resumé des chapitres
Le premier chapitre de cette thèse esquisse une théorie de la transi-tion vers du capital propre. L’un des enjeux majeurs des politiques
de stabilisation du climat est de remplacer un stock existant de capital
polluant par un stock comparable de capital propre. Or, une compo-
sante centrale du cout de cette transformation dépend de la vitesse à
laquelle elle est menée : une transformation plus rapide demande de
détourner plus de travailleurs et plus de capitaux d’un autre usage pro-
ductif. Le cout marginal des investissements bas carbone est donc une
fonction croissante de la vitesse à laquelle l’appareil productif est trans-
formé, un phénomène connu sous le terme de cout d’ajustement dans
la théorie générale de l’investissement (Gould 1968 ; Lucas 1967).
Pour minimiser le cout d’ajustement, la stratégie optimale doit an-
ticiper l’objectif de long terme, et étaler l’investissement total dans le
temps. Le résultat, détaillé dans le texte, est qu’un prix du carbone
qui croit exponentiellement dans le temps se traduit par des investis-
sements en forme de cloche, qui peuvent démarrer au-dessus du prix
du carbone. A long terme, la transition vers du capital bas carbone est
terminée, et l’investissement retombe donc, malgré un prix du carbone
élevé (Figure 1).
Par ailleurs, puisque le capital propre a une longue durée de vie,
la valeur optimale d’un investissement bas carbone ne dépend pas uni-
quement du prix du carbone, mais également de la valeur du capital
bas carbone dans le futur. En particulier, le cout technique des abat-
tements, c’est-à-dire le rapport de leur surcout (par rapport au capital
polluant) sur la somme actualisée des émissions évitées, ne doit pas
directement être comparé au prix du carbone. Pourtant, c’est souvent
cette valeur, appelée cout annualisé des réductions d’émission par le
GIEC (Kolstad et Urama 2014) ou simplement cout marginal d’abatte-
ment dans de nombreuses études (McKinsey and Company 2009), qui
est utilisée en pratique pour jauger la valeur d’une mesure de réduction
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Figure 1 – Profil temporel d’une taxe carbone, de l’investissement bas
carbone, et de l’abattement qui en résulte. Le cadran de gauche montre
qu’un prix du carbone qui croit exponentiellement se traduit par un profil
d’investissement en cloche. A droite, l’abattement croit selon une courbe en
S. Une fois que tout le capital sale a été remplacé par du capital propre
(en T), 100% des émissions sont abattues, et l’investissement ne sert qu’à
maintenir le stock de capital propre en place.
des émissions.
De plus, différents secteurs de l’économie (production d’électricité,
bâtiments, transport), sont caractérisés par différent potentiels maxi-
mum d’abattement, et différent couts du capital bas carbone. De ce
fait, la valeur du capital bas carbone diffère dans chaque secteur, et
un unique prix du carbone se traduit par des investissements différents
dans chaque secteur, notamment lorsque ceux-ci sont exprimés en euros
dépensés par tonne de carbone évitée, c’est-à-dire grâce au cout annua-
lisé d’investissement. On montre qu’ils doivent être supérieurs, toute
chose égale par ailleurs, dans les secteurs où le capital bas carbone est
plus cher (comme le secteur des transports), et ceux où le potentiel
de réduction des émissions de gaz à effet de serre est plus important
(comme la production d’électricité). Ces secteurs font en effet face à un
plus grand besoin d’investissement total, qu’il convient d’étaler le plus
possible pour réduire les couts d’ajustements, et donc de commencer le
plus tôt possible.
Le deuxième chapitre vise à prolonger les résultats du premier
dans deux directions. D’abord, le premier chapitre étudie la réparti-
tion de l’effort de réduction dans des secteurs distincts de l’économie,
en faisant l’hypothèse qu’ils n’interagissent pas entre eux. Le second
chapitre s’intéresse à la comparaison d’investissements en compétition
à l’intérieur d’un secteur. Ensuite, le premier chapitre ignore la ques-
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tion de l’usage optimal des ressources fossiles (pétrole, charbon, gaz),
qui peut pourtant jouer un rôle dans le timing optimal des réductions
d’émissions de gaz à effet de serre. Ce chapitre combine donc ces deux
aspects dans un seul modèle.
Il prend l’exemple archétypal d’une économie dont la production
d’électricité est assurée par des centrales à charbon, qui peuvent être
remplacées soit par de l’énergie renouvelable (éolienne, solaire), chère
mais presqu’entièrement décarbonée, soit par des centrales à gaz, moins
chères mais au potentiel de réduction plus réduit. Il étudie la transition
optimale des centrales à charbon vers l’énergie renouvelable, et le rôle
que le gaz peut jouer dans cette transition, sous contrainte d’un objectif
climatique.
Ici aussi, prendre en compte l’inertie inhérente aux dynamiques d’ac-
cumulation du capital s’avère crucial (alors que l’impact de la modéli-
sation explicite des ressources fossiles s’avère limité). Comme dans le
chapitre précédent, il serait bien trop cher de remplacer du jour au len-
demain le parc de production existant par un parc entièrement décar-
boné ; au contraire, les ressources de l’économie (travailleurs qualifiés,
lignes de production) établissent un rythme optimal auquel construire
et déployer le nouveau capital, par exemple des éoliennes. De ce fait, la
stratégie optimale démarre l’installation d’éoliennes tôt, plutôt que de
remplacer séquentiellement le charbon par du gaz, puis le gaz par du
renouvelable – comme une application hâtive de la règle d’Herfindahl
(1967),10 qui ignore les dynamiques d’accumulation du capital, pourrait
suggérer.
Par ailleurs, le rôle que jouent les centrales à gaz dans une transition
vers une électricité entièrement décarboné est purement temporaire :
il permet de réduire le besoin d’investissement dans le renouvelable à
court terme, et donc les coûts d’ajustement ; mais à moyen terme, il
doit être déclassé afin de laisser la voie libre à plus de renouvelable (Fi-
gure 2). Ce dernier résultat est spécifique à ce chapitre, car il demande
de modéliser deux options concurrentes de réductions d’émissions de
gaz à effet de serre, l’une pouvant remplacer l’autre. En l’occurrence, le
gaz permet de réduire les émissions à court terme, mais ne peut pas être
utilisé pour atteindre l’objectif final de décarbonisation presqu’entière
de l’économie. Ce résultat illustre de nouveau l’importance de l’anti-
10La règle d’Herfindahl établit que des dépôts de ressources fossiles qui différent
par leur cout d’extraction doivent être exploités par ordre de cout croissant. Le
chapitre 2 discute les ajouts qui ont été fait à la théorie d’Herfindahl depuis 1967.
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Figure 2 – Transition optimale du charbon vers le gaz et l’énergie renouve-
lable. Sur le sentier optimal, l’investissement et la production à base d’énergie
renouvelable peuvent commencer tôt, c’est-à-dire avant d’arrêter la produc-
tion d’énergie fossile. Sous contrainte de budget carbone, le gaz permet de
réduire le besoin d’énergie renouvelable à court terme, mais doit finalement
être sous-utilisé et être remplacé par du renouvelable.
cipation du long terme lors de la comparaison des options disponibles
à court terme – en l’espèce, il y a un risque de surévaluer la valeur
des centrales à gaz si on ignore qu’elles sont appelées à être remplacées
elles-mêmes par du renouvelable à moyen terme.
Le troisième chapitre illustre d’une autre façon comment la prise
en compte de l’inertie et des objectifs de long terme est essentiel à l’éva-
luation d’options destinées à réduire les émissions de GES. Il prend
l’exemple de l’électrification comme moyen de réduire les émissions de
gaz à effet de serre (c’est-à-dire à l’utilisation de technologies telles que
fourneaux électriques, véhicules électriques, ou pompes à chaleur en
remplacement de fourneaux au charbon, véhicules à essence, ou chauf-
fage au gaz). Il suggère que, du fait de l’inertie des systèmes techniques,
la contribution des technologies aux réductions d’émissions de gaz à
effet serre, à l’instar de leur cout, ne peut pas s’apprécier indépen-
damment d’une vision concernant le tempo de leur déploiement et le
système technique dans lesquelles elles s’inscrivent.11
De nombreux rapport d’experts et études académiques ont établi
que l’effet de l’électrification sur les émissions de gaz à effet de serre
dépend de la source d’énergie utilisée pour produire l’électricité. Par
exemple, les voitures électriques rechargées sur des centrales à char-
11Une analyse similaire à celle de ce chapitre, limitée au cas du véhicules électrique
en Europe, est également développée dans un article qui ne fait pas partie de ce
manuscrit (Vogt-Schilb et al., 2013).
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bon émettent plus de carbone que les voitures à essence traditionnelles
(Ademe 2009 ; Hawkins, Gausen, et Strømman 2012). Dans le débat pu-
blic, ces résultats sont trop souvent interprétés comme mettant sérieu-
sement en doute la pertinence de l’électrification comme moyen d’atté-
nuer le changement climatique (BBC 2012).
Le chapitre 3 explicite les mécanismes clés qui justifient qu’au sein
de la communauté de modélisation prospective, l’électrification est vue
comme l’un des piliers de la stabilisation du changement climatique
(Williams et al. 2012 ; Krey et al. 2014). Cette communauté utilise des
modèles (les « integrated assessment models ») qui sont parfois qualifiés
de boîte noires par des économistes plus à l’aise avec des petits modèles
analytiques, en raison de la richesse en détail technologique et de leur
complexité qui empêchent d’en décrire exhaustivement le fonctionne-
ment en quelques équations (et qui mènent ces modélisateurs à utiliser
des méthodes de résolution numériques assistées par ordinateur). Ce
chapitre met en avant un consensus au sein de la communauté de la
modélisation prospective : la stabilisation du réchauffement climatique
passe nécessairement par la production d’électricité décarbonée (à ho-
rizon 2050 à 2100, en fonction des pays, des hypothèses faites sur le
coût des moyens de production d’électricité bas carbone, et du seuil
d’augmentation de la température atmosphérique visé).
A la lumière de ce résultat, la question pertinente n’est plus de
savoir si il est désirable d’électrifier, mais plutôt quand le faire. Pour
répondre à cette question, les décideurs ont besoin de deux éléments.
Le premier est une estimation de la vitesse à laquelle l’électricité peut
être décarbonée, et le chapitre 3 fournit de telles estimations pour 4
économies majeures de la planète (Chine, Europe, Etats-Unis, Inde).
Le deuxième est une estimation du temps nécessaire pour opérer une
transition vers un système électrifié, par exemple pour remplacer le parc
de voiture à essence ou diesel par un parc de voitures hybrides rechar-
geables ou électriques – on pourrait dire une estimation de l’inertie de
chaque secteur de l’économie. L’enjeu d’une politique d’électrification
n’est pas de réduire les émissions de gaz à effet de serre dès sa mise en
œuvre, mais d’opérer une transition progressive vers une économie bas
carbone, dans laquelle l’électricité est propre et permet de satisfaire un
nombre étendu de besoins énergétiques.
Le quatrième chapitre de cette thèse, et les deux suivants, mettent
moins l’accent sur l’explication des principes théoriques justifiant une
nouvelle approche des liens entre prix du carbone, coût des options
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Figure 3 – Contenu carbone de l’électricité mondiale dans les scenarios de
l’IPCC. Gauche : pour atteindre une concentration de gaz à effet de serre
(grossièrement) compatible avec la cible des 2°C (Droite : 3°C). Chaque ligne
de couleur représente un modèle différent. Tous les modèle s’accordent pour
dire que la stabilisation du changement climatique passe par de l’électricité
bas carbone. L’utilisation de biomasse couplée à la séquestration et capture
du carbone permet de produire de l’électricité à contenu carbone négatif (le
chapitre 3 montre que cette technologie n’est pas nécessaire à la décarboni-
sation du secteur de l’électricité).
technologies, et ordonnancement temporel de leur mise en place, pour
revenir à une discussion plus centrée sur le débat public, et à la façon
dont on pourrait le faire évoluer. Une première étape, essentielle, se-
rait de communiquer aux décideurs et au public une caractérisation de
l’inertie des mesures de réduction des émissions de gaz à effet de serre.
Le quatrième chapitre s’intéresse en particulier au cas des courbes
de coût marginal (MACC), un outil populaire dans le débat politique,
et qui représente une liste de mesures de réductions d’émissions de gaz
à effet de serre (isolation des bâtiments, installation d’éoliennes, gestion
des déchets…), caractérisées par leur coût (donné en ordonnée) et leur
potentiel d’abattement (donné en abscisse), et triée par ordre de coût
croissant. Les MACC ressemblent à des courbes d’offre d’abattement,
et sont souvent interprétées comme telles. Selon cette interprétation,
les options de réductions d’émission de gaz à effet de serre doivent être
mise en œuvre par ordre de coût croissant, c’est-à-dire en commençant
par la moins chère (Taylor, 2012 ; Wächter, 2013).
Or, en plus du coût et du potentiel, une dimension importante de
chaque mesure est le temps nécessaire à sa mise en œuvre, limitée par
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des facteurs comme la durée de vie du capital, la disponibilité de tra-
vailleurs qualifiés et la quantité d’épargne mobilisable pour financer les
investissements bas carbone. Par exemple, la main d’œuvre qualifiée
disponible dans un pays peut limiter le nombre de bâtiments pouvant
être isolés chaque année.
Dans ce cadre,12 les stratégies optimales d’atténuation du change-
ment climatique doivent se faire en deux temps. D’abord, partir des
objectifs de long terme (par exemple réduire les émissions de 80% en
2050), et établir, en fonction de leur cout et potentiel, le panier optimal
de mesures qui doivent avoir été déployées en 2050 pour atteindre cet
objectif (énergie renouvelable, isolation des bâtiments, infrastructures
de transport, etc.).
Ensuite, en prenant en compte une estimation de la vitesse à laquelle
chacune de ses mesures peut être mise en œuvre, déterminer la date à
laquelle le déploiement de chacune d’entre elles doit commencer. En
particulier, les objectifs de court terme (comme réduire les émissions
de 20% à horizon 2020) doivent être atteints avec certaines des options
qui sont nécessaires pour accomplir les objectifs de plus long terme et
qui ont besoin de temps pour être déployées, et ce même si ces options
ne sont pas les moins coûteuse à court terme (par exemple, peut-être
grâce à 20% d’énergie renouvelable).
Réciproquement, on montre que, du fait de l’irréversibilité, décider
de stratégies de court terme sans prendre en compte les objectifs de
long terme mènerait à des stratégies sous-optimales. En caricaturant,
un décideur « découvrant » en 2021 que les réductions de 2020 ne
sont qu’une première étape vers plus de réductions en 2050 pourrait
s’apercevoir qu’il n’a pas le temps, entre 2021 et 2050, de mettre en
œuvre l’ensemble des mesures nécessaires pour atteindre l’objectif de
2050.
Ce chapitre permet donc d’expliquer simplement le résultat, bien
12Ce chapitre et le suivant abandonnent momentanément les couts d’ajustements
convexes pesant sur la vitesse à laquelle les investissements bas carbone sont mis en
œuvre, au profit d’un cout d’abattement donné et d’une vitesse de mise en œuvre
maximale. Ce cas de figure peut être vu comme un cas particulier des couts d’ajus-
tement – négligeables en dessous de la vitesse maximale, et prohibitifs au-dessus.
Surtout, il est peut-être plus conforme à l’information dont disposent les décideurs
publics. Il est peut-être plus aisé, et en tout cas plus courant, d’estimer le cout
d’une éolienne et le temps nécessaire à remplacer un parc de centrales électriques
que d’estimer une fonction de cout convexe, liant le cout de l’éolienne marginale à
la vitesse de déploiement instantanée des éoliennes.
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connu dans la communauté de la modélisation prospective, qu’une quan-
tité suffisante de réductions d’émissions de GES est nécessaires à court
terme pour atteindre des objectifs ambitieux à long terme (Luderer
et al. 2013 ; Riahi et al. 2015). Il le prolonge également, en montrant
que ces réductions de court terme doivent avoir lieu dans « les bons
secteurs », c’est-à-dire ceux soumis à l’inertie.
Ces résultats tendent donc à encourager l’utilisation d’objectifs et
de politiques sectorielles (comme la cible de 20% d’énergie renouvelable
en Europe en 2020) et de politiques affectant directement l’investisse-
ment (comme les normes d’efficacité énergétique sur les bâtiments ou
les véhicules). Leur rôle ici est de s’assurer, en l’absence de crédibilité
d’une trajectoire de prix du carbone s’étendant jusqu’à 2050 et au-delà,
que les objectifs agrégés de court terme (comme réduire l’ensemble des
émissions de 20% en 2020) soient atteints avec des réductions de qualité
suffisante, c’est-à-dire avec certaines des mesures requises à long terme,
par exemple pour atteindre un objectif de 80% de réductions en 2050.
Le cinquième chapitre quantifie et donne un aspect plus concret
aux résultats du chapitre 4. Il s’intéresse à une MAC curve développée
à la Banque Mondiale pour étudier le développement bas carbone du
Brésil sur la période 2010-2030 (de Gouvello 2010). Il montre que pour
une même quantité d’abattement en 2020, ignorer l’objectif de 2030
conduit à sous-investir dans des infrastructures de transport propre –
métro et train – c’est-à-dire dans des options chères mais inertes, et à
sur-investir dans des améliorations marginales d’efficacité énergétique
dans les raffineries, une option peu chère mais au potentiel limité (Fi-
gure 4).13 Là où la première ligne de métro ouvre la possibilité à une
deuxième ligne de métro, et à un système de transport cohérent avec
l’objectif de décarbonisation de l’économie à long terme, l’amélioration
des raffineries ne peut déboucher que sur un parc de raffineries margi-
nalement plus efficaces, mais tout de même émettrices de carbone. De
ce fait, 9 MtCO2 évitées grâce à une première ligne de métro peuvent
avoir plus de valeur que 11 MtCO2 évitées dans les raffineries.
Pour éviter que les MAC curves ne soient interprétées comme des
courbes d’offre d’abattement, le chapitre 5 propose qu’elles soient sys-
tématiquement flanquées d’une représentation graphique des scénarios
de pénétrations des différentes mesures, pour insister sur le caractère
dynamique des stratégies de sabilisation du climat, informant ainsi le
13L’absence de données ne nous permet pas d’étudier comment un objectif d plus
long terme, par exemple 2050, peut influencer l’action de court terme.
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Figure 4 – L’investissement à court terme dépend de l’objectif de long
terme. Les deux barres verticales atteignent la même quantité de réductions
d’émission de GES en 2020, mais en utilisant des mesures différentes. Lorsque
l’objectif de 2030 est pris en compte (à droite), l’abattement à 2020 repose
plus sur des options inertes, telles que les infrastructures de transport propre.
19
Figure 5 – Les trois dimensions essentielles des mesures d’abattement : le
profil de pénétration, le cout, et l’abattement finalement atteint. En retour-
nant la MAC curve (à droite) et en l’affichant face aux profils temporels
de pénétration (à gauche), on évite son interprétation comme une courbe
d’offre d’abattement. Par exemple, le secteur des transports est ici le plus
cher à décarbonner, mais la figure montre que l’action dans le secteur des
transports doit commencer tôt.
lecteur du temps nécessaire à la mise en œuvre des différentes mesures
(Figure 5).
Finalement, le sixième chapitre de cette thèse explore un autre as-
pect des instruments, qui, à l’instar des normes d’efficacité énergétique,
des systèmes de bonus-malus, ou des prêts financiers bonifiés, agissent
directement sur les décisions d’investissement. Il compare le prix du
carbone et des instruments agissant directement sur l’investissement,
dans un modèle de Ramsey avec deux types de capital : l’un polluant et
préexistant (centrales à charbon, voitures à essence), et l’autre, propre
(éoliennes, voitures électriques), dans lequel il faut investir pour stabi-
liser le climat. Il compare l’efficacité économique et l’impact distributif
du prix du carbone et des instruments alternatifs.
Il confirme qu’en l’absence d’autres imperfections de marché ou ob-
jectifs politiques, le prix du carbone permet de minimiser le coût actua-
lisé de la transition vers du capital propre. En effet, un prix du carbone
parfaitement crédible et anticipé par le marché agit sur tous les leviers
disponibles pour réduire les émissions : redirection de l’investissement,
mais aussi ajustement du taux d’utilisation du capital polluant, par
exemple en réduisant les distances parcourues en automobile, ou en
déclassant les centrales à charbon les plus polluantes. En économie, le
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principe d’équi-marginalité établit que tous les leviers permettant d’ar-
river à un même résultat doivent être utilisés avec la même intensité
pour atteindre ce résultat à un cout minimal.
Mais ce second levier fait justement peser un coût disproportionné
sur les propriétaires du capital polluant, et sur les travailleurs qui en
dépendent dans les filières les plus intensives en carbone. Les acteurs
de ces filières, qui se sont développées avant la mise en place d’un
prix du carbone, peuvent donc se constituer en opposants à la mise
en place de ce dernier, et peut-être empêcher toute réforme (Olson
1977 ; Trebilcock 2014). De plus, la sous-utilisation soudaine du capital
polluant fait peser une part significative de l’effort sur les générations
(et l’électorat) présents, pour le bénéfice des générations futures.
En revanche, des instruments comme les normes d’efficacité éner-
gétique sur les voitures neuves ou les bâtiments redirigent l’investis-
sement vers du capital propre (Figure 6), sans toucher directement au
capital polluant existant. Ces instruments sont donc moins efficaces, et
réduisent les émissions plus lentement ; mais ils lissent la distribution
de l’effort dans le temps, et ne réduisent pas la valeur du capital pol-
luant existant.14 Au contraire, en rendant la construction de nouveau
capital polluant plus difficile, mais ne changeant pas son cout d’utilisa-
tion, les instruments tels que les normes d’efficacité énergétique et autre
bonus/malus augmentent la valeur du capital polluant préexistant sur
le marché secondaire. De tels instruments peuvent donc éveiller moins
d’opposition politique.
On ne peut pas conclure de ce chapitre que les instruments agissant
directement sur les investissements sont en théorie plus justes ou plus
acceptables que le prix du carbone. Au contraire, la théorie économique
la plus élémentaire conclue qu’idéalement, les revenus de la taxe carbone
peuvent être redistribués à la faveur de ceux qui perdent le plus à sa
14On peut ici faire le parallèle avec les travaux de Chichilnisky et Heal (1994),
qui montrent qu’en l’absence de transferts entre différents acteurs d’une économie,
il n’est plus optimal d’égaliser le cout marginal d’abattement dans l’économie. Ici, il
n’y a pas de transfert aisément possible entre les agents qui décident dans quel type
de capital investir, et les propriétaires du capital polluant qui décident de son taux
d’utilisation, et cela peut conduire le gouvernement à ne pas leur imposer le même
cout marginal d’abattement. Signalons par ailleurs que d’autres études ont déjà
montré que les instruments alternatifs étalent leur cout sur une population plus large
que le prix du carbone (Giraudet et Quirion 2008 ; Fullerton et Heutel 2010), mais en
se limitant à un cadre statique. (Grimaud et Lafforgue, 2008) montrent également
que subventionner la recherche et le développement de technologies propres, sans
mettre en place de prix du carbone, permet d’épargner les générations présentes.
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Figure 6 – Comparaison d’un prix du carbone et de mesures régulant uni-
quement l’investissement. Le prix du carbone permet de réduire les émissions
plus rapidement (droite), mais il mène à une chute de consommation pour
les générations (et l’électorat) présent (gauche). La régulation des investis-
sements évite ce travers, au prix d’un cout plus élevé pour les générations
futures.
mise en œuvre, afin de préserver une distribution des richesses souhaitée
tout en incitant chacun à réduire les émissions grâce à tous les leviers
disponibles. Mais en pratique, il peut être malaisé d’identifier chaque
perdant à la mise en place d’une taxe carbone, et de le dédommager à
hauteur de ses pertes. Les résultats de ce chapitre contribuent peut-être
à expliquer pourquoi les instruments qui, comme les normes d’efficacité
énergétique, redirigent l’investissement sans imposer de prix du carbone
explicite, semblent avoir la préférence des décideurs publics.
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1
Optimal timing, cost and sectoral
distribution of abatement
investment
Many governments aim to stabilize climate change to mitigate sub-sequent damages (e.g., G7, 2015; UNFCCC, 2011). This will
require transitioning from an economy based on polluting capital, such
as inefficient buildings and polluting cars, to clean capital, such as
retrofitted buildings or electric vehicles. A critical question for public
policy is to determine the optimal cost and timing of such abatement
investment. Is action as urgent as frequently advocated? In addition,
there are many options to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions,
from renewable power plants to improved building insulation and more
efficient cars; a second important issue is the optimal allocation of
abatement. Should mitigation start with the least expensive options
and progressively clean the economy by ascending cost order?
To shed light on these questions, we study the optimal timing, cost,
and sectoral allocation of abatement investment. We capture the tran-
sition to clean capital using a simple abatement investment model with
three basic features. First, emissions reduction requires investments
that have long-lasting effects on emissions. For instance, once a coal
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power plant is retrofitted with carbon capture and storage, emissions
from that power plant are lowered for years to decades. Second, we
assume convex investment costs. This convexity, sometimes referred
to as adjustment costs in the theory of investment (Lucas, 1967; Gould,
1968), captures increasing opportunity costs to use scarce resources
(skilled workers and appropriate capital) to perform abatement invest-
ment. For instance, retrofitting all buildings in a country in three
months would be much more expensive than doing it over three decades.
Third, we take into account limited abatement potential in each sector
of the economy. Once all the buildings are retrofitted, no more GHG
can be saved in the building sector; and once every coal power plant is
replaced with renewable power or retrofitted with carbon capture and
storage, the abatement potential of the power sector is depleted.
Our analysis brings three main findings. First, while the opti-
mal carbon price increases over time (a familiar result), the optimal
abatement investment profile is bell-shaped or even strictly decreas-
ing; in particular, a growing carbon price is compatible with ambitious
short term investment. Second, optimal marginal abatement invest-
ment costs, expressed in dollars invested per discounted abated ton of
carbon (a metric called the levelized cost of conserved carbon, or some-
times simply the marginal abatement cost), can be higher than the
carbon price. Third, optimal marginal abatement investment costs,
still in dollars invested per discounted abated ton, should be higher
in sectors where abatement capital is more expensive and sectors with
higher abatement potential. By and large, optimal climate change mit-
igation can start with ambition action focused on the options with
higher abatement potential or higher abatement cost, even if the opti-
mal carbon price starts low and grows progressively over time.
The reason is that abatement investment has two effects. First,
it reduces emissions, and the optimal valuation of abatement invest-
ment involves comparing future abatement (discounted at the usual
discount rate) and the price of carbon (which increases at the same
discount rate). And second, abatement investment increases the fu-
ture stock of abatement capital. Therefore, the value of abatement
investment today also depends on the value of abatement capital to-
morrow. When the value of abatement capital grows over time, both
optimal marginal abatement investment costs and optimal abatement
investment are higher than suggested when looking only at the cur-
rent carbon price. This second effect is stronger in sectors with higher
abatement needs, that is in sectors where abatement capital is more
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expensive and sectors with higher abatement potential. On the other
hand, when the value of abatement capital decreases over time, abate-
ment investment is worth less than the value of avoided emissions. This
happens at the end the transition, when the abatement potential will
soon be depleted.
These results suggest that under a well-functioning forward-looking
market, a perfectly credible carbon price would trigger more invest-
ment in the sectors of the economy with higher abatement potential,
and, maybe more surprisingly, where abatement is the most expensive.
In practice, while carbon prices are gaining momentum, no existing car-
bon price is scheduled to grow automatically over time (World Bank,
2014).1 In addition, many existing climate policies, such as feed-in-
tariffs, renewable portfolio mandates, feebates, and performance stan-
dards, are implemented at the sector scale (IEA, 2015). In this setting,
our results suggest that second-best sector-specific policies depend on
both the abatement potential and the cost of abatement investment
in each sector, in addition to the social cost of carbon. If the future
value of abatement capital is disregarded, second-best sector-scale poli-
cies may thus appear to impose too much costs in the short term, and
would appear to set a higher shadow cost of carbon in sectors where
abatement is more expensive.
This paper relates to several branches of the literature. First, and
motivating to this paper, our findings contrast with those from the lit-
erature on the optimal timing of GHG emission reductions. Since the
seminal contributions by Nordhaus (1991, 1992), which have established
the DICE model as a reference framework for studying this question
(Dietz et Stern, 2014), studies have found that abatement effort should
start low and grow over time. The reason is that in DICE, abatement
can be chosen at each point in time on an abatement cost curve, inde-
pendently of previous abatement (see Nordhaus et Sztorc, 2013 and G).
In a model based on abatement cost curves, the optimal carbon price,
the quantity of abatement and the abatement cost increase together
over time. In particular, contemporaneous mitigation action, relevant
for today’s decision makers, is desirable only if today’s carbon price
1For instance, the British Columbia carbon tax was phased-in, increasing from
10 to 30 C $/tCO2 between 2008 and 2012, but is currently not scheduled to increase
any more (Ministry of Finance, 2015). Also, the European carbon market sets a
cap over a few years (the current phase runs until 2020), but optimal abatement
investment in long-lived capital such as power plants would require allowances to
be credibly announced several decades in advance.
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is high enough. Advocates of early voluntarism in climate mitigation,
such as Stern (2006), have thus proposed modifications in DICE that
would result in higher carbon prices, hence higher abatement in the
short term (Dietz et Stern, 2014; Espagne et al., 2012).
Many papers expand the DICE framework to investigate the impact
of particular aspects of the climate-economy system on the optimal
timing of climate mitigation. Examples include Kolstad (1996) and
Keller et al. (2004) on learning that reduces climate uncertainty over
time; Bruin et al. (2009) and Bosello et al. (2010) on how considering
adaptation to climate change impacts may affect optimal mitigation;
Hwang et al. (2013) and Lemoine et Traeger (2014) on the impact of
fat-tailed risks and the role of tipping points; and Heal et Millner (2014)
on the choice of the appropriate discount rate for climate policy. Dietz
et Stern (2014) propose many modifications to DICE, including to use
a lower discount rate, and higher estimates for climate-change-related
damages. In all these papers, the question of the optimal timing of
emission reduction and the optimal timing of mitigation expenses boil
down to the question of the optimal carbon price.2
Compared to a model based on abatement cost curves, abatement
investment allows disentangling the optimal carbon price, the optimal
cost of emission reductions, and the optimal timing of emission re-
ductions. We illustrate this difference with a numerical comparison of
an abatement-cost-curve model and an abatement-investment model.
We calibrate both models with the same sectoral costs and potentials
from IPCC data, and an economy-wide carbon budget compatible with
the 2◦C target. While the two models virtually agree on the optimal
carbon price, they lead to radically different emission reductions and
abatement effort in the short term. The abatement-cost-curve model
recommends spending 100 billion dollars on mitigation the first year
and, somewhat unrealistically, to reduce as much as 12 GtCO2 that
same year (about forty percent of global emissions). In contrast, the
abatement-investment model recommends spending three times more,
that is 300 billion dollars, while reducing less than 1 GtCO2 the first
year. Only the abatement-investment framework captures the fact that
emission reductions cannot happen overnight, but still require substan-
tial short-term investment. The abatement investment framework can
thus reconcile the idea that climate change, caused by a stock pollution,
2Similarly, a literature on the optimal distribution of effort across sectors focuses
on pinning down sector-specific market or government failures that would justify
different carbon prices in different sectors (e.g., Hoel, 1996; Rosendahl, 2004a).
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imposes a growing shadow price of carbon; and the need for immedi-
ate and significant abatement investment stressed by the international
community (NCE, 2014; IPCC, 2014b).
Moreover, in the abatement-cost-curve framework, optimal mitiga-
tion expenses grow over time until all emissions are abated (and re-
main constant after that). In contrast, in the abatement-investment
framework, climate stabilization requires to fund a temporal transition
to clean capital. Optimal abatement investment is bell-shaped or de-
creasing over time, and, in the long term, investment is only required
to maintain abatement capital at its maximum potential.
Finally, the sectoral allocation of abatement effort is also different in
the abatement-cost-curve framework and in the abatement-investment
framework. With abatement cost curves, the carbon price provides
direct guidance on where and when to spend on emission reductions; in
each sector, the best option is always to start with the cheapest option.
This is because abatement-cost-curve models implicitly assume that
emissions can be adjusted instantaneously to the carbon price. With
abatement investment, optimal decisions depend on what happens in
the future, and the same carbon price translates to different levelized
cost of conserved carbon in different sectors. For instance, we find
that an abatement option at 25 $/tCO2 in the industrial sector may
be preferable to a 15 $/tCO2 option in the building sector, because
the industrial sector is both more expensive to decarbonize and has a
greater abatement potential.3
Second, our paper also relates to the literature that studies op-
timal emission reductions when knowledge accumulation can reduce
abatement costs. It is well established that the double market failure
of GHG emissions and learning spillovers in the development of new
technologies means that the optimal climate mitigation strategy starts
with some investment in research and development (e.g., Wigley et al.,
1996; Kverndokk et Rosendahl, 2007; Acemoglu et al., 2012). In partic-
ular, the effect of learning by doing has been studied in models based
on abatement cost curves, including by extending DICE (Goulder et
Mathai, 2000; Popp, 2004). On the distribution of effort across options,
Rosendahl (2004a), Bramoullé et Olson (2005), and del Rio Gonzalez
(2008) find that more short-term effort should go to options that will
3As explained below, these numbers should not be directly interpreted as policy
recommendations, because simulations adopt a short time horizon and are based on
limited data.
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experience more learning-by-doing. But they investigate options com-
peting within a single sector (such as photovoltaic versus wind power).
Here, we investigate abatement investment across different sectors of
the economy (such as buildings versus transportation), and we focus
on capital instead of knowledge accumulation. Our analysis provides a
somewhat different rationale for early mitigation action, and of a dif-
ferent nature: early investment in physical capital that will take time
to deploy, especially in sectors with large baseline emissions or large
abatement costs.4
Last but not least, our contribution is also not the first to consider
abatement capital. In their seminal papers, Jacoby et Wing (1999) and
van der Zwaan et al. (2002) propose numerical models that emphasize
capital turnover and adjustment costs. Both focus on implications for
the optimal carbon price profile, showing that the higher adjustment
costs are, the highest the carbon price needs to be to reach the same
environmental target. Fischer et al. (2004) investigate the trade-offs
between energy production from clean capacity and dirty energy, and
damages from pollution in a single-sector analytical model; and they
also focus on optimal pathways for the carbon price. Williams (2010),
Slechten (2013) and Rozenberg et al. (2014) model abatement capital
accumulation, also in a single-sector economy, but they focus on pol-
icy design or political economy concerns. Finally, Lecocq et al. (1998),
Jaccard et Rivers (2007) and Vogt-Schilb et al. (2014a) have also found
that large short-term effort is needed in sectors with high abatement
potential and large inertia, but they entirely rely on numerical resolu-
tion.
4Capital and knowledge accumulation, if similar, differ slightly in theory and
greatly in practice. For instance, knowledge accumulation can continue to reduce
costs once emissions are entirely abated, but it does not make sense to accumu-
late more abatement capital than what suffice to reduce emissions down to zero.
Spillovers is a prominent feature of most knowledge accumulation related to climate
mitigation, while private ownership is a feature of most power plants, vehicles and
buildings, clean or dirty. In addition, a key component of capital is its turnover
rate, which is not necessarily linked to the obsolescence of the knowledge used to
built it (as illustrated by old bridges and buildings in use in Europe). In practice,
a given sector, such as maybe public transportation, can be subject to negligible
learning dynamics, while still requiring early action for the reasons exposed in this
paper. Finally, the operational policy operations also differ: putting researchers to
work on better turbines, as recommended by Acemoglu et al. (2012), and building
and deploying wind turbines, as suggested by this paper, are not the same thing.
As discussed in the conclusion, it remains an avenue for further research to account
for the two phenomena in a single model.
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To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to disentangle
the optimal carbon price, the optimal timing of emission reduction, and
the optimal abatement investment pathways in a multi-sector analyt-
ical model. Other contributions have focused on the optimal carbon
price, generally found to grow over time, and optimal abatement capi-
tal stocks, also found to grow smoothly over time. Our focus is on the
explicit modeling and discussion of the optimal allocation and measure-
ment of abatement investment across sectors and over time. A novel
finding is that a growing carbon price translates into optimal abatement
investment concentrated in the short term, and focused on the sectors
where abatement capital is most expensive or the abatement potential
is larger. Another is that the levelized cost of conserved carbon should
not be equal to the carbon price. Both are relevant for public policy.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 presents the basic abate-
ment investment model. Section 2 derives analytical results concerning
the optimal timing of abatement investment. Section 3 examines the
optimal cost of emission reductions. Section 4 investigates the optimal
allocation of abatement investment. Section 5 compares abatement in-
vestment and abatement cost curves with numerical illustrations cali-
brated with IPCC data. Section 6 concludes.
1 Model
A social planner needs to constrain cumulative GHG emissions be-
low a given ceiling, or carbon budget B. The carbon budget B can be
interpreted as the allowable emissions to stabilize global warming to
a given temperature target (Matthews et Caldeira, 2008; Meinshausen
et al., 2009a), or as a tipping point beyond which the environment is
catastrophically damaged. This keeps the model as simple as possible,
and allows us to focus on the dynamics of emission reductions costs,
keeping the dynamics of climate change and climate damages out —
that is abstracting from the benefits of emission reductions.5
5The ideal approach to determine the price of carbon is to perform a cost-
benefit analysis. Due to the various scientific uncertainties surrounding climate
change and resulting damages, assessing the benefits from climate mitigation is not
straightforward (Manne et Richels, 1992; Ambrosi et al., 2003; Stern, 2013; Pindyck,
2013), and it is common to use targets expressed in global warming (such as the
2◦C target from the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change), or,
similarly, cumulative emissions (Allen et al., 2009; Matthews et al., 2009b; Zickfeld
et al., 2009). B shows that the results exposed in this paper hold under cost-benefit
analysis.
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We denote mt the cumulative atmospheric emissions at date t. The
emission dynamics and carbon budget read (dotted variables represent
temporal derivatives):
m0 given
m˙t = eref − at
mt ≤ B
(1.1)
Where eref represents baseline emissions (assumed constant for sim-
plicity), and at represents abatement at time t.
To reduce emissions, the social planner must invest in abatement
capital, which has a long-lived effect on emissions. Borrowing the word-
ing by Davis et Socolow (2014), investment in electric vehicles or build-
ing retrofitting is a hard commitment to emit less GHG during a few
years to decades. For simplicity, abatement capital is directly measured
in terms of avoided emissions, and baseline emissions are assumed con-
stant. We also assume the stock of abatement capital starts at zero
(without loss of generality). None of these three simplifying assump-
tions are essential to derive our results, but they considerably ease
exposition, allowing us to focus on relevant insights instead of technical
details.
At each time step t, the social planner chooses a positive amount of
physical investment xt in abatement capital at, which otherwise depre-
ciates at rate δ:
at0 = 0 (1.2)
a˙t = xt − δat (1.3)
Abatement investment costs c(xt), where the function c is positive,
increasing, differentiable and convex:
∀xt, c′′(xt) ≥ 0
c′(xt) ≥ 0
c(xt) ≥ 0
(1.4)
c′(xt) is referred to as the marginal abatement investment cost. The
convexity of the abatement investment cost c, sometimes referred to
as adjustment costs(Lucas, 1967; Gould, 1968), captures increasing op-
portunity costs to use scarce resources (skilled workers and appropriate
capital) to build and deploy abatement capital. As noted by Mussa
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(1977), c′(xt) can simply be seen as the marginal cost curve for the in-
dustry that supplies abatement investment — e.g., clean vehicle man-
ufacturers or insulation contractors.
For instance, xt is the pace — measured in buildings per year —
at which old buildings are being retrofitted at date t (the abatement
at would then be proportional to the share of retrofitted buildings in
the stock). Retrofitting buildings at a given pace requires to pay a
given number of scarce skilled workers. If workers are hired in the
merit order and paid at the marginal productivity, the marginal price
of retrofitting buildings c′(xt) is an increasing function of the pace xt.
The cost c(xt)may also be interpreted as the net present cost of building
and operating low-carbon capital (e.g., an electric vehicle) instead of,
or in replacement for, polluting capital.
The social planner chooses when to perform abatement investment
in order to meet a carbon budget at the lowest inter-temporal cost,
under the constraint set by the maximum abatement potential eref :
min
xt
∫ ∞
0
e−rtc(xt) dt (1.5)
subject to mt ≤ B (φt)
m˙t = eref − at (µt)
a˙t = xt − δat (νt)
at ≤ eref (λt)
Importantly, the social planner does not control directly abatement at,
but abatement investment xt, linked to the temporal derivative of at.
For instance, he controls and pays for a number of buildings to retrofit
each year, which indirectly translates to a total share of retrofitted
buildings in the stock, which in turn translates to reduced GHG emis-
sions. The Greek letters in parentheses are the co-state variables and
Lagrangian multipliers (chosen in current value and such that they are
positive): νt is the shadow value of abatement capital, µt is the shadow
cost of carbon emissions, and λt is the shadow cost of the maximum
abatement potential eref , that quantifies the scarcity of investment op-
portunities.
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2 Optimal timing of abatement investment
We start the resolution of problem 1.5 from the steady state. The
cumulative emission ceilingB is reached at an endogenous date T . After
T , emissions net of abatement are null, meaning that the abatement
potential eref is reached, and abatement investment only compensates
for depreciation (A):
∀t ≥ T, mt = B
=⇒ at = eref
=⇒ xt = δeref
(1.6)
Before T , the optimal shadow price of carbon µt increases at the
discount rate r (A demonstrates this familiar result):
∀t < T, µt = µert (1.7)
The exponentially-increasing carbon price ensures that the present value
of the carbon price is constant along the optimal path until full decar-
bonization, such that the social planner is indifferent between one unit
of abatement at any two dates. (In the following, we frequently omit
the term “shadow” when referring to co-state variables and Lagrangian
multipliers. We also freely switch between the social planner’s per-
spective and the equivalent point of view of private agents facing the
optimal carbon price.) The initial carbon price, µ, is chosen at the
lowest value such that the carbon budget is met.
Before T, emissions are strictly positive, abatement capital is lower
than its potential at < eref , and optimal investment dynamics are de-
scribed by the first order condition (A) :
∀t < T, (r + δ) c′(xt)− dc
′(xt)
dt
= µert (1.8)
We call the left hand side of (1.8) the marginal implicit rental cost of
capital, adapting to the case of endogenous capacity prices the concept
of implicit rental cost of capital first proposed by Jorgenson (1967). It is
the rental price that ensures agents would be indifferent between buying
abatement capital at c′(xt) or renting it at the rental price.6 Equation
6The expression of the rental price translates that there is no profitable tradeoff
between the two following strategies: (i) buy capital at t at a cost ci′(xi,t), rent it
out during one period dt at the rental price, then sell the depreciated (δ) capacities
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Figure 1.1 – The carbon price and the two possible optimal abatement in-
vestment pathways. While the carbon price grows exponentially over time,
the optimal abatement investment cost (r + δ)c′(xt), and thus optimal in-
vestment xt, may either draw a bell shape or decrease over time.
(1.8) thus simply means that if there was a well-functioning market for
abatement capital, the rental cost of abatement capital would be equal
to the carbon price.
For instance, consider a taxi company that meets a fixed demand
for travel, rents the vehicles it uses, and pays a carbon tax on the
carbon it emits. Consider the taxi company faces two similar vehicles
available for rent, differing only in their carbon emissions and rental
price. Equation 1.8 suggests the company will chose the cleaner vehicle
for a given year if and only if the difference in rental costs (in dollars
per vehicle per year) is lower or equal to avoided emissions (in tons of
carbon per year per vehicle) valued at the carbon price that year (in
dollars per ton).
The exponentially-increasing carbon price then influences indirectly
abatement investment. In particular it does not translate into increas-
ing abatement investment:
Proposition 1. Along the optimal trajectory, investment is either bell-
shaped or decreasing over time, and so is the optimal marginal invest-
ment cost.
Proof. See A for a formal proof. As a sketch, equation 1.8 may be
at t + dt at a price c′i(xi,t) + ddtc′i(xi,t)dt or (ii) simply lend money at the interest
rate r (Jorgenson, 1967). D proposes an alternative explanation of the marginal
implicit rental cost of abatement capital.
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Figure 1.2 – Optimal timing of abatement investment and resulting abate-
ment pathway. Left: Abatement investment is bell-shaped. Right: Abate-
ment continuously grows over time.
re-arranged as:
∀t < T, dc
′(xt)
dt
= (r + δ) c′(xt)− µert (1.9)
Fig. 1.1 plots the carbon price µert and two possible cases of (r + δ) c′
against time t. In the upper region, (r + δ) c′ > µert, implying that
dc′(xt)/dt > 0. In the lower region, (r + δ) c′ < µert, implying that
dc′(xt)/dt < 0.
The strictly decreasing profile happens for stringent climate targets,
that is for high carbon prices compared to abatement investment costs
µ≫ (r+ δ) c′ (δeref ) (see Fig. 1.1). The bell shaped profile happens for
low carbon prices or high investment costs µ≪ (r + δ) c′ (δeref ).7
Prop. 1 means that the combination of two simple assumptions —
adjustment costs and finite abatement potential — in a model with a
single externality — climate change in the absence of learning spillovers
— is sufficient to reconcile the views that the optimal policy is a growing
carbon price and that early investment is needed to stabilize climate
change.8 Fig. 1.2 illustrates how such bell-shaped abatement invest-
7The threshold value corresponds to the case where µ = (r + δ)c′(x0). Such
condition is not easily linked analytically to the parameters of the model because
x0 is endogenous.
8Simple calculations show that each feature separately does not provide similar
results; only the combination of both adjustment costs and a maximum abate-
ment potential leads to a transition with bell-shaped investment. If one assumes
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ment translates into an increasing abatement pathway — A formally
demonstrates that at increases steadily to eref .
There is some empirical evidence that optimal investment in long-
lived capital can actually be bell-shaped. For instance, Lecocq et Shal-
izi (2014) report bell-shaped investment pathways in the case of the
transition to nuclear power in France and the building of the national
interstate highways in the United States.
3 Optimal cost of abatement investment
3.1 Optimal marginal abatement investment costs
When emission reduction requires abatement investment and is lim-
ited with a maximum abatement potential, the carbon price is only one
of two parts of the information required to value abatement investment:
Proposition 2. Before full decarbonization, the optimal marginal cost
of abatement investment c′(xt) equals the sum of two terms: (1) the
value of avoided emissions before the maximum abatement potential is
reached; and (2) the cost of maintaining the investment over the long-
term, after emissions have reached zero.
Proof. The solution of the differential equation (1.8) is (A):
∀t < T, c′(xt) =
∫ T
t
µerθe−(δ+r)(θ−t) dθ + e−(δ+r)(T−t) c′ (δeref )
(1.10)
In equation 1.10, output from the marginal unit of abatement capital
e−(δ+r)(θ−t) is valued at the carbon price µerθ before T , and the c′ (δeref )
is the value of the abatement capital built at t that remains at T .
that investment costs are not strictly convex, that is ∀x, c′(x) = C, then the op-
timal schedule is to cap all emissions in a bang bang fashion at the date t when
µert = (r+ δ)C. A model without abatement potential makes no sense. Without a
maximum abatement potential, an exponential carbon price would result in expo-
nentially growing investment, the total stock of abatement capital would also grow
exponentially towards infinity, and emissions will thus decrease towards negative
infinity.
: the exponential carbon price would yield exponentially-increasing investment,
exponentially-increasing abatement, and
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Proposition 2 means that optimal investment in abatement capac-
ity cannot be decided based only on the current carbon price, investors
have to anticipate a full decarbonization strategy. Take the example of
a firm that builds cleaner personal vehicles with the intend of renting
them to a taxi company facing a carbon price. When deciding how
many vehicles to build at a given date, and at what cost, the manufac-
turer cannot rely only on the current carbon price — in particular, the
optimal cost of a clean vehicle is not equal to the value of future avoided
emissions. The car manufacturer has to anticipate its full investment
pathway, including the date T when all taxi vehicles will have been
replaced by cleaner vehicles, and the cost of replacing these cleaner
vehicles after T .
The marginal abatement investment cost c′(xt) represents the op-
timal cost of physical capital used to reduce emissions. For instance,
it could be expressed in dollars per building retrofitted, or dollars per
vehicle replaced with an electric vehicle. When seeing this equipment
as abatement capital, one unit of capital, e.g. an electric vehicle, trans-
lates into a flux of emission reductions, e.g. 1 tCO2/yr. As a result,
c′(xt) is to be expressed in dollars per ton of avoided carbon per year
($/(tCO2/yr)). Because the marginal investment cost c′(xt) leaves the
lifetime of abatement capital implicit, it does not inform directly on the
amount of GHG saved thanks to a marginal investment xtdt. An al-
ternative metric to measure abatement investment is the levelized cost
of avoided carbon emissions, which compares investment costs to dis-
counted committed emission reductions, as discussed in the following
subsection.
3.2 An operational metric? The levelized cost of conserved
carbon
A natural metric to measure and compare the cost of abatement
investments in different options (e.g electric vehicles versus retrofitting
buildings) is the ratio of the cost of using a given option (e.g in dollars)
to the discounted sum of GHG emissions avoided thanks to that option
(e.g in tCO2). This ratio is widely used to compare abatement options,
for instance to build marginal abatement cost curves, and is then sim-
ply called “marginal abatement cost” (McKinsey, 2009; Vogt-Schilb et
Hallegatte, 2014). The IPCC (2014a) calls this ratio the Levelized Cost
of Conserved Carbon (LCCC).
Definition 1. We call Levelized Cost of Conserved Carbon (LCCC) the
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ratio of marginal investment to the corresponding discounted abatement.
The LCCC ℓt expresses in dollars per ton. It reads ℓt = (r + δ) c′(xt)
(C).
Practitioners often use the LCCC when comparing and assessing
abatement investments (IPCC, 2014a), for instance replacing conven-
tional cars with electric vehicles (EV). Assume the additional cost of
an EV built at time t, compared to the cost of a conventional car, is
7 000 $/EV. If cars are driven 13 000 km per year and electric cars emit
110 gCO2/km less than a comparable internal combustion engine vehi-
cle, each EV allows to save 1.43 tCO2/yr. The abatement investment
cost in this case would be 4 900 $/(tCO2/yr). If electric cars depre-
ciate at a constant rate such that their average lifetime is 10 years
(1/δ = 10 yr) and the discount rate is 5%/yr , then r + δ = 15%/yr
and the LCCC is 730 $/tCO2.9
LCCCs are homogeneous to a carbon price, and, unlike the marginal
rental cost of abatement capital, they fully characterize an investment
pathway.10 They are a straightforward measure of abatement invest-
ment, as they relate how much the social planner invests in the marginal
unit of abatement capital to the emission reduction resulting from this
marginal investment. It may thus be counter-intuitive that LCCCs
should not be equal to the carbon price. As stated before, the reason is
that the value of abatement investment comes from both reduced emis-
sions and the value of abatement capital in the future — D shows how
an investment strategy aiming at reducing emissions without chang-
ing the future stock of abatement capital would simply equalize the
marginal implicit rental cost of capital to the carbon price, as in (1.8).
Indeed, another way of reading (1.8) is:
ℓt = (r + δ) c
′(xt) = µert +
dc′(xt)
dt
(1.11)
Equation (1.11) shows that the optimal value of abatement capital, ex-
9The investment cost was computed as 7 000 $/(1.43 tCO2/yr) =
4 895 $/(tCO2/yr); and the levelized cost as 0.15 yr−1 · 4 895 $/(tCO2/yr)=
734 $/tCO2.
10Investment xt can be calculated from the LCCC ℓt as xt = c′−1
(
ℓt
r+δ
)
. This
contrasts with the rental cost of abatement capital, which defines a differential
equation that has to be completed with a boundary condition to define a single
investment pathway (1.29).
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pressed using the levelized cost of capital ℓt, equals the carbon price
µert plus the current variation of the value of abatement capital dc′(xt)
dt
.
When the value of abatement capital is increasing over time
(
dc′(xt)
dt
> 0
)
,
the optimal LCCC is higher than the carbon price. This happens, if
ever, at the beginning of the transition (Fig. 1.1). When the value of
abatement capital decreases over time, the optimal LCCC is lower than
the carbon price. This happen in the second phase of transition, when
the abatement potential is close to be depleted (Fig. 1.1). In the follow-
ing we analyze how in a multi-sector economy, the temporal evlution
of the value of abatement capital differs across sectors, and thus the
optimal LCCC differs across sectors.
4 Optimal sectoral allocation of abatement invest-
ment
In this section, we extend the model of abatement capital accumu-
lation to investigate optimal allocation of abatement investment across
sectors. The economy is partitioned in a set of sectors indexed by i. For
simplicity, we assume that abatement in each sector does not interact
with the others.11 Each sector is described by an abatement potential
a¯i (such that
∑
i a¯i = eref ), a depreciation rate δi, and a cost function
ci. The social planner’s program becomes:
min
xi,t
∫ ∞
0
e−rt
∑
i
(ci(xi,t)) dt (1.12)
subject to a˙i,t = xi,t − δi ai,t (νi,t)
ai,t ≤ a¯i (λi,t)
m˙t =
∑
i
(a¯i − ai,t) (µt)
mt ≤ B (φt)
The value of abatement capital νi,t and the cost of the sectoral poten-
tials λi,t now depend on the sector i, while there is still a single carbon
price µt for the whole economy.
11This is not entirely realistic, for instance abatement realized in the power sector
may actually increase the potential and reduce the cost to implement abatement in
other sectors thanks to electrification (Williams et al., 2012; Audoly et al., 2014).
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Similarly to the case with a single sector, the implicit rental cost in
each sector is equal to the single current carbon price (see E).
∀i, ∀t < Ti, (r + δi) ci′(xi,t)− dci
′(xi,t)
dt
= µert (1.13)
But the single implicit rental cost translates into different investment
costs across sectors:
Proposition 3. Each sector i reaches its abatement potential at a
different date Ti, and the optimal marginal investment cost is different
in each sector:
∀i, ∀t < Ti,
ci
′(xi,t) =
∫ Ti
t
µerθe−(δi+r)(θ−t) dθ ++e−(δ+r)(Ti−t) c′i (δia¯i) (1.14)
Proof. Equation 1.14 is the generalization of equation 1.10 to the case
of several sectors (E).
In Fig. 1.1, the two pathways may now be seen as corresponding
to two different sectors facing the same carbon price. In the following,
we derive some conditions under which a sector should receive more
investment than others.
Corollary 1. Along the optimal path, investment costs are higher (i)
in sectors with larger abatement potential:(
δi = δj, a¯i > a¯j and ∀y, c′i(y) = c′j(y)
)
=⇒ ∀t, ci′(xi,t) > cj ′(xj,t)
and (ii) in sectors where abatement capital is more expensive:(
δi = δj, a¯i = a¯j and ∀y, c′i(y) > c′j(y)
)
=⇒ ∀t, ci′(xi,t) > cj ′(xj,t)
Proof. E.a
The intuition behind Coroll. 1 is the following. The value of abate-
ment investment comes from avoided emissions and from the future
value of abatment capital. The future value of abatement capital is
greater in sectors where future investment needs are greater. These
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are the sectors with larger abatement potential (as more abatement
investment is then required to exploit this potential); and — maybe
more surprisingly — sectors where abatement capital is more expen-
sive, as these sectors also need to invest more money to fully exploit
their abatement potential.
Interestingly, the ranking established by Coroll. 1 holds when mea-
suring marginal investment costs with the levelized cost of conserved
carbon:
Corollary 2. Everything else being equal, optimal levelized costs of
conserved carbon (LCCC) is higher in sectors with larger abatement
potential a¯i or greater marginal abatement investment costs c′i.
Proof. This corollary is a direct consequence of Coroll. 1.
This corollary provides counter-intuitive policy guidance, as it sug-
gests that more investments should be done in the sectors with higher
abatement investment costs. The rationale should however be clear: in
a sector with higher abatement potential or more expensive abatement
capital, the value of abatement capital is higher in the long run, and
thus, it is more profitable to build abatement capital in the short term.
This result is relevant when designing an abatement strategy. For
instance, when abatement options are presented in a marginal abate-
ment cost curves à la McKinsey (2009), it may be desirable to imple-
ment some of the “expensive” measures on the right-hand side of the
curve, even if their LCCC is higher than the carbon price, and higher
than the LCCC of alternative abatement options. Coroll. 2 does not
mean that different sectors should face different carbon prices; F shows
that, in the absence of any other market failure, a single carbon price
can decentralize the social optimum. If a government is able to impose
the optimal carbon price pathway in a perfectly credible fashion to a
well-functioning forward-looking economy, the market will thus perform
the socially-optimal amount of abatement investment. If governments
are using non-optimal policy instruments (such as sector-scale perfor-
mance standards), however, or cannot commit to perfectly credible car-
bon price signals, Coroll. 2 suggests that second-best policy instrument
need to be designed accounting for different total abatement potentials
and different costs of abatement investment in different sectors (not
just the social cost of carbon).
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5 Abatement investment vs. abatement cost curves
In this section, we compare the model of abatement investment to a
model based on abatement cost curves. As stated in the introduction,
models of abatement cost curves are popular in the literature on the
optimal timing of mitigation. G provides a very simple model based on
abatement cost curves and its analytical resolution. It shows that un-
der abatement cost curves, the optimal strategy of equalizing marginal
abatement costs across sectors to the unique, exponentially-increasing
carbon price simply leads to increasing abatement similarly in all sec-
tors.
We investigate with both models the optimal cost and timing of
emission reduction, at sector scale, over the 2007-2030 period. We set
a policy objective over this period only,12 and use abatement cost in-
formation derived from IPCC (2007, Fig. SPM 6). Because of data
limitations and of the short time horizon,13 this exercise is not sup-
posed to suggest an optimal climate policy. It aims at illustrating the
impact of two contrasting approaches to model emission reductions on
the optimal abatement strategy: abatement cost curves or abatement
investment.
5.1 Specification and calibration
We calibrate the model of abatement cost curve presented in G with
seven sectors of the economy: energy, industry, buildings, transport,
forestry, agriculture and waste. We assume quadratic abatement costs,
which grants that the abatement cost curves γi are convex, and simpli-
fies the resolution as marginal abatement costs are linear:
∀i, ∀ai,t ∈ [0, a¯i] γi(ai,t) = 1
2
γmi a
2
i,t
γi
′(ai,t) = γmi a (1.15)
where γmi are parameters specific to each sector. We calibrate these
using emission reductions corresponding to a 20 $/tCO2 marginal cost
in figure SPM.6 in IPCC (2007). We calibrate the sectoral potentials a¯i
as the potential at 100 $/tCO2 provided by the IPCC (this is the highest
12The infinite-horizon model exposed in sections 2 has to be slightly modified; all
the results exposed in the previous sections hold.
13The newer IPCC report does not feature an estimation of marginal abatement
costs and potentials across sectors.
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Abatement potential Abatement cost Depreciation rate Investment cost
a¯i [ GtCO2/yr] γmi
[
$/tCO2
GtCO2/yr
]
δi [%/yr] cmi
[
$/tCO2
GtCO2/yr3
]
Waste 0.76 34 3.3 2309
Industry 4.08 17.6 4 1195
Forestry 2.75 15.9 0.8 1080
Agriculture 4.39 11.9 5 808
Transport 2.1 11.6 6.7 788
Energy 3.68 10.3 2.5 699
Buildings 5.99 3.6 1.7 244
Table 1.1 – Values used in the numerical simulations.
potential provided for each sector). Numerical values are gathered in
Tab. 1.1.
To calibrate the abatement investment model, we assume quadratic
investment costs:
∀i, ∀xi,t ≥ 0, ci(xi,t) = 1
2
cmi x
2
i,t
ci
′(xi,t) = cmi xi,t (1.16)
To calibrate the cmi , we ensure that relative costs, when comparing two
sectors, are equal in the two models, in the sense that:
∀(i, j), c
m
i
cmj
=
γmi
γmj
(1.17)
This defines all the cmi off by a common multiplicative constant. We
calibrate this multiplicative constant such that the discounted costs
of reaching the same target are equal in the two models (following
Grubb et al. 1995). This way, we aim at reducing differences in optimal
strategies to the different models of emission reductions (cost curves vs.
investment).
We call T¯ = 23 yr the time span from the publication date of IPCC
(2007) and the time horizon of IPCC data (2030). We set the discount
rate to r = 4%/yr. We constrain the cumulative emissions over the
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period as: ∫ T¯
0
∑
i
(a¯i − ai,t) ≤ B
To compute the carbon budget B, we chose the Representative Concen-
tration Pathway RCP 8.5 (from WRI, 2015) as the emission baseline.
An emission scenario consistent with the 2◦C target is the RCP3-PD.
Remarkably, the difference in carbon emissions in 2030 between these
two RCPs amounts to 24 GtCO2/yr, which matches
∑
i a¯i as calibrated
from IPCC (Tab. 1.1). We use the difference in cumulative emissions
from 2007 to 2030 in the two RCPs to calibrate B = 153GtCO2.
Finally, we estimate the depreciation rates of capital as the inverse of
typical capital lifetimes in the different sectors of the economy (Philib-
ert, 2007; World Bank, 2012, Tab. 6.1). The resulting rates of depreci-
ation δi are displayed in Tab. 1.1.
We solve the two models numerically in continuous time.14
5.2 Results
Fig. 1.3 compares the optimal mitigation strategy by the two models
and Fig. 1.4 compares the aggregated pathways in terms of abatement
and financial effort.
The two models give the same result in the long run: abatement
in each sector eventually reaches its maximum potential (Fig. 1.3). By
construction, they also achieve the aggregated abatement target at the
same discounted cost. And the carbon budget implies that the carbon
price grows exponentially, regardless of how emission reductions are
modeled (Fig. 1.3, upper panels). Moreover, the models find similar
carbon prices, at 17 $/tCO2 with cost curves and 18.6 $/tCO2 with
abatement investment, reflecting that they are calibrated on the same
data.
However, the similar carbon prices lead to radically different strate-
gies in terms of the temporal and sectoral distribution of aggregated
abatement and costs. First, the two frameworks differ in their optimal
abatement pathway: in the abatement-cost-curve framework, abate-
ment jumps when the climate policy is implemented (to emphasize this,
14All data and source code, including for figures in the analytical sections and
appendixes, will be available online.
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Abatement cost curves Abatement investment
Figure 1.3 – Comparison of optimal abatement strategies to achieve the
same amount of abatement, when the costs from IPCC (2007, SPM6) are
understood in an abatement-cost-curve framework (left) vs. an abatement
investment framework (right).
Note: We follow Davis et Socolow (2014) in measuring investment in com-
mitted abatement, (δixi,t in MtCO2/yr) instead of crude investment (xi,t
in MtCO2/yr2). With committed abatement, 1 000 electric vehicles built in
2010 that will each save 11 tCO2 during their lifetime count as committed
abatement of 1,1 ktCO2/yr in 2010. In the abatement-cost-curve frame-
work, there is no equivalent to the physical abatement investments xi,t, as
the planner controls directly the abatement level ai,t.
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Figure 1.4 – Optimal timing and cost of GHG emissions in the two models
(abatement cost curves vs abatement capital accumulation). When abate-
ment is assumed to be freely chosen on a cost curve at each time step, the
abatement can jump to any amount instantaneously at the beginning of the
period. When abatement requires accumulating capital, abatement has to
grow continuously. The same carbon price (not shown) translates in radi-
cally different short-term expenses in the two models (right panel).
we plotted a null abatement between 2005 and the start of the climate
policy in 2007). In contrast, the abatement pathway according to the
abatement-investment model starts at zero and increases continuously
(Fig. 1.3, lower panels).
Second, the two frameworks give different results in terms of tempo-
ral distribution of abatement costs: with abatement cost curves, abate-
ment expenses starts low and increases over time; in the abatement
investment framework, abatement investment starts high and then de-
creases over time (Fig. 1.4, right). In the latter case, abatement invest-
ment is concentrated on the short term, because once all the emissions
in a sector has been avoided using abatement capital, the only cost is
that of maintaining the stock of abatement capital. Importantly, the
appropriate level of effort that current decision makers have to imple-
ment is substantially different in the two models: 100 billion dollars of
abatement expenditures versus 300 billion dollars of abatement invest-
ment.15
15Results from our abatement investment model are compatible with estimates
reported by Fay et al. (2015), that is between 300 and 400 billion dollars per year of
investment required to meet the 2◦C target. Again, we do not claim that ours are
optimal pathways to mitigate climate change: in particular, they only consider a
target in the 2007-2030 window. Considering the long-term objective would impose
a higher abatement investment.
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Third, in the abatement-cost-curve framework, the carbon price
gives a straightforward indication on where and when effort should
be concentrated. In contrast, the increasing carbon price is a poor in-
dicator of the optimal distribution of abatement investment (Fig. 1.3,
higher panels). For instance, in the abatement cost curve framework,
complete decarbonization in the building sector is realized in 5 years
— a somewhat unrealistic result. In the abatement investment frame-
work, doing so would imply a very high level of investment in building
retrofit, and therefore very high marginal costs. As a result, the model
with abatement investment distributes these investments over 12 years,
to smooth investments and reduce the overall cost of decarbonizing the
building sector. Since costs differ across sectors, this smoothing mech-
anism is different across sectors, leading to different marginal abate-
ment investment costs and different levelized costs of conserved carbon
(LCCC).
For instance, in this numerical example, the optimal short-term
LCCC is twice as high in the industrial sector than in the building
sector even if the climate policy is implemented with a single carbon
price. Forward-looking investors facing a perfectly credible carbon price
would therefore be ready to pay twice as much per ton of abated carbon
emissions in the industrial sector than in the building sector. Facing
an abatement option that cost 25 $/tCO2 in the industrial sector and
an abatement option at 15 $/tCO2 in the building sector, the optimal
choice is to invest in the former, not in the latter.
This numerical application illustrates that using LCCCs to compare
abatement investment across sectors can be misleading. It also suggests
using abatement cost curves with caution, in particular when assessing
options that involve investment in long-lived capital. Symmetrically,
the abatement-investment model proposed here should not be used to
assess measures, such as driving less miles per year or reducing air
conditioning, that are best modeled using abatement cost curves.
6 Conclusion
Two types of emission-reduction actions should be distinguished to
investigate when and where reducing greenhouse gases emissions. In
every sector of the economy, some actions bring immediate and short-
lived environmental benefits, such as driving less miles per year, using
existing gas power plants more hours per year and existing coal power
plants fewer hours per year, or reducing air conditioning. These are
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appropriately modeled with abatement cost curves. For these actions,
the increasing carbon price provides direct guidance on where and when
effort to reduce emissions should be allocated.
But in every sector, other actions imply punctual investment and
persistent emission reductions over a long period of time — such as
replacing gasoline vehicles with plug-in hybrid or electric vehicles, re-
placing fossil-fueled power plants with renewable power, or retrofitting
buildings. These are best modeled as abatement investment. In these
cases, decision-makers have control on the rate of change of emission re-
ductions, rather than on the emission level directly. For these actions,
the carbon price does not provide a direct indication of the optimal
distribution of emission reductions over time and across sectors; one
must also take into account the future value of abatement capital when
assessing abatement investment. An increasing carbon price translates
into optimal abatement investment that can be bell-shaped or concen-
trated over the short run. Moreover, more investment per abated ton
is needed in sectors with larger abatement potentials and in sectors
where abatement capital is more expensive, even though the same car-
bon price applies to all sectors. For instance, we find in an illustrative
example that an abatement option at 25 $/tCO2 in the industrial sector
can be preferable to a 15 $/tCO2 option in the building sector.
These results suggest that when assessing abatement investment,
the ratio of annualized investment to discounted abatement is a poor in-
dicator of where abatement investment should be concentrated — such
ratio, sometimes labeled “levelized cost of conserved carbon” or sim-
ply “marginal abatement cost”, is however broadly used in the policy
debate to compare abatement options, for instance in marginal abate-
ment cost curves a la McKinsey (2009). Our results also suggest that
the dynamics of abatement capital accumulation cannot be represented
with abatement cost curves. It can thus be misleading to use models
based solely on abatement cost curves to design or assess abatement
strategies, or to investigate the optimal timing or distribution across
sectors of abatement effort.
These results should be interpreted cautiously, as we disregarded
several mechanisms that would affect the cost and timing of climate
policies, such as knowledge accumulation, knowledge spill-overs and
economic growth. We also leave for further research the effect of uncer-
tainty on climate impacts and future technologies, limited foresight by
investors, policy-makers and regulators, and the limited ability of the
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government to commit. Notwithstanding these limitations, this anal-
ysis may help clarify public economic questions related to the optimal
response to climate change.
Appendices
A Optimal accumulation of abatement capital
A.a Hamiltonian
The Hamiltonian associated with (1.5) reads:
H(xt, at,mt) = e
−rt
(
c(xt) + λt (at − eref ) + νt (δat − xt)
+ µt (eref − at) + φt (mt −B)
) (1.18)
A.b First order conditions
The first order conditions read:
∂H
∂xt
= 0 ⇐⇒ c′(xt) = νt (1.19)
∂H
∂at
− d (e
−rtνt)
dt
= 0 ⇐⇒ ν˙t − (δ + r)νt = λt − µt (1.20)
∂H
∂m
+
d (e−rtµt)
dt
= 0 ⇐⇒ µ˙t − rµt = −φt (1.21)
Where νt is the current value of abatement capital, µ is the current cost
of carbon, and λt is the current social cost of the maximum abatement
potential.16
Equations (1.20) and (1.19) can be rearranged as:
(r + δ) c′(xt)− dc
′(xt)
dt
= (µt − λt) (1.22)
16Note that the FOCs do not depend on eref , showing that the assumption that
eref is constant over time does not impact the basic dynamics of the model.
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A.c Complementary slackness conditions
The following complementary slackness condition implies that the
carbon price grows at the discount rate before the steady state:
∀t, (mt −B)φt = 0
mt ≤ B =⇒ µt = µert (1.23)
Equation (1.23) is similar to a Hotelling rule: here, the carbon budget
is analogous to a nonrenewable resource. The other complementary
slackness conditions is
∀t, (at − eref )λt = 0 (1.24)
A.d Steady state
We call T the date when the carbon budget is reached. After T ,
emission are null and investment is used to counterbalance depreciation:
∀t ≥ T, m˙t = 0 =⇒ at = eref =⇒ xt = δeref (1.25)
A.e The optimal temporal profile of abatement and invest-
ment
In this subsection, we show that along the optimal trajectory, abate-
ment capital increases over time before T ; and that optimal investment
is either bell-shaped or decreasing with respect to time and so is the
marginal investment cost, even though the carbon price is exponentially
increasing. We first show that
Lemma 1. if at < eref then xt is either decreasing or increasing then
decreasing,
then we show that
Lemma 2. at is increasing and is strictly lower than eref before the
finite date T .
Lemma 1 formalizes one of the main messages from this paper: a
growing carbon price does not translate into growing abatement in-
vestment. Lemma 2 reflects that since the only reason to invest in
abatement is to reach the carbon budget, it cannot be optimal to abate
all emissions before the date when the carbon budget is reached.
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Proof. • Lemma 1 If at < eref , equation 1.22 may be re-arranged
as:
∀t s.t. at < eref , dc
′(xt)
dt
= (r + δ) c′(xt)− µert (1.26)
Equation (1.26) implies that if optimal investment is decreasing
at a date θ, it continues to decrease ∀t > θ s.t. at < eref , since
(r + δ) c′(xθ) < µerθ, with the LHS of the inequality decreasing
over time, and the RHS increasing. In addition, (r + δ) c′(xt)
could not increase indefinitely, since this would lead to infinite
abatement capital, higher than eref .
In addition, if there is a θ such that (r + δ) c′(xθ) = µerθ, then
dc′(xθ)
dθ
= 0 and c′ has reached its maximum at θ. Immediately
after θ, c′ starts decreasing. By and large, investment can either
decrease over time, or increase until it crosses the carbon price,
and then decrease to its steady-state value afterward (Fig. 1.1).
• Lemma 2 Let us now show that at is increasing ∀t < T . First,
note that at starts from 0 and is necessarily increasing at first.
Second, if at is not continuously increasing, then there is a date t
such that a˙t = 0 and a¨t ≤ 0. Then, at this date a˙t = xt− δat and
a¨t = x˙t − δa˙t = x˙t, so x˙t ≤ 0 and xt decreases for all future dates
(Lemma 1). This implies that at also decreases at all future dates
(otherwise, reproducing the reasoning would give a date τ > t
with x˙τ ≥ 0), and mt ends up above B, a contradiction. at is
thus steadily increasing over time. A direct consequence is that
∀t < T, at < eref .17 Finally, let us show that abatement reaches
its potential in finite time, T < +∞: otherwise (1.26) is satisfied
at all dates, and
c′(xt) = c′(x0)e(r+δ)t − µe
rt
δ
(
eδt − 1)
which converges either toward +∞ or −∞, a contradiction .
17If we assume that eref depends on t, then T has to be defined as the last
moment such as ∀t ≥ T, at = eref . In that case, at can be decreasing before
T , if eref,t decreases before T . This makes exposition less easy without providing
additional insight on the optimal cost, timing, and sectoral allocation of abatement
investment.
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Since emissions are null after T and strictly positive before, it means
that social cost of the maximum potential is null before the steady state:
∀t < T, at < eref and λt = 0 (1.27)
∀t ≥ T, at = eref and λt ≥ 0
A.f Solving for c′
Before T , (1.27) allows simplifying (1.22) to:
∀t < T, (r + δ) c′(xt)− dc
′(xt)
dt
= µert (1.28)
The solutions of this first order linear differential equation read:
∀t < T, c′(xt) = e(r+δ)t
∫ T
t
e−(r+δ)θµerθ dθ + e(r+δ)t C (1.29)
Where C is a constant. Any C defines an investment pathway that
is consistent with the exponentially growing carbon price (1.28). The
optimal investment pathways also satisfies a boundary condition: the
full potential must be reached at the date T .
A.g Boundary conditions
After T , at is constant and the investment xt is used to counterbal-
ance the depreciation of abatement capital.
c′(xT ) = c′ (δeref ) (from eq. 1.25) (1.30)
A.h Optimal marginal investment costs (MICs)
Injecting 1.30 in 1.29 and re-arranging, one gets:
∀t < T,
c′(xt) = µert
∫ T
t
e−δ(θ−t) dθ + e−(δ+r)(T−t) c′ (δeref ) (1.31)
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which can also be written as:
c′(xt) =
∫ T
t
µerθe−(δ+r)(θ−t) dθ +
∫ ∞
T
(r + δ) c′ (δeref ) e−(δ+r)(θ−t) dθ
(1.32)
In equation 1.32, output from the marginal, deprecating, abatement
capital is valued at the current carbon price before T , and valued at
the replacement cost of abatement capital c′ (δeref ) after T .18
A.i The forgone-opportunity effect
Here we explain how the previous result compares to Slechten (2013).
Equation (1.32) can be rewritten to show that the marginal abatement
investment cost c′(xt) can be expressed as the sum of three terms: (1)
the value E of avoided emissions along the full lifetime of the invest-
ment; (2) the value O of the forgone opportunity, since each investment
in abatement capital reduces future investment opportunities; and (3)
the value K of abatement capital in the long run:
∀t < T, c′(xt) = µert
∫ ∞
t
e−δ(θ−t) dθ︸ ︷︷ ︸
E
− µert
∫ ∞
T
e−δ(θ−t) dθ︸ ︷︷ ︸
O
(1.33)
+ e−(r+δ)(T−t) c′ (δeref )︸ ︷︷ ︸
K
(1.34)
The second term O echoes previous findings by Slechten (2013) and can
be interpreted as a forgone-opportunity effect. The limited potential
eref behaves here like a non-renewable resource, an abatement deposit.
After T , accumulating more abatement capital does not allow to reduce
emissions. The value O of this forgone opportunity is the value of the
GHG that the maximum potential prevents to save after T . Slechten
(2013) does not have an analog to K as she neglects depreciation.
18c′ (δeref ) is the replacement cost of the capital after T . It is the cost one has to
pay to buy one unit of abatement capital and keep it for its lifetime. (r+δ)c′ (δeref )
is the corresponding rental cost, since dc′(xt)/dt = 0 after T . It is the price one has
to pay for renting abatement capital for one unit of time.
52
B Optimal investment dynamics are similar under
cost-effectiveness and cost-benefit
Here, we clarify that the results exposed in the previous section do
not depend on the fact that we used a cost-effectiveness analysis instead
of a cost-benefit analysis.
Consider the following problem, where a social problem minimizes
the sum of abatement investment costs and the cost of climate change
impacts:
min
xt
∫ ∞
0
e−rt
(
c(xt) + d(mt)
)
dt (1.35)
subject to m˙t = eref − at (µt)
a˙t = xt − δat (νt)
at ≤ eref (λt)
Where d(mt) is an increasing and convex function that captures dam-
ages from climate change impacts.
The Hamiltonian associated with (1.35) reads:
H(xt, at,mt) = e
−rt
(
c(xt) + d(mt) + λt (at − eref ) + νt (δat − xt)
+ µt (eref − at)
)
(1.36)
The first order conditions read:
∂H
∂xt
= 0 ⇐⇒ c′(xt) = νt (1.37)
∂H
∂at
− d (e
−rtνt)
dt
= 0 ⇐⇒ ν˙t − (δ + r)νt = λt − µt (1.38)
∂H
∂m
+
d (e−rtµt)
dt
= 0 ⇐⇒ µ˙t = rµt − d′(mt) (1.39)
Compared to the case of a carbon budget, the optimal carbon price
is now more complex, and cannot be expressed analytically in general.
Fischer et al. (2004) study the possible temporal profiles of the carbon
price resulting from (1.39). In the case relevant to this paper, the opti-
mal carbon price first increases over time and then tends to a constant
value at the steady state, once GHG concentration in the atmosphere
53
have stabilized at an endogenous level B⋆ (see figures 2 and 3 in Fischer
et al., 2004).
In this paper, we focus on how the carbon price translates to opti-
mal abatement investment (and how optimal investment differs across
sectors). Irrespective of the particular shape of the carbon price, it
remains the case that before the steady state, emissions are positive,
λt = 0, and (1.37) and (1.38) can be integrated so as to express optimal
investment as a function of the carbon price µt as:
∀t ≤ T,
c′(xt) =
∫ T
t
µθe
−(δ+r)(θ−t) dθ +
∫ ∞
T
(r + δ) c′ (δeref ) e−(δ+r)(θ−t) dθ
(1.40)
In particular, Prop. 2 holds (as does Coroll. 2).
Yet another equivalent problem is the following, where a social plan-
ner (or any equivalent decentralized procedure) faces an exogenous car-
bon price µt on unabated emissions:
min
xt
∫ ∞
0
e−rt
(
c(xt) + µt(eref − at)
)
dt (1.41)
subject to a˙t = xt − δat (νt)
at ≤ eref (λt)
This problem also leads to optimal marginal abatement investment
costs to be valued at the carbon price before the steady state, and
at the replacement cost of abatement capital after the steady state —
that is, (1.40) and Prop. 2 (and Coroll. 2) all remain true.
C Proof of the expression of the LCCC ℓt
Let h be a marginal physical investment in abatement capital made
at time t in sector i (expressed in tCO2/yr per year). It generates an
infinitesimal abatement flux that starts at h at time t and decreases ex-
ponentially at rate δi, leading to discounted abatement ∆A (expressed
in tCO2):
∆A =
∫ ∞
θ=t
er(θ−t)h e−δi(θ−t) dθ =
h
r + δ
(1.42)
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This additional investment h brings current investment from xt to
(xt + h). The additional cost ∆C (expressed in $) that it brings reads:
∆C = c(xt + h)− c(xt) =
h→0
h c′(xt) (1.43)
The levelized cost of conserved carbon ℓt is the ratio of additional costs
by additional discounted abatement:
ℓt =
∆C
∆A
(1.44)
ℓt = (r + δ) c
′(xt) (1.45)
D An alternative understanding of the marginal
implicit rental cost of abatement capital
From an existing investment pathway (xt) leading to an abatement
pathway (at), the social planner may increase investment by one unit at
time θ and immediately reduce investment by 1−δ dθ at the next period
θ + dθ. The resulting investment schedule (x˜t) leads to an abatement
pathway (a˜t) that abates one supplementary unit of GHG between θ
and θ + dθ (Fig. 1.5). Moving from (xt) to (x˜t) costs:
P = 1
dθ
[
c′(xθ)− (1− δ dθ)
(1 + r dθ)
c′(xθ+ dθ)
]
(1.46)
For marginal time lapses, this tends to :
P −−−→
dθ→0
(r + δ) c′(xθ)− dc
′(xθ)
dθ
(1.47)
P tends to the cost of renting one unit of abatement capital at θ.
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Figure 1.5 – Top row: from a given investment pathway (xt) leading to
the abatement pathway (at), one additional unit of investment at time θ has
two effects: it saves GHG, and brings forward the date when the maximum
potential eref is reached (T → T˜ ). Bottom row: saving one more unit of
GHG at a date θ without changing the rest of the abatement pathway, as in
(a˜t), requires to invest one more unit at θ and (1 − δ dθ) less at θ + dθ, as
(x˜t) does.
E Optimal allocation of abatement investment
The Hamiltonian associated with (1.12) reads:
H(xi,t, ai,t,mt) = e
−rt
(∑
i
ci(xi,t) +
∑
i
λi,t (ai,t − a¯i) +
∑
i
νi,t (δiai,t − xt)
+µt
∑
i
(a¯i − ai,t) + φt (mt −B)
)
(1.48)
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The first order conditions read ∀(i, t):
ci
′(xi,t) = νi,t (∂xi,t) (1.49)
ν˙i,t − (δi + r)νi,t = λi,t − µt (∂ai,t) (1.50)
µ˙t − rµt = −φt (∂mt) (1.51)
Where νi,t is the present value of investment in low carbon capital, µ
is the present cost of carbon, and λi,t is the social cost of the sectoral
potential. The steady state is reached at a date Tm when the carbon
budget is reached. After this date, emission are null in every sector and
investment is used to counterbalance depreciation:
m˙t = 0 =⇒ ∀i, ai,t = a¯i =⇒ xi,t = δia¯i (1.52)
Denoting Ti the date when all emissions in sector i are capped (∀i ≥
Ti, ai,t = a¯i), it is easy to establish that Tm = maxi(Ti) (adapting the
resolution from A). The complementary slackness conditions mean that
the carbon price grows at the discount rate before the steady state:
∀t < Tm, mt < B and φt = 0 (1.53)
=⇒ µt = µert (1.54)
and the social costs of the sectoral potentials are null before the respec-
tive dates Ti:
∀t < Ti, ai,t < a¯i and λi,t = 0 (1.55)
The first order conditions can be re-arranged as:
∀(i, t), (r + δi) ci′(xi,t)− dci
′(xi,t)
dt
= µert − λi,t (1.56)
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Following the demonstration for the case of one single sector (A) yields:
ci
′(xi,t) = µert
∫ Ti
t
e−δi(θ−t) dθ + e−(δ+r)(Ti−t) c′i (δia¯i) (1.57)
=
∫ Ti
t
µerθe−(δi+r)(θ−t) dθ +
∫ ∞
Ti
(r + δi) c
′
i (δia¯i) e
−(δi+r)(θ−t) dθ
(1.58)
The fact that the dates Ti differ across sectors is easily derived from
the demonstrations of the corollaries in the next subsection.
E.a Proof of Coroll. 1
Here we demonstrate Coroll. 1. We first show that two investment
profiles cannot cross before one of the sector has reached its maximum
potential. One is therefore always higher than the other. We then show
that the highest investment profile corresponds to the most expensive
sector, or the one with higher abatement potential.
As a lemma, note that the Euler equation
∀i, ∀t < Ti, dci
′(xi,t)
dt
= (r + δi)ci
′(xi,t)− µert (1.59)
implies that if two sectors have the same depreciation rate δi, if their
investment trajectories meet before one of the sectors is decarbonized,
then they must be equal for all times before one of the sector is decar-
bonized:
∀(i, j), δi = δj and ∃t× ≤ min(Ti, Tj) s.t. c′i(xi,t×) = c′j(xj,t×) (1.60)
=⇒ ∀t ≤ min(Ti, Tj), c′i(xi,t) = c′j(xj,t) (1.61)
This means that the only possibility for two optimal investment
trajectories — corresponding to two sectors with the same deprecia-
tion rate — to cross at one point in time is after one has reached its
maximum abatement potential (Fig. 1.6).
Let us prove Coroll. 1(i):
Proof. Let two sectors {1, 2} be such that they exhibit the same invest-
ment cost function, the same depreciation rate, but different abatement
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Figure 1.6 – Two different investment trajectories corresponding to two
sectors with the same depreciation rate crossing after one has reached its
maximum abatement potential.
potentials:
∀x > 0, c′1(x) = c′2(x), δ1 = δ2 = δ, a¯1 > a¯2
In the long term, the largest sector is above the small one:
∀t ≥ max(T1, T2), (r + δ)c′1(δa¯1) > (r + δ)c′2(δa¯2) (1.62)
Suppose that the two investment pathways cross at t× ∈ [T1, T2],19 such
that (Fig. 1.6):
{
∀t < t×, c′1(x1,t) ≤ c′2(x2,t)
∀t > t×, c′1(x1,t) > c′2(x2,t)
(1.63)
=⇒ ∀t < T1, x1,t ≤ x2,t
=⇒
∫ T1
0
x1,t e
−δ(T2−t)dt = a¯1 <
∫ T1
0
x2,t e
−δ(T2−t)dt = a2,T1
which is incompatible with the constraint that a2,T2 ≤ a¯2 and the as-
sumption that a¯1 < a¯2. As a result, it is impossible that c′1(x1,t) and
c′2(x2,t) cross, and:
∀t, c′1(x1,t) > c′2(x2,t) (1.64)
19Because dci
′(xi,t)
dt < 0 in the vicinity of Ti, T1 > T2 is not possible if the curves
cross (Fig. 1.6)
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Coroll. 1(ii) tackles the similar case of two sectors differing only for
the cost of their abatement capital:
∀x > 0, c′1(x) < c′2(x) (while a¯1 = a¯2 and δ1 = δ2)
The proof is similar: (1.62) holds and (1.63) would imply that a¯2 =
a2,T2 > a¯1 = a¯2.
Note that Coroll. 1 does not prevent any two optimal sectoral in-
vestment pathways to cross: the situation pictured in Fig. 1.6 may
happen for two sectors which differ in cost and abatement potential in
different directions (c′1 > c′2 and a¯1 < a¯2) and for sectors for which the
depreciation rate of abatement capital differs (δ1 ̸= δ2).
F A perfectly-credible carbon price can decentral-
ize the optimal abatement strategy
Take the point of view of the owner of one polluting equipment in a
sector i, facing the credibly announced carbon price µert. One question
for this owner is when should the equipment be retrofitted or replaced
with zero-carbon capital. The following corollary illustrates that the
question is easily answered if agents correctly anticipate the prices of
carbon and abatement capital:
Corollary 3. Along the optimal pathway, individual forward-looking
agents in each sector i are indifferent between investing in abatement
capital at any time before Ti.
Proof. Let τ be the date when the agent invests in abatement capital.
Before τ , the agent pays the carbon price. At τ , she invests in one unit
of abatement capital at the price c′i(xi,τ ). At each time period t after
τ , she has to maintain its abatement capital, which costs δic′i(xi,t). The
total discounted cost Vi(τ) of this strategy reads:
Vi(τ) = µτ + e
−rτc′i(xi,τ ) +
∫ ∞
τ
e−rtδic′i(xi,t)dt (1.65)
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Let us derivative the cost V with respect to the decision variable τ :
V ′i (τ) = µ+ e
−rτ
(
c′i(xi,τ )− r
d
dτ
c′i(xi,τ )
)
− e−rτδic′i(xi,τ )
= (r + δi) c
′
i(xi,τ )−
d
dτ
c′i(xi,τ )− µerτ
V ′i (τ) = λi,τ (from eq. 1.56)
This last equations means that V ′i (τ) is null for any τ ≤ Ti, and positive
afterward (1.55).
Coroll. 3 means that the optimal investment pathways can be de-
centralized to a market equilibrium by imposing a perfectly credible
carbon price path µert to forward-looking investors.
G Overview of the abatement-cost-curve model
Since the seminal contribution by Nordhaus (1991), a frequent ap-
proach to derive the optimal timing of mitigation strategies is to use
an abatement cost curve. In this section we find that in this framework
the optimal timing and cost of GHG reductions is essentially the same
thing as the exponentially-increasing carbon price.
G.a An abatement cost curve model
The cost of emission abatement at time t is linked to the abatement
at through an abatement cost curve γ. The function γ is classically
convex, positive and twice differentiable:
∀at, γ′′(at) > 0 (1.66)
γ′(at) > 0
γ(at) > 0
The basic idea behind the abatement cost curve is that some potentials
for emission reductions are cheap (e.g. building insulation pays for
itself thanks to subsequent savings), while other are more expensive
(e.g. upgrading power plants with carbon capture and storage). If
potentials are exploited in the merit order — from the cheapest to the
most expensive — the marginal cost of doing so γ′(at) is increasing in
at, and γ(at) is convex.
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Figure 1.7 – Optimal timing and costs of abatement in the abatement-cost-
curve framework. Left: Before the potential is reached, abatement efforts
are equal to the carbon price and grow over time. Right: When the social
planner imposes a carbon price at t0, the level of abatement “jumps”.
A social planner determines when to abate in order to minimize
abatement costs discounted at a given rate r, under the constraints set
by the abatement potential and the carbon budget:
min
at
∫ ∞
0
e−rt γ (at) dt (1.67)
subject to at ≤ eref (λt)
m˙t = eref − at (µt)
mt ≤ B (φt)
We denoted in parentheses the co-state variables and Lagrangian mul-
tipliers.
G.b Result in the abatement cost curve framework
In the abatement cost curve framework, the optimal abatement cost
strategy is to implement abatement options such that the marginal
abatement cost is equal to the carbon price µert at each point in time,
until the potential eref is reached at a date T (G.c):
γ′(at) =

0 t ≤ t0
µert t0 < t < T
γ′(eref ) t ≥ T
(1.68)
Where t0 is the date when the social planner implements the carbon
price (Fig. 1.7).
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Many contributions based on abatement cost curves and numerical
optimization factor in some climate change dynamics and damages from
climate change, including the DICE model and its extensions discussed
in footnote 1, without changing these general results.
In the abatement cost curve framework, both the optimal abate-
ment efforts γ(at) and the abatement level at thus increase over time.
Moreover, abatement decisions can be made at each time step indepen-
dently, based only on the current carbon price µert and the abatement
cost curve γ. In particular, the level of abatement jumps when the
carbon price is implemented (Fig. 1.7). Such jumps are common in the
literature on the optimal timing of mitigation. For instance, the last
version of DICE finds that the least-cost pathway to reach 2◦C start-
ing a policy in 2010 is to jump to 35% of emission reductions in five
years, between 2010 and 2015 — see Figure 9 in Nordhaus et Sztorc
(2013); and Schwoon et Tol (2006) allow explicitly for such jumps, in
a model that would otherwise be close to the abatement investment
model presented in section 1.
The (implicit) assumption that abatement can be decided indepen-
dently at each time step is only valid in cases where abatement action
is paid for and delivers emission reduction at the same time, such as
driving less or reducing air conditioning. In many cases, such as upgrad-
ing to more efficient vehicles or retrofitting buildings, costs are mainly
paid when the action is undertaken, while annual emissions are reduced
over several decades. These actions are better modeled as abatement
investment.
G.c Detailed resolution
The Hamiltonian associated with (1.67) reads:
H(at,mt) = e
−rt
(
γ(at) + λt (at − eref ) + µt (eref − at) + φt (mt −B)
)
(1.69)
The first order conditions are:
(∂at) γ
′(at) = (µt − λt) (1.70)
(∂mt) µ˙t − rµt = −φt (1.71)
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The steady state is reached at a date T when m˙t = 0, that is when the
abatement potential eref is reached, such that:
∀t < T, at < eref and mt < B
∀t ≥ T, at = eref and mt = B
As the associated Lagrangian multiplier, φt is null before the carbon
budget is reached (complementary slackness condition):
∀t, φt · (mt −B) = 0
=⇒ ∀t < T, φt = 0 (1.72)
This means that the present value of carbon µt is constant while the
carbon budget has not been reached (1.71):
∀t < T, µt = µert (1.73)
For the same reason, λt is null before the sectoral potential becomes
binding:
∀t, λt · (at − eref ) = 0
=⇒ ∀t < T, λt = 0 (1.74)
Combining (1.70), (1.73), and (1.74), one gets (1.68).
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2
Optimal transition from coal to gas
and renewable energy under
capacity constraints and adjustment
costs
Many governments aim at stabilizing climate change to avoid impor-tant climate damages, which requires reaching near-zero green-
house gas (GHG) emissions in the long term (Steinacher et al., 2013;
IPCC, 2014c). Abating GHG emissions from power generation is key
to reach this goal, as the power sector is currently responsible for nearly
40% of carbon emissions worldwide, and fuel switching to clean electric-
ity is a major technical option to reduce emissions from other sectors
(Williams et al., 2012; Audoly et al., 2014).
Two important features of the electricity sector are that (i) it de-
pends on long-lived capital that, in general, is tied to a specific fuel, and
(ii) today’s power production predominantly relies on polluting fossil
fuels such as coal (IEA, 2014b). Several alternatives are available to
abate GHG emissions from electricity production. Emissions may be
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reduced by replacing coal plants by new gas power plants, 1 or by more-
expensive but almost-carbon-free options such as renewable power. In
addition, decision makers can either wait for existing plants to reach
their natural lifetime, or decide to decommission them earlier in order
to switch faster to cleaner energy sources.
This paper analyzes the optimal transition from coal to gas and re-
newable energy under capacity constraints and a carbon budget. We
model different types of nonrenewable resources, à la Chakravorty et al.
(2008) (cheap coal and more expensive gas), and an expensive renew-
able source. All energy sources are subject to capacity constraints: con-
suming more energy first requires investment in coal, gas, or renewable
power plants. Finally, investment is irreversible and bears adjustment
costs. Adjustment costs are convex investment costs capturing the in-
creasing opportunity cost to use scarce resources to build and deploy
new capital faster (Lucas, 1967; Gould, 1968; Mussa, 1977).
We find that optimal investment in renewable can start early, that
is before coal and gas are phased out. The reason is that smoothing
investment over time reduces adjustment costs. Loosely speaking, the
availability of appropriate resources (skilled workers, production lines)
sets an optimal speed at which to deploy renewable power. This speed,
combined with the ultimate goal of achieving carbon neutrality (to com-
ply with the carbon budget), sets an optimal date to start investment
in renewable power plants. We also find that transient investment in
new gas plants can be used to reduce (but not necessarily cancel) the
need for investment in expensive renewable energy in the short term.
But new gas-fired capital needs to be decommissioned eventually and
give room to more carbon-free energy.
More generally, the transition from coal to gas and renewable en-
ergy can exhibit three different profiles. First, the social planner can
sequentially switch from coal to gas, and only after from gas to re-
newable power. Numerical simulations suggest that this occurs for lax
carbon budgets and low adjustment costs, giving time to switch en-
tirely to gas before starting to invest in renewable power and reducing
the need to smooth investment in renewable energy. Second, for inter-
1This paper assumes gas is a low-carbon substitute for coal. The relative carbon
content of gas and coal may actually depend on the type of gas and coal and on
the particular processes used for extracting and transporting the fuels (e.g., Alvarez
et al., 2012). The relative merits of coal and gas also depend on factors disregarded
here, such as impact on energy security (see the review in Guivarch et al., 2015) or
impact on local pollution (e.g., Shindell, 2015).
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mediate adjustment costs and carbon budgets, the transition can start
with investment in gas, and continue with investment in renewable be-
fore coal has been phased out. In the third type of transition profile,
for stricter carbon budget and larger adjustment costs, investment in
renewable power starts as soon as possible.
We illustrate and quantify these findings in a numerical simulation
of the European Commission’s Energy Roadmap (EU, 2011), whose
aim is to fully decarbonize the European power sector by mid-century.
According to our simulations, the ambitious goal of the European Com-
mission implies that the optimal transition starts with investment in
renewable power, except if adjustment costs are small and the cost of re-
newable energy is significantly higher than suggested by available data.
With our reference calibration, it is optimal to start with investment
in both renewable and gas. Optimal short-term investment in renew-
able capacity is comparable to actual figures. New gas power plants
are built until 2040, to reduce the need for renewable power plants in
the short-term, but electricity generation from gas is then phased out
within the next 15 years. These results shed light on technical choices
(e.g. investors can consider gas plants with short scheduled lifetimes) as
well as policy decisions (when setting milestones for carbon-free power
generation capacity).
This paper relates to two different strands of the analytical liter-
ature. The first one studies the optimal usage of different fossil fuels
under an environmental constraint, through the lens of nonrenewable
resources theory (Hotelling, 1931; Herfindahl, 1967), with little atten-
tion to the dynamics of capital accumulation (e.g., Chakravorty et al.,
2008; van der Ploeg et Withagen, 2012). In this literature, renewable
energy is modeled as a clean backstop, a technology that can imme-
diately produce arbitrary quantities of energy at some fixed marginal
costs. With these assumptions, renewable energy should never be used
early, that is before fossil fuel consumption stops. We expand this lit-
erature by studying the effect of capacity constraints and adjustment
costs limiting the extraction of all types of energies. We find that to
reduce adjustment costs, it makes sense to start investing in renewable
and gas power plants early, and to use several energy types at the same
time.
The other strand of the literature studies optimal investment in
clean capital under adjustment costs, with little attention to fossil fuel
resources, and neglecting intermediate alternatives to perfectly clean
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capital (such as switching from coal to gas). Fischer et al. (2004),
Williams (2010) and Slechten (2013) all stress that to reduce adjust-
ment costs, the optimal strategy is to smooth investment in clean ca-
pacity, anticipating future carbon prices. Vogt-Schilb et al. (2014b)
compare abatement investment across sectors, and find that the abate-
ment potential in each sector should also be anticipated: the same car-
bon price translates into more short-term investment in sectors with
larger abatement potential. Here, we confirm that smoothing invest-
ment and anticipating future prices is critical. In particular we find that
more investment should go to renewable power, which is built to last,
than to gas power, which is only an intermediate technology. Finally,
Rozenberg et al. (2014) analyze the trade-off between early-scrapping
existing dirty capital and investing in clean capital. They find that
early-scraping part of the dirty capital, built before climate policies are
announced, is optimal for achieving stringent climate targets.2 Here,
we find that it can also be optimal to build gas-fired capital after cli-
mate policies are implemented, knowing that it will subsequently be
underused, to move efforts from the short to the middle term.
Last but not least, other authors have previously investigated opti-
mal capital accumulation and resource extraction under a single model.
In a recent working paper, Amigues et al. (2013) study the extraction
of a renewable and a non-renewable energy source, taking into account
that the extraction of the renewable source requires to first invest in
appropriate capital (renewable power plants) and pay for adjustment
costs. They also find that optimal investment in renewable may start
early, before fossil resources are exhausted. 3 But they model a single
fossil resource, and they leave environmental constraints and capacity
constraints limiting the extraction of fossil fuels for further research.
This paper thus proposes the first analytical model able to assess the
optimal transition from coal to gas and renewable power plants, taking
2We focus on the analytical literature. Early decommissioning of existing coal
power plants has also been studied using numerical models (e.g., IEA, 2014b; John-
son et al., 2014).
3A whole literature started by Kemp et Long (1980) has established that if the
extraction rate of an expensive energy source is constrained by an exogenous factor,
it may be optimal to use that source simultaneously with cheaper alternatives (e.g.,
Amigues et al., 1998; Holland, 2003). Amigues et al. (2013) confirm this result for
endogenous constraints.
Other reasons for not extracting resources according to a strict Herfindahl se-
quence include time to build (Winkler, 2008), imperfect substitution (Smulders et
Van Der Werf, 2008), heterogeneity of producers, heterogeneity of consumers and
transportation costs – Gaudet et Salant (2014) provide a review.
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into account capacity constraints on all energy sources and an environ-
mental constraint.4
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 1 de-
tails the model. section 2 solves the model for the carbon and fossil
energy costs (2.1), the optimal value of capacities and the cost of build-
ing new ones (2.2), the electricity price and capacity rents (2.3), and
optimal investment trajectories (2.4). Section 2.5 discusses the optimal
ordering of investment and possible transition profiles. Section 3 pro-
vides numerical simulations calibrated with data from the European
electricity sector. Section 4 discusses limitations of this paper and con-
cludes.
1 Model
A social planner controls the supply of electricity, using and invest-
ing in three different technologies: an existing high-carbon technology
(h, coal power), a fossil-fueled low-carbon technology (ℓ, gas), and an
inexhaustible zero-carbon technology (z, renewable power).
At each time t, the social planner chooses a positive amount of
physical investment xi,t in technology i. Investment adds to the installed
capacity kt, that depreciates at the constant rate δ (dotted variables
denote temporal derivatives):5
4 The interaction of investment and natural resources extraction is also the
subject of the theory of the mine (e.g., Campbell, 1980; Gaudet, 1983; Lasserre,
1985), in which installed capital similarly limits the extraction rate of (a single type
of) minerals. After reviewing this literature, Cairns (1998) notes that “there can
be three phases in the exploitation of the mine, namely (1) a period of positive
investment after time t = 0, in which production is at full capacity, then (2) a
period in which investment is zero and production is at full capacity, and finally
(3) a period of declining production”. This paper is different, as we model several
resources and an environmental constraint; we find, however, a similar trajectory
for exploitation of gas resources.
In addition, Dasgupta et Heal (1974), Solow (1974) and Stiglitz (1974) have
started a literature that studies the impact of resource exhaustiblity on growth, in
green Ramsey models that feature both capital accumulation and resource extraction
(e.g., van der Ploeg et Withagen, 1991, 2014). This literature also focuses on a
single type of capital and a single fossil resource while we model several resources
and resource-specific capital.
5Throughout this paper, capacity is to be understood as equivalent capacity,
e.g., in kWh/yr, unless otherwise specified. For instance if 2 kW of windmills are
required to provide as much output per year as 1 kW of coal, then 2 kW of windmills
are accounted as 1 kWeq.
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k˙i,t = xi,t − δkt, ∀i (2.1)
xi,t ≥ 0 (2.2)
Without loss of generality, we assume low-carbon and zero-carbon
capacities to be nil at the beginning (kℓ,t0 = kz,t0 = 0).6
The constraint that investment is positive implies that once a power
plant has been built, it cannot be unbuilt to retrieve its costs. For
instance, once the workforce and cement have been used to build a gas
power plant, the plant cannot be transformed back to manpower and
raw cement to build something else. Other authors have referred to
such constraints as irreversible investment (Arrow et Kurz, 1970), or
putty-clay capital (Arltesou, 1999; Wei, 2003).7
Physical investment is made at a positive, increasing and convex
cost ci:
ci(x) > 0, c
′
i(x) > 0, c
′′
i (x) > 0, ∀x (2.3)
This convexity captures the increasing opportunity cost to use scarce
resources (skilled workers and appropriate capital) in order to build and
deploy capacities faster. It has been labeled adjustment costs in the
theory of the firm (Lucas, 1967; Gould, 1968). In general, the words
adjustment costs cover many factors limiting the speed at which indi-
vidual firms can adjust their stock of capital to new prices, such as the
cost to purchase capital or to install it. In the literature on resource
extraction (e.g., Gaudet, 1983; Amigues et al., 2013), including this pa-
per, adjustment costs are best understood as the production costs for
the industries that manufacture each type of power plants — Mussa
(1977) calls these external adjustment costs. 8
6The reason why this assumption does not result in a loss of generality is that
our model studies the transition from the existing situation to cleaner and to clean
power, as done in Section 3.
7As the irreversibility constraint is on the building process of power plants, it
does not prevent private agents who own a power plant to sell it to other private
agents at any moment. During the analytical resolution of the problem, it will be
useful to interpret some terms as the resale value of existing capacities.
8In this paper, investment refer to the building of new power plants. When
private owners of power plants sell an existing plant to another electricity production
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A practical consequence of adjustment costs is that the faster the
social planner builds new windmills or new gas plants, the higher are
their marginal costs. In order to minimize the costs of the transition,
the social planner will smooth investment over time.
We assume that, when both are built at the same pace, low-carbon
capacity is cheaper than zero-carbon capacity:
c′ℓ(x) < c
′
z(x), ∀x (2.4)
In general, we do not assume that c′i(0) = 0; the strictly positive c′i(0)
are the minimum costs at which power plants i may be built. 9
The social planner also chooses how much output to produce with
each technology. We assume production exhibits constant returns to
scale: two gas plants can produce twice as much electricity as one
gas plant.10 The positive production ci′(xi,t) with technology i cannot
exceed the installed capacity kt:
0 ≤ ci′(xi,t), ∀i (2.5)
ci
′(xi,t) ≤ kt (2.6)
For simplicity, we assume the existing carbon-intensive capital is over-
abundant, such that (2.6) is not binding for coal; this assumption is
relaxed and confirmed in the numerical application.
Let Fi be the carbon intensity (or emission factor) of technology
i. The high-carbon technology is more carbon-intensive than the low-
carbon technology:
firm, that latter firm is also performing investment. But at the social level, such
investment is a transfer, not a net accumulation of new capital.
9Some readers may prefer to think of our marginal investment costs c′(x) as
the sum of some “pure” investment costs c′(0) and some “pure” adjustment costs
c′(x)− c′(0).
10We are neglecting any complementarity or imperfect substitution between gas
and renewable plants that comes from their respective cost structures (in terms of
fixed versus variable costs) and from the intermittency of renewable power avail-
ability. We are implicitly assuming that such considerations have more impact on
the optimal electricity mix at the equilibrium than on the optimal transition from
the existing state to that equilibrium, which is the focus of the paper.
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Fh > Fℓ > Fz = 0 (2.7)
The social planner is constrained by an exogenous carbon budget (or
emission ceiling), that is cumulative emissions cannot exceed a given
ceiling B:
mt ≤ B, ∀t (2.8)
where cumulative emissions mt grow with emissions Fi qj,t:
m˙t =
∑
i
Fi qj,t (2.9)
Cumulative emissions have been found to be a good proxy for global
warming (Allen et al., 2009; Matthews et al., 2009a; IPCC, 2014c).
Some policy instruments, such as an emission trading scheme with
unlimited banking and borrowing, set a similar constraint on firms
(Slechten, 2013).
Using fossil fuel (gas or coal) requires to extract exhaustible resource
from an initial stock, such that the current stock Si,t satisfies:
Si,t0 given
S˙i,t = −ci′(xi,t) (2.10)
Si,t ≥ 0
We assume that the zero carbon technology is renewable: Sz,t0 = ∞.
While it is convenient to use the general notations introduced above
(indexed by i), parts of the analytical resolution will focus on the case
where coal is overabundant (Sh,t0 = ∞). In these cases the carbon
budget is more stringent than the scarcity of coal resources (as in van
der Ploeg et Withagen, 2012).
Consumers derive utility u (∑i ci′(xi,t)) from electricity consump-
tion, where u satisfies Inada conditions and is sufficiently smooth. The
program of the social planner consists of determining the trajectories of
investment xi,t and production ci′(xi,t) that maximize discounted util-
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ity net of investment costs while complying with the carbon budget B
and the various constraints:
max
xi,t,ci′(xi,t)
∫ ∞
0
e−rt
[
u
(∑
i
ci
′(xi,t)
)
−
∑
i
ci(xi,t)
]
dt (2.11)
s.t. k˙i,t = xi,t − δkt (νt)
qj,t ≤ kj,t (γi,t)
qj,t ≥ 0 (λi,t)
xi,t ≥ 0 (ξi,t)
m˙t =
∑
i
Fi qj,t (µt)
mt ≤ B (ηt)
S˙i,t = −ci′(xi,t) (αi,t)
Si,t ≥ 0 (βi,t)
Where r is the constant discount rate and the Greek letters in paren-
theses denote the costate variables and Lagrange multipliers (all chosen
such as to be positive). A few of them play a key role in the analyt-
ical resolution: νt, the shadow value of new power plants; γi,t, the
social costs of the capacity constraint, which can also be interpreted as
the shadow rental costs of power plants; µt, the shadow carbon price;
and αi,t, the shadow price of resource i (all notations are gathered in
Tab. 2.5).
2 Analytical resolution
2.1 Hotelling rents, carbon prices and energy costs
The transition from coal to gas and renewable power is driven by
the increase of three prices: the price of coal αh,t, the price of gas αℓ,t,
and the price of carbon emissions µt. (In the following, we frequently
omit the term “shadow” when referring to co-state variables and La-
grangian multipliers. We also freely switch between the social planner’s
perspective and the equivalent point of view of private agents facing op-
timal energy and carbon prices.) All three prices correspond to scarcity
rents, and follow the Hotelling rule (see the appendix for the full set of
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efficiency conditions), that is they grow over time at the interest rate:
αh,t = αh e
rt, αℓ,t = αℓ e
rt, µt = µe
rt (2.12)
As there are no extraction costs in this model, αh,t, αℓ,t, and µt are
non-zero only when the respective exhaustibility constraint for coal,
gas, and the carbon budget is binding. Under the assumption that coal
reserves are not binding, αh = 0; in addition, if there is more carbon
contained in gas reserves underground than the carbon budget allows
to emit into the atmosphere, then αℓ,t = 0.
In the following, we continue the analytical resolution of the model
using αh,t and αℓ,t — without substituting. With this more general
notation, the resolution also holds for cases with positive extraction,
transformation and transportation costs that would be encompassed
in the energy costs αh,t and αℓ,t; or more generally for any exogenous
energy price trajectory αh,t and αℓ,t — as will be used in section 3.
2.2 Capacity rents, capacity value, and construction costs
This subsection clarifies the link between capacity rents γi,t, capacity
value νt, and construction costs ci′(xi,t). Such clarification is essential
to the rest of the resolution.
After deriving the first order conditions (see appendix), we find that
along the optimal path, the costs of building new capacities ci′(xi,t)
equals the shadow value of capacities νt plus the shadow costs of the
irreversibility constraint ξi,t, that is ci′(xi,t) = νt + ξi,t. According to
when the value of a power plant νt is higher than the minimal costs
c′i(0) of constructing the same power plant from scratch, power plants
are built up to the pace at which the building costs equal the value of
power plants, and the irreversibility constraint is not binding (ξi,t = 0):
νt > c
′
i(0) ⇐⇒ ci′(xi,t) = νt ⇐⇒ xi,t > 0 (2.13)
For values νt lower than c′i(0), it would be desirable to deconstruct the
power plants back into raw resources, but the irreversibility constraint
prevents that. First order conditions also show that the value of capac-
ity νt is linked to the shadow cost of the capacity constraint γi,t by the
following relation:
γi,t = (δ + r) νt − ν˙t, ∀t (2.14)
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This is a well-known equation in the theory of investment. It means that
γi,t is what Jorgenson (1967) calls the implicit rental costs of capital.
It is the rental price that ensures agents are indifferent between buying
capacity at νt and renting capacity at γi,t. As pointed by Jorgenson
(1967), the relation expresses the absence of arbitrage opportunities
between the two following strategies: (i) buy a power plant at t at a
costs νt, rent it out during one period dt at the rental price γi,t, then
sell the depreciated (δ) capacities at t + dt at a price νt + ν˙tdt or (ii)
simply lend money at the interest rate r. In other words, the current
price of capital, νt, comes from the rent derived from the capital today,
γi,t, and from future price changes ν˙t.
Combining (2.13) and (2.14), we find that when power plants are
being built, the building costs and the rental costs of a given type of
power plant are linked in a similar way:
xi,t > 0 ⇐⇒ γi,t = (δ + r) ci′(xi,t)− d
dt
ci
′(xi,t) (2.15)
This relation means that on the optimal path, there are no arbitrage
opportunities between using a stock of money for building power plants
in order to rent them, and simply lending money at the interest rate r.
In section 2.4, we show how integrating (2.15) yields an equation
analogous to ci′(xi,t) =
∫
e−(r+δ)tγi,t dt: power plants are built up to
the pace for which the construction cost equals the discounted sum of
future rental revenues from the depreciating marginal capacity. Before
that, the next subsection studies the capacity rents γi,t.
2.3 Electricity prices, Hotelling and capacity rents
We continue the resolution with the equilibrium conditions between
Hotelling rents, capacity rents, and electricity prices at each point in
time. When power plants are being used, the first-order conditions
simplify to (see appendix):
ci
′(xi,t) > 0 ⇐⇒ u′t = γi,t + αi,t + µt Fi (2.16)
On the left hand side, u′t is the competitive electricity price — u′t stands
for u′ (∑i ci′(xi,t)). On the right hand side, γi,t is the capacity rent, αi,t
are the fuel costs, Fi the carbon intensity of technology i, and µt is
the carbon price. Equation 2.16 implies that, if a technology is used at
time t, the full costs of producing electricity with that technology must
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be equal to the electricity price.
In addition, the capacity rent γi,t, as the Lagrange multiplier associ-
ated with the capacity constraint, is null when capacity i is underused
(equation 2.45 in the appendix):
ci
′(xi,t) < kt =⇒ γi,t = 0 (2.17)
Taken together, the last two equations imply that (in general), at
any time, only one type of power plant is used at full capacity. Indeed,
if two technologies i and j are both used under full capacity at time t,
then the costs of fuel and carbon for these two technologies are equal:
0 < ci
′(xi,t) < kt & 0 < qj,t < kj,t =⇒ u′t = αi,t + Fi µt = αj,t + Fj µt
(2.18)
The occurrence of such a situation requires a very specific set of pa-
rameters linking available coal resources, gas resources, and the carbon
budget. As a consequence, we neglect this case for the rest of the paper.
The previous results suggest the following natural definitions, and
an immediate proposition, both illustrated in Fig. 2.2:
Definition 1. 1. We call the sum of fuel prices and carbon prices
of technology i: αi,t + Fi µt variable production costs.
2. We call the used capacity with the highest variable production costs
at time t the marginal power plant at time t.
Following these definitions, equation 2.16 allows to characterize the
electricity price at each point in time t, contingent on the marginal
power plant:
Proposition 1. At each point in time t, the electricity price u′t is
given by the variable costs of the marginal power plant, and a capacity
rent which is strictly positive only when capacities are fully used. In
particular:
1. If coal capacities are used at less than full capacity, the electricity
price equals variable costs from coal generation:
0 < qh,t < kh,t =⇒ u′t = αh,t + Fh µt (2.19)
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2. If gas capacities are used at less than full capacity, the electricity
price equals variable costs from gas generation:
0 < qℓ,t < kℓ,t =⇒ u′t = αℓ,t + Fℓ µt (2.20)
3. If all capacities are either used at full capacity or not used at all,
rental costs adjust such that the production costs, including the
rental costs of capacities, is equal across technologies.
ci
′(xi,t) = kt =⇒ γi,t > 0 and u′t = γi,t + αi,t + µt Fi (2.21)
Proof. Straightforward implication of equations (2.16),(2.17) and (2.18).
Fig. 2.1 and 2.2 illustrate this proposition. Fig. 2.1 shows the marginal
costs of energy and the electricity price of electricity as a function of the
installed capacity at time t, as well as the downward sloping electricity
demand. Installed capacities are ranked along their merit order, that
is according to variable production costs — again, excluding capacity
rents. Price and total quantities are set where the demand function
intersects the merit order curve. The various panels represent different
phases in the transition, and different cases of Proposition 1.
Fig. 2.1 also illustrates how fully-used capacities receive a capacity
rent γi. Capacity rents provide incentives to invest and increase infra-
marginal capacity. They also allow the market to clear when marginal
capacities are fully used (Fig. 2.1b and Fig. 2.1d), and finance the main-
tenance of renewable capacities when all production comes from renew-
able power (Fig. 2.1d). Positive capacity rents are possible even in the
absence of market imperfections (other than the unrelated GHG ex-
ternality) because adjustment costs prevent total capacities to adjust
immediately to a point where capacity rents would be null. 11
11It is well-known that infra-marginal capacity rents allow power producers to
finance investment (e.g., ?Boiteux, 1960; Biggar et Hesamzadeh, 2014). At the best
of our knowledge, this paper is the first to propose that adjustment costs allow
explicit (and parsimonious) modeling of the link between infra-marginal rents and
investment decisions. Indeed, the most frequent practice to take into account the
limited ability to switch quickly from high- to low-carbon capital is to use exogenous
maximum investment speeds (see footnote 3 and Seebregts et al., 2002; Loulou, 2008;
Wilson et al., 2013; Iyer et al., 2015; Vogt-Schilb et al., 2014a).
77
/

	
	ℓ
′
 + ℓ  + ℓ + 
ℓ + ℓ
0
 =  + 
$
/




(a) A case where coal is the
marginal power plant, and is used
under full capacity
$
/




	
	ℓ
′
 =   + ℓ  + ℓ + 

ℓ + ℓ
0
 + 
/
(b) A case where gas is the
marginal power plant and is used at
full capacity
$
/




	
′
 +ℓ
 = ℓ + ℓ
 + 
/

0
(c) A case where gas is the
marginal power plant, and is used
under full capacity
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(d) The steady state, when all
production comes from renewable
power
Figure 2.1 – Examples of the merit-order curve at different points of the
transition from coal to gas and renewable power
Note: The horizontal axis shows the installed capacity for renewable power (z), gas
(ℓ) and coal (h) at one given point in time. The vertical axis shows the marginal
costs and the price of electricity. The production technologies are ranked according
to their variable production costs, excluding capacity rents (in other words, account-
ing only for the resource costs αi plus the cost of emissions µFi). The price p and
quantity q are set by the intersection of the demand curve u′ and the merit-order
curve. Such intersection can lead to only one type of power plants to be used, but
under full capacity: the marginal capacity. All technologies used at full capacity
receive a capacity rent γi = p− αi − µFi.
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(a) Production and capacity (b) Electricity price
(c) Marginal investment cost
Figure 2.2 – Capacity, production, electricity price and investment in one
possible transition from coal to gas and renewable power
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As discussed in section 2.5, the ordering of investment in gas and re-
newable power may vary. Fig. 2.2 shows one particular situation where
investment in both renewable and gas power start at the beginning
of the time horizon. Fig. 2.2a plots capacity and production against
time, while Fig. 2.2b shows the electricity price. In a first phase, coal is
progressively replaced by both renewable and gas, coal capacity is un-
derused and the price of electricity is determined by the variable cost of
coal (as in Fig. 2.1a). During this phase, the electricity price increases,
as the cost of coal and the cost of carbon emissions increase.
When coal is entirely phased, a phase follows during which renew-
able power progressively replaces gas. During this phase, gas is used at
full capacity, and the electricity price includes a rent for gas capacity
(as in Fig. 2.1b). Investment in renewable and gas power first increases
both renewable and gas capacity, reducing capacity rents, and decreas-
ing the price of electricity. At some point, future rents for gas plants
become too low to make new gas capacities profitable, and investment
in gas stops. During the later part of this second phase, total capacity
decreases and electricity prices increase again. 12
In a third phase, gas plants are used under full capacity, the price
is set by the variable costs of gas, and the price increases over time
(as in Fig. 2.1c). During the final phase, gas plants are entirely phased
out, carbon-free capacity receives a decreasing rent (and the electricity
price decreases) until the point where capacity rents compensate ex-
actly depreciation of carbon-free capacity, and the system has reached
a steady state (as in Fig. 2.1d).
2.4 Valuing investment in gas and renewable power plants
In this section, we study optimal investment decisions. As clarified
in section 2.2, the anticipation of all future prices and resulting capacity
rents γi,t translates into a value νt for current capacity. If that value is
higher than the cost of building new capacities νt > c′i(0), investment in
type capacity i is desirable (and undertaken by well-functioning markets
facing the right carbon price).
The case of renewable power plants is the simplest one. Because
12Fig. 2.1b shows that when gas is used at full capacity, the increasing cost of
carbon and gas fuel (which translates into an increasing height for the red rectangle)
cannot be passed to the consumer through the electricity price; while the changes
of wind and gas capacity (modifying the width of the green and red rectangles) do
change capacity rents and resulting electricity prices.
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they bare no variable costs, existing renewable power plants are always
used and always receive a rent equal to the electricity price : γz,t = u′t.
The value of renewable power plants is the solution of the differential
equation (2.14):
νz,t =
∫ ∞
t
e−(r+δ)(θ−t)u′θ dθ, ∀t (2.22)
It is equal to the present value of all future revenues from selling the
electricity (u′θ) produced by the depreciated marginal unit of capacity
(e−(r+δ)(t−θ)). We denote the date when investment in renewable power
starts by τ+z ; following (2.13):
c′z(xz,t) =
∫ ∞
t
e−(r+δ)(θ−t)u′θ dθ, ∀t ≥ τ+z (2.23)
Equation 2.23 says that when windmills are built, they are built up to
the pace where the marginal costs of producing windmills equal their
discounted future revenues.
The case of gas capacity is more complex. As we have shown in the
previous subsection, gas capacity may be underused during the optimal
transition from coal to gas and renewable power. We denote by Tγ the
date when gas is underused. Gas capacities receive a rent only when
they are fully used (t > Tγ =⇒ γℓ,t = 0), leading to the following
value for gas capacities:
νℓ,t =
∫ Tγ
t
e−(r+δ)(θ−t)(u′θ − µθ Fℓ − αℓ,θ)dθ (2.24)
The value of gas power plants is the discounted sum of the electricity
price net of production costs over the period when gas power plants are
used at full capacity. Investment in gas power plants is optimal when
the value of gas plants exceeds the minimal value of producing a gas
plant νℓ,t > c′ℓ(0). 13
13Note that investment in gas stops at τ -ℓ when future revenues are lower than
the minimal building cost, such that:∫ Tγ
τ -ℓ
e−(r+δ)(θ−τ
-
ℓ)(u′θ − µθ Fi − αi,θ)dθ = c′ℓ(0) (2.25)
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Comparing equations 2.23 and 2.24 reveals that renewable power
plants are more valuable than gas power plants:
νz,t − νℓ,t =
∫ Tγ
t
e−(r+δ)(θ−t) (µθ Fℓ + αℓ,θ) dθ︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆γ
+ c′z(xz,Tγ )e
(r+δ)(t−Tγ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆ν
≥ 0
(2.26)
The difference in the values of renewable and gas power plants breaks
down into:
• ∆γ, the discounted value of emissions and fossil fuels that the
marginal renewable capacity built at time t saves before τ -ℓ , when
compared to a marginal gas capacity built at the same time; and
• ∆ν, the difference between the discounted values of the capacities
at Tγ. Indeed, after Tγ, gas plants are underused and receive no
rents, such that their value is null; while renewable power plants
have a positive value νz,t = c′z(xz,Tγ ).
While the value of renewable plants are higher than the value of
gas power plants, gas plants are cheaper to build than windmills. As a
result, the optimal ordering of investment in both types of power plants
is not trivial, as discussed in the next subsection.
2.5 Ordering investment in low- and zero-carbon capacity
Three dates are of particular importance to classify transition pro-
files from coal to gas and renewable power: the date τ+z when invest-
ment in renewable starts, the date τ+ℓ when investment in gas power
plants starts and the date T -h when coal production is phased out.
In general, three given dates can be ordered in six different ways.
Two cases (T -h < τ+z ≤ τ+ℓ and T -h < τ+ℓ ≤ τ+z ) are never optimal
with standard utility functions, because they imply that coal is phased
out before investment in renewable or gas have started, so that energy
consumption tends to 0 when t tends to T -h. This leaves four relevant
cases, as stated in the following proposition:
In particular, if c′ℓ(0) = 0 then τ -ℓ = Tγ (this is the case in Fig. 2.2).
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Proposition 2. Depending on the parameters, investment phases may
be ordered in three different ways:
1. Two successive transitions (τ+ℓ ≤ T -h < τ+z ). Gas first completely
replaces coal, then renewable power replaces gas. In this case,
investment in renewable power starts after coal is phased out, but
before gas is phased out (Fig. 2.3a).
2. Gas and wind simultaneously replace coal, starting with invest-
ment in gas (τ+ℓ ≤ τ+z ≤ T -h). In this case, investment in renew-
able starts before production from any fossil resources is phased-
out (Fig. 2.3b).
3. Starting with investment in renewable power, either using some
gas (τ+z ≤ τ+ℓ ≤ T -h, as in Fig. 2.2) or without using any gas
(τ+z ≤ T -h ≤ τ+ℓ ,Fig. 2.3c).
Proof. See text before the proposition.
We use numerical simulations to investigate how the stringency of
the carbon budget and the adjustment costs lead to different transitions
profiles. To quantify the stringency of adjustment costs, we write the
cost functions as:
ci(xi,t) = Ci ×
(
(1− A) xi,t + 1
2
Ax2i,t
)
(2.27)
=⇒ ci′(xi,t) = Ci × ((1− A) + Axi,t) (2.28)
where A ∈ (0, 1) is a measure of adjustment costs, which for simplicity
is equal across technologies, and Ci is a scaling parameter (Cz > Cℓ as
renewable capacity is more expensive than gas capacity). When A = 0,
i.e. marginal investment costs are constant, there are no adjustment
costs, and optimal investment pathways may exhibit jumps. When A =
1, the full cost is purely quadratic, marginal costs are linear, capacity
accumulated at very low speed is almost free (limxi,t→0;A=0 ci′(xi,t) = 0),
and the cost of new capacity doubles when the investment pace doubles.
For intermediate value A ∈ (0, 1), new capacity is always costly, and
the marginal costs of new capacity increase with the pace of investment.
Results are displayed in Fig. 2.4. The first case discussed in Prop. 2
is similar to an Herfindahl sequence, where energy sources are used
one after the other (Fig. 2.3a). The sensitivity analysis reveals that
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(a) Two successive transitions
(b) Gas and wind simultaneously replace coal
(c) Wind alone replaces coal
Figure 2.3 – Numerical simulations of three possible transition profiles.
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Figure 2.4 – How transition profiles depend on the stringency of the carbon
budget and the adjustment costs.
this case requires a large carbon budget—which “gives time” to switch
entirely to gas before starting to invest in renewable power, and low
adjustment costs—making it cheap to invest in each of the transitions
(red triangles in Fig. 2.4). In the limiting case without adjustment
costs, the optimal strategy is to replace all coal with gas overnight at
a date Thℓ = T -h = τ+ℓ , and then replace all gas with renewable at some
later date Tℓz = Tγ = τ+z .
The second case happens with any non-zero carbon budget, pro-
vided adjustment costs are large enough, but not too large (orange cir-
cles in Fig. 2.4). In this case, renewable power enters early to smooth
investment and reduce adjustment costs. In addition, transient in-
vestment in gas allows for reducing investment in expensive renewable
power plants in the short term, moving some efforts to the medium
term, when gas power is under-used and replaced by renewable power
(Fig. 2.3b).
With even higher adjustment costs, it becomes even more profitable
to smooth investment in renewable power, and investment in renewable
power starts as soon as possible. In this case, investment in gas and
wind start simultaneously at the beginning of the transition (τ+z = τ+ℓ =
t0 ≤ T -h, green dots in Fig. 2.4). This case corresponds to the third
one in Prop. 2, as the transition begins with investment in renewable
power. Finally, for very low carbon budgets, investment still starts with
renewable power, but gas is not even used as intermediary technology
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(Fig. 2.3c and blue stars in Fig. 2.4). 14
3 Numerical application to the European electric-
ity sector
3.1 Functional forms, data and calibration
We calibrate the model with raw data from the European power
sector, as described in the European 2050 Energy Roadmap (EU, 2011).
In this numerical application, efficient gas power plants (the low-carbon
technology) and onshore wind (the zero-carbon technology) are used to
phase out the existing polluting capacities represented by the average
legacy thermal production mix (composed of coal, oil and gas Tab. 2.1).
We modify the model from section 1 to take into account that Eu-
rope is price-taker for fossil resources. We assume exogenous fossil fuel
costs αi,t, calibrated from the European 2050 Roadmap — αh,t is com-
puted as the weighted average of the price of coal, gas and oil (Tab. 2.2).
The new social planner program reads:
max
xi,t,ci′(xi,t)
∫ ∞
0
e−rt
[
u
(∑
i
ci
′(xi,t)
)
−
∑
i
(ci(xi,t) + ci
′(xi,t)αi,t)
]
dt
(2.29)
s.t. k˙i,t = xi,t − δkt (νt)
qj,t ≤ kj,t (γi,t)
qj,t ≥ 0 (λi,t)
xi,t ≥ 0 (ξi,t)
m˙t =
∑
i
Fi qj,t (µt)
mt ≤ B (ηt)
Problem 2.29 has the same first order conditions and economic inter-
pretation as problem 2.11 exposed in section 1.
For the utility function, we start from a demand function calibrated
14In the limit case with no adjustment costs, and very low carbon budgets, switch-
ing overnight from coal to gas at Thℓ and then overnight to renewable at Tℓz would
not be optimal, because the time span during which gas power plants would operate
Tℓz − Thℓ would be too short for the initial investment to be profitable. This case,
mentioned for the sake of completeness, is not distinguishable from the case of a 0
carbon budget in Fig. 2.4.
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Table 2.1 – Technology sets considered in the numerical model
Set Abbreviation Composition
High carbon technology Legacy
Average thermal production
mix in 2008: 40% gas, 50%
coal, 10% oil
Low carbon technology Gas Efficient gas
Zero carbon technology Wind Onshore wind
Source: ENERDATA (2012)
Table 2.2 – Fuel price trajectories of the fossil technology sets in $/MWh
2008 2025 2035 2050
Legacy 40 43 45 37
Gas 58 68 67 54
Source: EU (2011)
Table 2.3 – Technology-specific data used in the numerical application
Description Unit Legacy Gas Wind Source
Cmi
Nominal
investment
costs
$/kW 2 100 1 400 2 500
EU (2011); IEA
(2010)
Xi
Average
annual new
capacity in
Europe
GW/yr 4.2 11 10 ENERDATA (2012)
Hi
Average
annual
operating
hours
h/yr 7 500 7 500 2 000
EU (2011); IEA
(2010)
Fi
Carbon
intensity gCO2/kWh 530 330 0
ENERDATA (2012);
Trotignon et
Delbosc (2008)
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Table 2.4 – General parameter values used in the numerical application
Description Unit Value Source
r Discount rate %/yr 5
B Carbon budget(central value) G tCO2 22 UE (2011)
D0
Electricity de-
mand in 2008 TWh/y 1 940
ENERDATA
(2012); EU (2011)
G Annual growth ofdemand TWh/y 16.5 EU (2011)
P Average electric-ity price in 2008 $/MWh 90 Eurostat (2014)
e
Short term lin-
ear price elastic-
ity of electricity
demand
(TWh/y)/($/MWh) 0.1 Eurostat (2014)
δ Depreciation rate %/yr 3.33 IEA (2010)
A
Convexity pa-
rameter (central
value)
· 1
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against Dt, the projected demand in the Roadmap. We assume this
demand corresponds to a reference price P , taken as the average elec-
tricity price to households in all European countries P = 90$/MWh
(Eurostat, 2014). We then assume a short-term linear elasticity e = .1,
meaning that increases of 10% of the electricity price above this refer-
ence level would lead demand to be reduced by 1% compared to the
reference demand Dt (Labandeira et al., 2012). The demand function
reads:
q(p) = Dt − e · (p− P ) (2.30)
Substituting the price p for u′t(q) yields:
u(q) =
(
P +
Dt
e
)
q − q
2
2e
(2.31)
The reference electricity consumption point D0 is calibrated to match
the reference fossil energy production (from coal, oil and gas) in 2008,
that is D0 = 1 940 TWh/yr (ENERDATA, 2012). The central sce-
nario of the Roadmap envisages that electricity demand will increase
by 700 TWh/yr between 2008 and 2050. We model this by a linear
growth of G = 16.5 TWh/yr2:
Dt = D0 + t ·G (2.32)
To better fit the data, we express installed capacity kt in peak
capacity (GW), and production ci′(xi,t) in GWh/yr. Production is
constrained by a maximum number of operating hours per year Hi
(Tab. 2.3). For instance, a given windmill produces electricity only
when it is windy, which happens only a given number of hours per year
in expectation. We thus ignore unpredicted intermittency issues, which
add a cost to renewable sources, and are a rationale to use back-up
generation along with renewable power (Ambec et Crampes, 2012). 15
The initial capacity of wind and gas are by assumption zero, and
we calibrate the initial capacity of the legacy technology to match the
level of capacity needed to produce the initial reference electricity con-
15Alternatively, our renewable technology may be interpreted as a mix of in-
termittent renewable and carbon-free back-up, as provided for instance, by large
hydro, nuclear or biomass.
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sumption point D0 at the given capacity factor:
kz,0 = kl,0 = 0; kh,0 =
D0
Hh
To calibrate the cost functions, we assume that when investment
equals the actual average annual investment flow in Europe between
2009 and 2011 (Xi), the marginal investment cost Cmi is equal to the
OECD average value for 2010 (Tab. 2.3). We thus re-write the cost
function used in the previous section as:
ci(xi,t) = C
m
i ·Xi ·
(
(1− A) xi,t
Xi
+
A
2
(
xi,t
Xi
)2)
(2.33)
=⇒ c′i (Xi) = Cmi (2.34)
According to Trotignon et Delbosc (2008), emission allowances allo-
cated to the power sector in 2008 amounted to eref,t = 1.03GtCO2/yr ,
leading to a reference carbon intensity of Fh = 530 tCO2/GWh. A lin-
ear decrease of these emissions until 2050, as planned in the Roadmap,
yields a carbon budget of B = 22GtCO2. (A sensitivity analysis on B
is performed later.) The carbon intensity of gas is taken to be equal to
Fl = 330 tCO2/GWh.
We use r = 5 %/yr for the social discount rate. We assume for
simplicity that all technologies have the same depreciation rate δ, cali-
brated as δ = 1/lifetime assuming a lifetime of 30 years (IEA, 2010).
3.2 Results
Fig. 2.5 shows production, investment and the electricity price ob-
tained in the numerical application. For the carbon budget to be consis-
tent with the roadmap, the social planner does not invest in the legacy
capacity. Moreover, existing legacy plants start being decommissioned
as soon as the climate policy is implemented (Fig. 2.5a). In this simu-
lation, legacy fossil-fueled plants are entirely phased out in 2028. With
our technology assumptions, the carbon budget is slightly too loose
to justify a complete decarbonization by 2050, as it is the European
Commission’s objective; production from fossil fuel is phased out by
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(a) Production and capacity (b) Electricity price
(c) Investment
Figure 2.5 – Numerical application to the European electricity sector
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2059 instead.16 The carbon price consistent with the carbon budget is
108 $/tCO2.17 Electricity prices start at 90$/MWh (close to the actual
average EU level), increase with the carbon price to 300 $/MWh by
the end of the transition in 2059, and decrease again to reach a plateau
around 220 $/MWh by the end of the century.
Investment in renewable power starts as soon as possible (Fig. 2.5c),
and grows over time, until all production is generated by renewable
power plants (Fig. 2.5a). Optimal investment in renewable rises from 15
to 18 GW/yr between 2008 and 2013. These figures are close to actual
numbers, as investment in renewable capacity in Europe fluctuated
between 15 to 34 GW/yr during this same period (EWEA, 2014).18
Investment in new gas plants also start as soon as possible, smooth-
ing the need for more expensive investment in renewable in the short
term (Fig. 2.5c). But new gas plants play a transient role. In 2040, in-
vestment in gas stops and gas capacities start being underused, allowing
gas to be replaced faster by renewable power. In this simulation, up
to 80 GW of gas power plants (or the capacity to produce 600 TWh/y)
are underused during the simulation.
We perform various sensitivity analyses to investigate under which
conditions it would be optimal to wait before building renewable power
in Europe. A first one varying adjustment costs A and the carbon
budget B reveal that for any carbon budget lower than 45 GtCO2 (twice
the budget implied in the Roadmap), and for any adjustment costs, it
is optimal to start building renewable power as soon as possible.
We then perform another sensitivity analysis, holding the carbon
budget constant and varying adjustment costs and nominal invest-
ment costs for renewable power (Fig. 2.6). For high adjustment costs
(A > 0.5), it is optimal to start with renewable power even if invest-
ment costs were as high as 10$/W (four times our estimation of actual
costs). For low adjustment costs (A = .125), it is optimal to delay
investment in clean electricity if costs are higher than 4$/W, that is
60% more expensive than our reference calibration. Finally, if adjust-
16Note that we ignored technical progress reducing the cost of renewable energy
in the future, which could be a rationale to accelerate decarbonization.
17This is much higher than the current carbon price in the EU-ETS. Note that the
European governments currently rely on other policies — feed-in-tariffs, mandates
and auctioned pilot projects — to encourage investment in renewable power.
18All these figures are expressed in peak capacity; Fig. 2.5c also reports investment
in equivalent capacity, taking into account that renewable power can be used less
hours per year.
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Figure 2.6 – Transition types for different values of the cost of renewables
and the adjustment costs.
ment costs are entirely absent, the optimal strategy is to first replace
existing capacity with gas, and only to later replace all gas power with
renewable power overnight.
4 Conclusion
Our results should be interpreted cautiously, as our analysis makes
several simplifications. Among them, we did not account for knowledge
accumulation and directed technical change, which have been found to
play a key role in the optimal transition from fossil to renewable energy
(Tahvonen et Salo, 2001; Acemoglu et al., 2012; André et Smulders,
2014; Gerlagh et al., 2014). Knowledge spillovers would tend to increase
the short-term gap between optimal investment in renewable and gas
energy (Rosendahl, 2004b; Bramoullé et Olson, 2005; del Rio Gonzalez,
2008), adding to the effect of adjustment costs studied here.
We also disregarded uncertainty, known to play a key role in optimal
accumulation of capital (Pindyck, 1991), optimal emission reduction
pathways (Ha-Duong et al., 1997), and optimal extraction of several
energy sources (Gaudet et Lasserre, 2011). While it is well known that
uncertainty provides a strong rationale for avoiding irreversible activi-
ties, the net effect of uncertainty is not trivial in our setting. Indeed,
extracting exhaustible resources, releasing long-lived GHG in the at-
mosphere, investing in carbon-intensive power plants, and investing in
expensive renewable capacities are all irreversible activities. Moreover,
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in the presence of adjustment costs, waiting makes subsequent invest-
ment more expensive. We leave the question of uncertainty for further
research.
Another limitation is that, we did not explicitly model the inter-
mittency of renewable sources, which may require to keep flexible gas
turbines (or other flexible but carbon-free options such as large hy-
dro or biomass-fueled plants) in operation. Finally, we disregarded the
possibility to retrofit existing plants (notably with carbon capture and
storage), and the possibility to use cleaner fuels (in particular derived
from biomass) in existing power plants.
Notwithstanding these limitations, our parsimonious model suggests
that capacity constraints and adjustment costs play an essential role
in the transition from coal to gas and renewable energy. Our results
stand in contrast to those derived from “pure” Hotelling models, where
capital accumulation and adjustment costs are neglected (or that focus
on generic capital that can be fueled with any type of energy). In
particular, we find that it makes sense to start investment in, and usage
of, renewable energy before coal and gas resources are phased out, even
if renewable energy first appears to be more expensive.
We also find that the transition to carbon-free energy may benefit
from temporary investment in intermediate technologies such as gas, to
decrease (but not necessarily cancel) the need for costlier renewables
in the short term. The resulting plants would however need to be
subsequently decommissioned, to give room to more carbon-free energy
in the medium term.
Our results shed light on technical choices (e.g., investors can con-
sider gas plants with shorter scheduled lifetimes or an option to retrofit)
as well as policy decisions (when setting milestones for carbon-free
power). Finally, while we used power generation as an obvious illustra-
tion, our paper more broadly informs on the ordering and assessment
of investment in polluting fossil-fueled and clean capital. Its results
could be extended to other capital- and energy-intensive sectors, such
as buildings and transportation.
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Appendices
A Efficiency conditions
The Hamiltonian associated with Problem 2.11 reads:
H = e−rt
[
u
(∑
i
ci
′(xi,t)
)
−
∑
i
ci(xi,t) −
∑
i
νt (δ kt − xi,t)
− µt
∑
i
Fi qj,t − ηt (mt −B)−
∑
i
(αi,t ci
′(xi,t)− βi,t Si,t)
−
∑
i
γi,t (qj,t − kj,t) +
∑
i
λi,t qj,t +
∑
i
ξi,t xi,t
]
(2.35)
The first-order conditions are:
∂H
∂xi
= 0 ⇐⇒ ci′(xi,t) = νt + ξi,t (2.36)
∂H
∂qi
= 0 ⇐⇒ λi,t − µtRi − αi,t + u′t = γi,t (2.37)
∂H
∂ki
=
−d (e−rtνt)
dt
⇐⇒ (δ + r) νt − ν˙t = γi,t (2.38)
∂H
∂mt
=
−d (e−rtµt)
dt
⇐⇒ µ˙t − r µt = −ηt (2.39)
∂H
∂Si
=
−d (e−rtαi,t)
dt
⇐⇒ α˙i − r αi,t = −βi,t (2.40)
The complementary slackness conditions are:
∀i, t, ξi,t ≥ 0, xi,t ≥ 0 and ξi,t xi,t = 0 (2.41)
∀i, t, λi,t ≥ 0, ci′(xi,t) ≥ 0 and λi,t ci′(xi,t) = 0 (2.42)
∀i, t, ηt ≥ 0, B −mt ≥ 0 and ηt (B −mt) = 0 (2.43)
∀i, t, βi,t ≥ 0, Si,t ≥ 0 and βi,t Si,t = 0 (2.44)
∀i, t, γi,t ≥ 0, kt − ci′(xi,t) ≥ 0 and γi,t (kt − ci′(xi,t)) = 0
(2.45)
The transversality condition is replaced by the terminal condition
that at some point the atmospheric carbon reaches its ceiling (2.8).
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B Scarcity rents of the exhaustible resources and
the carbon budget
From (2.43) and (2.44), we see that while the carbon budget and the
resource stocks are not exhausted, their non-negativity dual variable ηt
and βi,t are zero. From (2.39) (2.40), we then get the classic Hotelling
rule:
αh,t = αh e
rt
αℓ,t = αℓ e
rt
µt = µe
rt
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Table 2.5 – Variables and parameters notations used in the model.
Description Dimension
i technology index
h coal (high-carbon technology,h)
l gas (low-carbon technology, ℓ)
z renewables (zero-carbon technology, z)
kt capacity of technology i at time t GW
ci
′(xi,t) production with technology i at time t GW
xi,t
physical investment in technology i at time
t
GW/yr
ci(xi,t) cost of investment in technology i at time t $/yr
νt shadow price of capacity kt $/GW
µt shadow cost of emissions (carbon price) $/ tCO2
αi,t
shadow cost of resource used by technology
i (fuel price) $/GWh
γi,t shadow rental cost of existing capacity i $/(GW· yr)
u′t
shadow electricity price (or willingness to
pay) $/GWh
mt stock of atmospheric carbon tCO2
δ depreciation rate yr−1
r discount rate yr−1
Fi emission rate of technology i tCO2/GWh
Dt demand level at time t GW
B carbon budget tCO2
u (
∑
i ci
′(xi,t)) consumer utility $/yr
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3
Pathways toward Zero-Carbon
Electricity Required for Climate
Stabilization
Power generation plays an important role in global warming, forat least two reasons. First, it is responsible for a large share of
anthropogenic greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions: today’s electricity ac-
counts for 12GtCO2/yr, about 28% of total annual greenhouse gas
emissions. Reducing the carbon content of electricity would thus de-
crease significantly global GHG emissions. Second, electricity can be
used as a substitute for carbon-intensive fossil fuels in many cases.
For instance, today’s road transportation and housing sectors account
together for about 16% of total emissions; and industrial energy con-
sumption, mainly used to produce heat or motion, accounts for an
additional 18% (IEA, 2012; WRI, 2015). Technologies such as electric
vehicles, heat pumps, electric furnaces, industrial motors and other
electric equipment can in part replace fossil-fuel based counterparts in
these sectors, reducing indirectly GHG emissions.
A well-established result from integrated assessment models (IAM)
is that both decarbonization of electricity supply and electrification of
the energy system play a decisive role in reaching climate stabiliza-
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tion (e.g., Luderer et al., 2012; Sugiyama, 2012; Williams et al., 2012;
IEA, 2014a; IPCC, 2014b; Krey et al., 2014; McCollum et al., 2014;
Sachs et al., 2014).1 Indeed, stabilizing climate change to any level
(e.g. 2, 3 or 4◦C) requires reducing global emissions to near-zero lev-
els (Collins et al., 2013; IPCC, 2013). Moreover, switching from fossil
fuel to low-carbon electricity is one of the only technical options to
drastically reduce GHG emissions in energy-intensive sectors such as
industry, transportation and buildings.
Despite this consensus and its importance to inform the policy de-
bate, cost-effective pathways of the future carbon content of electricity
are not available to decision-makers, researchers in other disciplines, or
the general public — in particular, none of the above-mentioned studies
provides any pathway of the carbon content of electricity under climate
stabilization targets. To fill this gap, we compute and report the carbon
content of electricity in a set of existing prospective scenarios.
We focus on a set of 55 pathways generated with 10 different in-
tegrated assessment models (IAM) for the purpose of a recent IAM
comparison study: AMPERE (Riahi et al., 2015).2 IAMs compute
cost-effective pathways of the socio-economic and energy systems un-
der the constraint set by climate targets. They factor in a wide range
of parameters, such as long-term demographic evolution; availability
of natural resources; countries’ participation to emission-reduction ef-
forts. Technology costs and maximum penetration rates, in particular,
are calibrated using a mix of historical uptake rates and assumptions
on learning by doing and autonomous technical progress (Wilson et al.,
2013; Iyer et al., 2015). IAMs are regularly peer-reviewed in comparison
exercises (Clarke et al., 2009; van Vuuren et al., 2009; Edenhofer et al.,
2010; Kriegler et al., 2015, 2014) and occasionally evaluated against
historical data (Guivarch et al., 2009; Wilson et al., 2013).
Unsurprisingly, the pathways of the carbon content of electricity
from AMPERE confirm the above-mentioned consensus. Specifically,
the pathways show that (1) near-zero-carbon electricity is necessary
1These and other studies offer in-depth analysis of the interlinked dynamics of
electrification and decarbonization of electricity, and cover topics out of the scope
of this paper, such as economic implications and the role of different technologies
to produce zero-carbon electricity.
2We chose this study as it is freely available online (IIASA, 2014), other recent
studies such as EMF27 (Kriegler et al., 2014) are of similar scope, use a broader va-
riety of models and assumptions, and reach qualitatively and quantitatively similar
results, but are unfortunately not publicly available online at the moment.
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to reach concentrations consistent with global warming anywhere from
2◦C to 3◦C; (2) near-zero-carbon electricity can be achieved even if
some of the key low-carbon technologies (nuclear, carbon capture and
storage, or renewable power) turn out to be unavailable; and (3) near-
zero-carbon electricity can and should occur in every major country or
region of the world.
We report pathways at the global level and the country/region level
for China, the EU, India and the US, under a variety of assumptions
concerning the state of technology and long-term climate targets. These
pathways may be useful to planners and policymakers designing climate
mitigation strategies. First, they provide a reference on the speed at
which decarbonization of the power sector should happen to meet a
given climate target in a cost-effective way. They may thus be used to
benchmark existing milestones, such as the ones proposed by the Euro-
pean Commission’s energy roadmap (UE, 2011) and the Clean Power
Plan currently under discussion in the US; or inform new measures in
other countries or jurisdictions.
Second, such pathways of the carbon content of electricity are useful
to assess the desirability of specific electrification technologies. Indeed,
existing studies have focused on the impact of electrification on today’s
GHG emissions, and concluded that it depends on the carbon intensity
of power generation at the specific location where it takes place. For
instance, electric vehicles may emit more GHG than conventional ve-
hicles if they are charged in places where or at time of the days when
electricity is produced from coal (Sioshansi et Denholm, 2009; Hawkins
et al., 2012a,b; Richardson, 2013; Graff Zivin et al., 2014).3 However,
since climate stabilization eventually requires near-zero carbon electric-
ity, the relevant question for policymakers is not whether to electrify,
but when to do it. The pathways reported make it possible to investi-
gate this question, using what Hertwich et al. (2014) recently called an
integrated life cycle analysis.4
3Such studies have been interpreted as showing that electrification is to be
avoided (e.g., BBC, 2012). Similar results have been reported by Thomson et al.
(2000) on industrial electric furnaces, and Gustavsson et Joelsson (2010), Za-
balza Bribián et al. (2009) and Ramesh et al. (2010) on buildings.
4As mentioned before, IAMs are sometimes used to assess optimal electrification
of the economy. The pathways provided here can nonetheless be used by scholars
outside the IAM community, for instance to evaluate the impact on GHG emissions
of a technology or industrial process too specific to be explicitly represented in an
IAM.
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(a) 450 ppm — all
carbon-free technologies
(b) 550 ppm — all carbon-free
technologies
Figure 3.1 – Carbon content of electricity at the global scale in two scenar-
ios: (a) stringent GHG concentration target (consistent with 2◦C); (b) less
stringent GHG concentration target (consistent with 3◦C). Each thin line
corresponds to the pathway simulated by one integrated assessment model
(the reported carbon intensity for 2005 and 2010 varies among IAMs because
they use different scopes and sources of historical data for calibration). In
both cases, bio-energy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) allows to
reduce the carbon content of electricity to below-zero levels by the end of
the century.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 1 re-
ports pathways of the carbon content of electricity in the most technology-
optimistic scenarios, where bio-energy combined with carbon capture
and storage (CCS) allows for producing electricity with negative car-
bon emissions. Section 2 reports pathways in scenarios where either
(i) both nuclear and CCS or (ii) renewable power are constrained. In
both cases, the carbon content of electricity still decreases to near-zero
levels. Section 3 and B detail pathways at the country/region level, for
China, the EU, India and the US. They illustrate that the decrease to
near-zero level can happen in every region of the world under a wide
range of assumptions concerning technology availability, and is part
of cost-effective strategies toward a range of different climate targets.
Section 4 concludes.
1 Biomass combined with CCS could provide elec-
tricty with negative carbon content
During AMPERE, IAMs were run under the constraint that final
GHG atmospheric concentration should not exceed 450 ppm CO2-eq —
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Meinshausen et al. (2009b) estimate such concentration leads to 63-92%
probability of remaining below +2◦C by 2100. Fig. 3.1a presents the
projected carbon intensity of the global electricity generation in this
scenario. It shows that all models project a drastic decrease in carbon
intensity by the end of the century.
Most trajectories in this scenario even fall below zero-carbon elec-
tricity. Indeed, this scenario assumes the technologies able to generate
low-carbon electricity are widely available — these technologies include
mainly wind, solar, hydro, biomass, nuclear and carbon capture and
storage (Smith et al., 2009). Among them, bio-energy with carbon
capture and storage (BECCS), the burning of biomass in power plants
associated to the long-term storage of resulting CO2, allows to produce
electricity with negative net GHG emissions (Tavoni et Socolow, 2013;
Kriegler et al., 2014).5 When BECCS is available, the least-cost strat-
egy to achieve global carbon neutrality is to produce negative-emission
electricity and offset emissions from sectors of the economy that are
more difficult to decarbonize.6
However, stabilizing GHG concentration around 450 ppm would re-
quire a fast intergovernmental coordination that may be difficult to
achieve in time (Guivarch et Hallegatte, 2013; Stocker, 2013; Luderer
et al., 2013b). AMPERE considered the effect of a less stringent concen-
tration target: 550 ppm CO2-eq — generally admitted to be consistent
with a 3◦C warming, and still 15–51% probability of remaining below
2◦C according to Meinshausen et al. (2009b). If low-carbon technolo-
gies are still assumed to be widely available, pathways to this easier
climate target also entail a decrease of the global carbon intensity to
negative levels (Fig. 3.1b).
2 Near-zero-carbon electricity does not require all
carbon-free technologies to be available
A third scenario in AMPERE sets a 550 ppmCO2-eq stabilization
target and assumes no further deployment of nuclear power after ex-
isting plants are decommissioned (for instance for social acceptability
reasons) and assuming CCS never reaches market deployment. The
5”Plants” extract carbon dioxide from the atmosphere as they grow.
6However, the large-scale feasibility and desirability of BECCs is controversial,
given their potential impact on land use, food production, freshwater availability,
and the uncertain availability of suitable geological storage sites — see Guivarch et
Hallegatte (2013) for an overview.
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(a) 550 ppm — No nuclear, no
CCS
(b) 550 ppm — Low
renewable
Figure 3.2 – Decarbonization of global electricity in two 550 ppm scenarios
(consistent with 3◦C): (a) without new nuclear or carbon capture; (b) with
low potential for renewable power. In both cases, the carbon content of
electricity is reduced to near-zero levels by the end of the century.
decrease in carbon intensity of electricity holds under these assump-
tions (Fig. 3.2a). The trajectories in this sample exhibit an average
of more than 95% reduction in carbon intensity, reaching less than
25 gCO2/kWh by 2100, while the most conservative pathway falls be-
low 75 gCO2/kWh.
Even in this scenario, decarbonization of power supply is sufficient
to justify electrification. For instance, a conservative estimate of electric
vehicles’ (EV) consumption is 25 kWh/100km from the power plant to
the wheel, that is accounting for losses when transmitting electricity
over long distances and charging the battery.7 In this case, electric
vehicles, or hybrid vehicles running on electricity, would emit between
0 and 19 gCO2/km by 2100. For comparison, the European target for
new passenger vehicles sold in 2015 is 130 gCO2/km on average, and
the proposed objective for vehicles sold in 2021 is 95 gCO2/km (ICCT,
2014).
AMPERE also explored scenarios where CCS and nuclear are widely
available, but biomass, wind and photovoltaic power are constrained.
Fig. 3.2b reports the pathways of the carbon content of electricity in
this case — they can still decrease to near-zero or negative levels by
7For instance, today’s most sold electric car, the Nissan Leaf is rated between
18 and 21kWh/100km (battery to the wheel) by the US Environmental Protection
Agency; and 20% is an accepted upper bound for transmission, distribution, and
recharging losses.
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the end of the century.
3 Every major country or region of the world can
and should decarbonize its electricity
(a) China (b) Europe
(c) India (d) USA
Figure 3.3 – Carbon intensity in China, Europe, India and the US in AM-
PERE’s 550 ppm (consistent with +3◦C), technology-pessimistic (no nuclear,
no CCS) scenario.
Finally, according to AMPERE, the decrease in the carbon content
of electricity is feasible in every region of the world. Fig. 3.3 reports the
pathways towards carbon free electricity as simulated in AMPERE for
China and India, two countries with high initial emissions from power
generation, and for the EU and US, where electricity is less carbon-
intensive. We consider the less favorable scenario both in terms of
the concentration target (550 ppm) and in terms of technology avail-
ability (no replacement of nuclear capacities and no CCS allowed) —
detailed pathways for these regions with different technology portfolios
are displayed in the appendix (Fig. 3.4, Fig. 3.6, Fig. 3.7, and Fig. 3.5).
In every region, the average carbon intensity decreases steadily dur-
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ing the 21st century, and falls below 100 gCO2/kWh in 2100 in every
simulation.
These figures suggest that electrification is an effective option to
reduce long-term emissions in every region. In other words, the policy-
relevant question is not whether to electrify, but when to do it. For
instance, indirect emissions from driving an electric vehicle would reach
100 gCO2/km between 2030-2060 in China, 2010-2030 in Europe, 2030-
2055 in India and 2020-2050 in the US; and would drop below 50 gCO2/km
between 2045-2065 in China, 2045-2060 in Europe, 2050-2070 in India
and 2035-2060 in the US.
4 Conclusion
The work reported here has several limitations. We only analyzed
scenarios where all countries participate in climate policies. In regions
that do not participate or delay their participation in climate poli-
cies, the reduction in carbon intensity of power generation would not
necessarily happen, or would be delayed (Kriegler et al., 2015). Also,
our analysis may overestimate the speed and/or potential of carbon
intensity reduction in power generation. Indeed, IAMs may imper-
fectly represent real-world barriers that may hinder power generation
decarbonization. A further discusses these limitations. Finally, the
IAM comparison studied here does not investigate the consequences
of simultaneous shortage of all the key low-carbon power generation
technologies — CCS, nuclear, biomass and intermittent renewable.8 In
that case, stabilizing the climate would be made much more difficult,
and would require a drastic reduction in global energy consumption.
The pathways towards clean electricity reported here should be in-
terpreted cautiously. In particular, they do not entail any normative
prescription of the level of efforts that any specific country should af-
fect to climate change mitigation. What they show is a consensus
among state-of-the-art integrated assessment models: cost-effective cli-
mate stabilization requires near-zero carbon electricity in every major
country/region of the world. This very robust finding is a technical
one, which disregards any consideration of the burden sharing of emis-
sion reductions: independently of who is or should be paying for it, the
8During AMPERE, IAMs explored the consequences of limited availability of
renewable, limited availability of nuclear, and limited availability of CCS separately
(as reported in B); in all these cases, the carbon intensity still decreases drastically
in every region, sometimes to below-zero levels.
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cheapest strategy to achieve climate stabilization includes decarboniza-
tion of the power supply.
The pathways of the carbon content of electricity that we report
can be used outside the community of integrated assessment, for in-
stance when assessing the relevance of electric vehicles as a means to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions; or to benchmark policies aiming at
reducing carbon emissions from power plants. Further work could re-
port pathways for other countries or regions of the world, and extend
this approach to sectors other than power supply.
Appendices
A Methods
Data
We reanalyzed a set of 55 IAM pathways from AMPERE, a study
for which CO2 emissions for electricity are reported separately, thus
allowing to recover the projected carbon intensity at each point (2005,
2010 and then every 10 years up to 2100).
We retain final energy as our measure of electricity production, that
is, the total electric energy consumed by end-users, excluding that used
by the power supply sector itself for transformation, transportation
and distribution (including these losses would result in lower carbon
intensities). As electricity-related emissions at a given point in time
are readily available in our sample, computing cumulative emissions is
straightforward.
Limitations
The limitations in our analysis are of two kinds. First, we restricted
our study to a subset of IAM trajectories by selecting only results re-
ported in a recent model comparison study. This may introduce a selec-
tion bias. Second, IAMs may imperfectly represent real-life barriers to
power generation decarbonization. We may therefore overestimate the
speed and/or potential of power generation carbon intensity reductions.
Bias
We restricted our study to the results of a recent IAM comparison
exercise, AMPERE, because the data are available online.
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We are not aware of any published scenario that would reach a
low or moderate atmospheric concentration target without featuring
a decreasing carbon-intensity trajectory similar to the consensus high-
lighted here. However, reducing the study sample can always introduce
biases. In particular, the studies presented here do not explore the case
where all renewable energies, carbon capture and storage, nuclear and
bio-energies turn out not to be widely available.
Moreover, previous studies have documented the risk of selection
bias in IAM reviews, as results are not always reported when targets are
unachievable (Tavoni et Tol, 2010). Our sample of trajectories may be
affected by selection bias, given some models might not report their re-
sults with some generation technologies unavailable. When availability
of some technologies is restricted, such as CCS and nuclear, the num-
ber of reported paths decreased, in particular when targeting 450 ppm
CO2-eq (this effect is mitigated with the looser 550 ppm CO2-eq con-
straint).9 This hints at the potential difficulty of reaching a stringent
climatic target if the development of BECCS is constrained (Tavoni et
Socolow, 2013; Bibas et Méjean, 2014; Rose et al., 2014).
Barriers to the decarbonization of power generation
IAMs might imperfectly account for several barriers to the decar-
bonization of power generation (Iyer et al., 2015). For instance, the
capacity credit – the contribution of a given technology to meeting the
demand – tends to be lower for intermittent renewable energy (mainly
solar and wind) than for fossil fuel, nuclear, and bio-energy, due to
potential mismatches between resource availability and demand peaks
(Sims et al., 2003). Also, some low-carbon technologies may require to
build wider distribution and transmission networks to connect remote
energy sources or production locations to end-users (renewable energies
and nuclear) and transportation infrastructure to carbon sequestration
sites (CCS).
B Additional figures
9Such evidence should be taken with caution, as participants were not required to
run every scenario (scenarios were ranked as required, recommended, or optional).
A smaller number of trajectories does not necessarily reflect selection.
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(a) 450 ppm – All carbon-free technologies (b) 550 ppm – All carbon-free technologies (c) 550 ppm – No new nuclear
(d) 550 ppm – No CCS (e) 550 ppm – No new nuclear and no CCS (f) 550 ppm – Low renewable
Figure 3.4 – Carbon content of electricity in China.
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(a) 450 ppm – All carbon-free technologies (b) 550 ppm – All carbon-free technologies (c) 550 ppm – No new nuclear
(d) 550 ppm – No CCS (e) 550 ppm – No new nuclear and no CCS (f) 550 ppm – Low renewable
Figure 3.5 – Carbon content of electricity in the EU.
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(a) 450 ppm – All carbon-free technologies (b) 550 ppm – All carbon-free technologies (c) 550 ppm – No new nuclear
(d) 550 ppm – No CCS (e) 550 ppm – No new nuclear and no CCS (f) 550 ppm – Low renewable
Figure 3.6 – Carbon content of electricity in India.
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(a) 450 ppm – All carbon-free technologies (b) 550 ppm – All carbon-free technologies (c) 550 ppm – No new nuclear
(d) 550 ppm – No CCS (e) 550 ppm – No new nuclear and no CCS (f) 550 ppm – Low renewable
Figure 3.7 – Carbon content of electricity in the US.
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(a) 450 ppm – All carbon-free technologies (b) 550 ppm – All carbon-free technologies (c) 550 ppm – No new nuclear
(d) 550 ppm – No CCS (e) 550 ppm – No new nuclear and no CCS (f) 550 ppm – Low renewable
Figure 3.8 – Carbon intensity of electricity at the global level.
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4
Marginal abatement cost curves and
the optimal timing of mitigation
measures
To design the best policies to cope with climate change, decision-makers need information about the options for reducing green-
house gas (GHG) emissions. Such information has been provided in
many ways, including through measure-explicit marginal abatement
cost curves (MACCs). We call measure-explicit MACCs the curves that
represent information on abatement costs and potentials for a set of
mitigation measures. Measures include changing technologies, notably
in the transport, housing and power sectors, but also non-technological
options such as waste recycling and management of land use and forest.
These MACCs are usually constructed for a specific country or region,
and for a specific date. They report abatement potentials as a function
of the abatement cost, ranking mitigation options from the least to the
most expensive (Fig. 4.1).
Decision makers who face an emission-reduction target need to de-
cide which abatement options to implement, and following which sched-
ule. They can misinterpret measure-explicit MAC curves as abatement
supply curves. According to this interpretation, the optimal behavior
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Figure 4.1 – A measure-explicit MACC exhibits N abatement options
ranked from the least to the most expensive. Each option i is characterized
by their abatement potential Ai and their marginal abatement cost ci. This
curves stands for a given date T. We explain why the optimal mitigation
strategy to reach a target X at T is not necessarily to implement exclusively
the measures 1 to 4 cheaper than Y (where Y is the marginal abatement
cost corresponding to X on the curve).
to meet an abatement target (e.g, bringing back GHG emissions at
their 1990 level by 2020) is to build a MAC curve for this date, and
implement only the cheapest options that allow the target to be met
(e.g., DECC, 2011, Fig 17, p. 52).
In this paper, we explain why decision makers need to distinguish
available abatement measures using their costs, abating potential, and
the time it takes to implement them. Indeed, the high-abating potential
options required to meet ambitious emission-reduction targets cannot
be implemented overnight. Therefore, the optimal set of measures to
reach a short-term target depends on the measures required to meet
longer-term targets and on the speed at which these measures can take
effect.
We thus propose a new way for reporting information on emission-
reduction options to the general public and decision-makers. Reports
could display assessments of the cost of each option, the abating po-
tential or carbon intensity of each option, and the speed at which each
option can be implemented – taking into account the required accu-
mulation of human and physical capital. While some MACCs factor
in all this information, none provides data on these three dimensions
separately.
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We first contribute a classification of existing MAC curves (Sec-
tion 1). Then, we build a simple model that can compute the optimal
timing of GHG emissions reductions (choice across time) along with
the optimal dispatch of the reduction burden (choice across abatement
measures) from this three dimensions (Section 2). We use it in Section 3
with an objective in terms of cumulative emissions over a long period,
a so-called carbon budget, reportedly a good proxy for climate change.
We show that it make sense to implement the more expensive options
before exhausting the whole potential of the cheapest options. We turn
in Section 4 to objectives expressed in terms of aggregate abatement
at one point in time, closer to the actual practices. In that case, it
can be preferable to start implementing the most expensive options
before cheap ones, if their potential is large and their inertia is great
(Section 4.1). Finally, we explain in Section 4.2 how the optimal short-
term strategy depends on the long-term emission objective. This means
that MACCs should not be used as supply curves when choosing the
optimal strategy to reach short-term emission targets.
1 Overview of existing marginal abatement cost
curves
The term “MAC curve” refers in the literature to various curves,
constructed in various ways. Here, we distinguish continuous MAC
curves and measure-explicit MAC curves. We then distinguish full-
potential measure-explicit MACCs and achievable-potential measure-
explicit MACCs.
1.1 Continuous vs. measure-explicit MAC curves
Continuous MAC curves depict the aggregate shadow cost of an
emission target against the stringency of this target. They do not
depict particular mitigation measures. The existing literature builds
this type of MACCs from Integrated Assessment Models (IAM). It has
for instance emphasized that the cost of reducing GHG emissions inside
an economy depends on external factors such as energy prices or climate
policies decided abroad (Klepper et Peterson, 2006; Kuik et al., 2009;
Morris et al., 2011).
In this paper we take the perspective of a decision maker who faces
an exogenous abatement target and needs to decide which emission-
reduction options to implement, and in which order. Continuous MACCs
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are out of the scope of this paper. We focus on measure-explicit MAC
curves that represent information on abatement costs and potentials
for a set of mitigation measures (Fig. 4.1).
Measure-explicit MACCs have recently reached a wide public, when
McKinsey and Company published an assessment of the cost and po-
tentials in the United States (Enkvist et al., 2007) and at the global
scale (McKinsey, 2009). These curves are increasingly used to inform
policymakers: McKinsey currently lists 15 MAC curves in its website,
the World Bank has assessed reduction potentials in many countries in
the form of MACCs (ESMAP, 2012), and Sweeney et Weyant (2008)
have proposed such a MACC for California. Other examples include
the MACCs developed by the Wuppertal Institute for Climate, Envi-
ronment and Energy (2006), and by Bloomberg (2010). Their usage
goes beyond climate mitigation: for instance, similar depictions have
been used to describe available options to reduce energy consumption
(e.g., Jackson, 1991), waste production (Beaumont et Tinch, 2004) and
water consumption (McKinsey, 2009).
Recent research has identified – and proposed solutions for – method-
ological issues when building measure-explicit MAC curves (Kesicki et
Ekins, 2012); this has allowed to enhance the reporting of abatement
costs and potentials. A first issue relates to uncertainty when assessing
future costs – it can be addressed by presenting ranges of costs and
potentials instead of best-guest estimates (IPCC, 2007, SPM6 p.11).
A second issue is that MACCs do not depict the interaction between
different measures (e.g, promoting electric vehicles and green electric-
ity together would allow to save more GHG than the sum of the two
isolated abatement measures), even if they are built taking these inter-
actions into account (Kesicki, 2012b). Kesicki et Ekins (2012) identify
other shortcomings, like the fact that MACCs frequently assess project
or technological costs only, excluding institutional barriers, transaction
costs and non-monetary costs. In contrast, we focus in this paper on
how to use MAC curves, that is on how they can help to design optimal
emission-reduction strategies.
1.2 Full potential vs. achievable potential measure-explicit
MAC curves
While similar in appearance, two types of measure-explicit MAC
curves should be distinguished, depending on their implicit definition
of the abating potential of a measure.
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The full-potential approach gives information on how much GHG
could be saved if the measure was used at his technical maximum.
It is calculated against a reference or baseline technology, taking into
account the carbon intensity and imperfect substitutability of different
technologies. For instance, this approach takes into account that an
Electric Vehicle (EV) does not emit any GHG (e.g. saves 140 gCO2/km
compared to the average new vehicle sold in Europe in 2010) but that
all passenger vehicles cannot be replaced by EVs due to limited driving
range. This approach does not take into account any dynamic aspect.
Among others, Rubin et al. (1992) used this approach. For instance,
they assess the potential of nuclear power (in the US) as the quantity of
GHG that would be saved if nuclear replaced all the fossil fuel capacity
that was used for base load and intermediate load operation in 1989,
and find 1 500 MtCO2/yr (Rubin et al., 1992, Table 3, footnote j). More
recently, Wächter (2013) built a MAC curve for Austria based on the
same approach, using 2008 data.
We call the other approach the achievable-potential approach. It
seems to have been popularized by McKinsey. Achievable-potential
measure-explicit MAC curves have a prospective dimension, as they are
built for a date in the future. This approach takes into account that
large-scale diffusion of new technologies can take up to decades (Grübler
et al., 1999). In this context, the abating potential of a technology
assesses the abatement that could be achieved with such a technology if
it was implemented at a given speed (McKinsey, 2009, Exhibit 1). For
instance, this approach takes into account that even ambitious fiscal
incentives in favor of electric vehicles would induce a limited increase
of EV sales, resulting in a limited share of EVs by 2020 or 2030. The
achievable-potential by a given date mixes the information on the full
potential and the slow diffusion process, and is therefore lower than the
full potential described above.
A MACC built this way is the one by Sweeney et Weyant (2008):
they find for instance that solar photovoltaic power can only save
0.8 MtCO2/yr in California by 2020. They also distinguish the abat-
ing potential of industrial combined heat and power achievable thanks
to price incentives and the potential that can be reached after an
“aggressive growth” (Table 11 page 50). As IAMs account for slow
technological diffusion (Wilson et al., 2013), they can be used to pro-
duce achievable-potential measure-explicit MACCs. One example is the
MACC built by Kesicki (2012a) for the UK transport sector by 2030.
119
In the following we show the value of combining the two approaches,
i.e. how the full-potential and the implementation speed, reported sep-
arately, can be used to decide which options to implement, and in
which order, to comply with exogenous emission targets. We propose
a methodology to do so, based on three information pieces per mea-
sure – its cost, full potential, and implementation speed – and a simple
intertemporal optimization model.
2 Model
A social planner controls GHG abatement from an emission base-
line, by spending money and time on a set of options described by
their cost, full abatement potential, and implementation speed. We do
not incorporate more realistic but complex dynamics, such as sectoral
interactions or crowding-out effects on investment.
2.1 GHG emissions
There are N abatement options, indexed by i. The model is run
on a period that goes from 2000 to 2050 with a time step, ∆t, of 3
months. At each time step t, emissions are computed from the baseline
emissions Ereft and the abatement ai,t achieved with each measure i at
time t.
et = E
ref
t −
N∑
i=1
ai,t (4.1)
The cumulative emissions Mt are then computed as the sum of emis-
sions.
Mt = et ·∆t+Mt−∆t (4.2)
2.2 Potentials, costs and inertia
Each measure is described by three figures. First, each measure
i has a maximum abating potential Ai, expressed in avoided annual
emissions, in MtCO2/yr. For instance, switching to more efficient ther-
mal engines for passenger vehicles may not save more than a fraction
of GHG emissions associated with private mobility. In full-potential
measure-explicit MACCs, this potential is represented by the width of
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the rectangles (see Fig. 4.1).
ai,t ≤ Ai (4.3)
Second, each measure i is qualified with a constant abatement cost ci
— the heights in Fig. 4.1. Here, we also assume that abatement costs
are independent of cumulative abatement and time.1 Abatement ai,t
achieved thanks to measure i at time t has a cost Ii,t which reads.
Ii,t = ai,t · ci (4.4)
Third, a given amount of abatement requires a non-negative amount of
time for its implementation. This is modeled as a constant maximum
speed vi, (in MtCO2/yr/yr), assumed to be independent of the financial
cost of the measure2: achievable abatement at time t directly depend
on already achieved abatement at time t−∆t.3
ai,t ≤ ai,t−∆t + vi ·∆t (4.5)
These growth constraints may come from any bottleneck such as
(i) availability of skilled workers, (ii) availability of productive capaci-
ties, (iii) incompressible institutional requirements, (iv) emissions being
embedded in long-lived capital, or (v) requirement for knowledge accu-
mulation before technologies spread.
Issues (i) and (ii) could be overcome by training workers or redi-
recting unemployed workers and unused capital; but training and redi-
recting are measures per se and cannot be done overnight either. The
issue of institutional or organizational delays is well documented (World
Bank et International Finance Corporation, 2013). Reducing them is
also a measure per se, and takes time. The fourth point is related to
capital vintages and turnover: if one sees emissions as embedded in
capital (Davis et al., 2010; Guivarch et Hallegatte, 2011), decarboniza-
tion cannot be faster than capital turnover, except by wasting valuable
productive capital through premature replacement (Lecocq et al., 1998;
Lecuyer et Vogt-Schilb, 2014; Rozenberg et al., 2014). Concerning (v),
1On the effect of learning-by-doing, see del Rio Gonzalez (2008) and Meunier et
Finon (2013).
2Note that abatement is expressed in MtCO2/yr.
3The initial abatement is assumed to be null (ai,0 = 0). This is done without
loss of generality: if the initial abatement is not null, a new abating potential A′i
can be redefined as the potential beyond what is already achieved A′i = Ai − ai,0.
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Mansfield (1998), and Agarwal et Bayus (2002) have found that re-
search and development is typically carried out from several years to
few decades before new technologies experience market uptake.
As noted in section 1.2, MAC curves built for a date in the future T
frequently provide an achievable potential, not a full potential. In our
framework, the achievable potential A˜i is linked to the full potential Ai
and the implementation speed vi.
A˜i = min (vi · T,Ai) (4.6)
We can also define the implementation time as Ai/vi, the ratio of the
abatement potentials over the maximum speed.
2.3 Social planner objectives
The objective is to achieve a climate-related target while minimizing
abatement costs. The decision maker minimizes C, the total present
cost of abatement, discounted at rate r over the period.
C =
T∑
t=T0
N∑
i=1
Ii,t
(1 + r)t·∆t
(4.7)
Theoretically, a benevolent social planner can control GHG emissions
in order to equalize the marginal costs of mitigation and adaptation
in a cost-benefit approach. Because of uncertainty surrounding both
climate response to a change in GHG emissions and adaptation costs,
and because decisions are made at national instead of global scale, it is
common to adopt a cost-effectiveness approach (Ambrosi et al., 2003).
In our model, this can be done by constraining cumulative emissions
Mt to remain below a given carbon budget Mobj.
Mt ≤Mobj (4.8)
Cumulative emissions can be used as proxies for climate change (Allen
et al., 2009; Matthews et al., 2009b).
In practice, however, governments and other public agencies fre-
quently provide objectives for given points in time. For instance, the
EU has the objective of cutting its emissions by 20% of 1990 levels by
2020.4 In our model, these objectives can be implemented by defining a
4It is also common to adopt intensity objectives, as the efficiency standards in
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Cheap Deep
Marginal Abatement Cost c $/tCO2 30 60
Full potential A GtCO2/yr 1.5 3.5
Speed v MtCO2/yr2 60 50
Table 4.1 – Numerical assumptions
set of milestones indexed by m, and by constraining emissions at each
milestone.
etm ≤ Eobjm (4.9)
2.4 Numerical values
For illustrative purpose, we assume a MAC containing only two
contrasted measures (N = 2), labeled cheap and deep. Cheap has a
lower abatement cost than deep, but also a lower abatement potential
(Table 4.1). Cheap could represent for instance the measure of switching
energy sources in buildings, and deep could represent the retrofitting of
these buildings. In the auto industry, cheap could represent the energy
efficiency gains in the internal combustion engines and deep switching
to other energy sources, such as electricity or hydrogen.
In the absence of reliable data, we assume that it takes 70 years
to implement the whole potential of deep, while cheap only requires
25 years. They lead to values for v of respectively 50 MtCO2/yr2 and
60 MtCO2/yr2. We use r = 5%/yr as the discount rate. These values
are not meant to represent accurately concrete sectors of the economy,
even though they do not differ much from the two sectors modeled by
Lecocq et al. (1998). We assume constant baseline emissions, that is
Ereft = 5GtCO2/yr (close to contemporaneous European GHG emis-
sions). We use these values to carry out illustrative experiments, which
help draw more general conclusions.
We solve this simple model using a linear programing algorithm
provided by GAMS (Brook et al., 1988). The source code also uses
Scilab (Scilab Consortium, 2011). Code and data are available on the
corresponding author’s web page. Results may be verified using the
the auto industry. Our model may be used with existing intensity MACCs (IEA,
2009, p. 37).
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Figure 4.2 – Left: Optimal abatement strategy to limit cumulative emis-
sions below 175 GtCO2 between 2000 and 2050. Inertia and discounting
mean that deep has to enter before the potential of cheap has been ex-
hausted. Right: curves represent emissions in the baseline and in the con-
strained simulation; in-between areas represent the cumulative abatement
and the carbon budget in the constrained simulation.
spreadsheet model provided on the corresponding author’s web page.
3 Optimal schedule under a cumulative carbon bud-
get
In this section, we investigate the optimal abatement pathway when
using a carbon budget, i.e. with full flexibility on when to reduce
emissions (Eq. 4.8). We test a range of carbon budgets (Mobj), and
assess the consequence on the optimal reduction pathway.
3.1 Using expensive options before exhausting the potential
of cheap ones
Figure 4.2 shows the optimal strategy for maintaining cumulative
emission below 175 GtCO2 over the 2000-2050 period. This value is
used for illustrative purpose, and will allow us to make some compar-
isons with subsequent simulations (in Section 4).
The abatement paths (figure 4.2, left panel) have triangular or trape-
zoidal shapes; this shows that one of the inertia (Eq. 4.5) or maximum
potential (Eq. 4.3) constraint is always binding. The cumulative abate-
ment corresponds to the area between baseline emissions and emissions
in the constrained run (figure 4.2, right panel). In this case, the intu-
itive ranking of abatement measures is respected: the social planner
starts by implementing cheap before deep. However, she does not use
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Figure 4.3 – Entry date and ceiling date of each abatement measure as
a function of the carbon budget. Lower carbon budgets, on the left, cor-
respond to tighter climate objectives and require more abatement. Start
of deep/cheap is the date when the respective measure begins to be imple-
mented; the ceiling date is the date when the abating potential is exhausted.
the whole potential of cheap before starting using deep. Deep enters in
2023 while cheap does not reach its full potential before 2027. A more
stringent objective would force deep to start even earlier (see below).
The optimal implementation strategy does not follow a merit order
in which the whole potential of the cheapest solutions is used before
more expensive solutions are introduced.
A more systematic analysis using a range of carbon budgets (Fig. 4.3)
confirms that for any objective it is never preferable to implement the
expensive deep before cheap. It also shows that if the objective is strin-
gent enough (about 195 GtCO2), deep has to begin before the whole
potential of cheap has been exploited — the implementation is not
sequential. And if the carbon budget is even more stringent (about
130 GtCO2), deep is forced to start in 2000, at the same time as cheap.
3.2 Expensive options may be useful even when cheaper ones
appear sufficient
Let us analyze a case in which the carbon budget is not very strin-
gent, e.g. 210 GtCO2. This translates into cumulative abatement of
45 GtCO2 over the period.5 Cheap has a cumulative abatement poten-
5Cumulative emissions in the baseline amount to 5 Gt/yr during 51 years, that
is 255 Gt.
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tial of more than 55 GtCO2.6 It is then possible to achieve the abate-
ment objective by implementing only cheap. An intuitive strategy could
be to focus on cheap and to not implement deep. Our simulations show
that this is not the optimal strategy, because there is a trade-off be-
tween (i) implementing only the cheapest solutions, but starting early
to give them enough time to reach the objective; (ii) delaying abate-
ment in order to save present value (thanks to the discounting), but
undertaking both cheap and deep to be more aggressive later and reach
the objective in spite of the delayed action.
In our simulations (Fig. 4.3), the optimal strategy to meet a (lax)
210 GtCO2 carbon budget is to implement deep from year 2040, which
makes it possible not to implement cheap before 2011 (for a strategy
starting in 2000). The additional cost of using deep is more than com-
pensated by the delay on implementing cheap. In other words, the
optimal strategy uses an expensive measure even when a cheaper mea-
sure is sufficient to reach the objective.
4 Optimal abatement pathways with annual emis-
sion targets
Commitments in terms of carbon budget are difficult to enforce:
there is an incentive for decision-makers to delay investments and efforts
beyond their mandate. Alternative policies include the definition of
emission targets at one or several points in time. In the next two
sections, we assume that commitments are made in terms of abatement
levels at different points in time.
The cumulative-emissions constraint (Eq. 4.8) is thus excluded from
the model, and we include the emission constraint with a single mile-
stone (m ∈ {1}, t1 = 2050) and test various emission objectives (Eobj1
in Eq. 4.9). We find that the shape of the optimal mitigation strategy
depends on the stringency of the emission target.
4.1 Implementing expensive options before cheap ones
Figure 4.4 shows the optimal abatement pathway for achieving an
ambitious reduction of 75% of emissions in 2050. In this case, the
6Its annual abatement potential is 1.5 Gt/yr and takes 25 years to implement
in full (see Table 4.1); adding the cumulated potential during the take-off phase
(25 yr × 1.5 Gt/yr)/2 and the potential when annual abatement have reached their
maximum value 25 yr×1.5 Gt/yr gives a total of 56.25 Gt.
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 Figure 4.4 – Optimal abatement pathways to achieve ambitious abate-
ment (3.75 GtCO2/yr) in 2050. The expensive option with large abatement
potential is implemented before the cheaper option.
optimal strategy is to start by implementing the most expensive option
before the cheapest (i.e., deep starts before cheap).
Indeed, the emission objective translates to 3.75 GtCO2/yr abated
in 2050, which cannot be achieved by implementing cheap alone. The
cheapest way to achieve this objective in 2050 is to use cheap to abate
as much GHG emissions as possible, i.e. 1.5 GtCO2/yr. Because cheap
cannot penetrate faster than 60 MtCO2/yr2, it has to enter in 2026.
Then 2.25 GtCO2/yr remain to be abated with deep by 2050. To do so,
deep has to enter as soon as 2006, 20 years before cheap.
The 75% reduction in emissions leads to cumulative emissions of
175 GtCO2, and is thus comparable to the simulation proposed in Sec-
tion 3.1.7 Compared to the carbon-budget simulation, this emission-
targets simulation leads to start cheap later and deep sooner. Short-
term abatement are lower — in 2020, they amount to 750 MtCO2/yr
under an emission target, against 1.3 GtCO2/yr under a carbon budget
— but long-term abatement are higher.
The loss of when-flexibility eventually raises the present cost of
abatement, from 390 G$ to 630 G$ when the carbon budget is replaced
by an emission target.8 Compared to emission objectives, carbon bud-
gets are more flexible and allow the social planner to reach the same
climate target at lower cost.
7Since cumulative emissions are good proxies for climate change, both simula-
tions would lead to comparable climate change impacts.
8In other words, 390 G$ is the lowest possible cost to reach the carbon budget
constraint, while 630G$ is the lowest cost for reaching the same carbon budget
through one aggregate emission target in 2050.
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Figure 4.5 – Entry date of each measure as a function of emission objec-
tive for 2050. For ambitious emission targets (below 2.25 GtCO2/yr), the
expensive option with large abatement potential is implemented before the
cheaper option.
A more systematic analysis is presented in Fig. 4.5. It gives the op-
timal entry dates of both measures (cheap and deep), as a function of
the 2050 emission target. It shows that below a threshold emission tar-
get, the optimal strategy starts to implement the expensive, inert and
high-abating potential measure before the cheap one. In our example,
this happens when the emission target is lower than 2.25 GtCO2/yr —
i.e. when the abatement objective is higher than 2.75 GtCO2/yr.
The optimal strategy to achieve an emission target is not to set a
growing carbon price and to implement sequentially the abatement op-
tions that show an abatement cost below this carbon price.9 However,
if the government cannot credibly commit to long-term carbon prices
(Kydland et Prescott, 1977; Dixit et Lambertini, 2003), investors may
be left with only current prices to take their decisions. In this case, a
carbon price of 60 $/tCO2 would be necessary in 2006 to trigger the
entry of deep (Fig. 4.4). This high carbon price would also trigger the
implementation of cheap (because its abatement cost, 30 $/tCO2, is
lower than the signal) in 2006, i.e. too soon, leading to a suboptimal
abatement pathway. In the conclusion we discuss possible solutions to
this problem.
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Cheap Deep
Time Horizon t1 yr 20
Achievable potential A˜ GtCO2/yr 1.2 1.0
Time Horizon t2 yr 50
Achievable potential A˜ GtCO2/yr 1.5 2.5
Figure 4.6 – MACCs derived from our numerical values, using the
achievable-potential approach. We explain why the 2020 target should not
be reached by implementing only cheap.
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 (a) Short-term Only
 
(b) Short-term and Long-term
objs
Figure 4.7 – Comparison of optimal abatement strategies to reach the
same target for 2020, disregarding or taking into account the longer-term
2050 objective (respectively SO and S&L). The best strategy to reach the
2020 target depends on whether this target is the ultimate objective (SO)
or only a milestone towards a longer-term target (SL).
4.2 The influence of long-term objectives on short-term strate-
gies
Actual policies include shorter-term emission objectives, such as the
2020 target in the EU. They are milestones toward a more ambitious
climate target in the long run, as the -75% by 2050 objective in Europe.
In this section, we find that it is dangerous to use only information on
costs and achievable potential to decide which measures to implement
in order to achieve an intermediate target (Fig 4.6), because it can make
the long term target impossible to reach.
We compare two simulations. The first simulation, labeled SO
(Short-term Only), has a short-term constraint but no long-term con-
straint.
Eobj1 = E(2020) = 4.25GtCO2/yr (4.10)
This target corresponds to 750 MtCO2/yr abated in 2020, that is ex-
actly the abatement achieved in 2020 in the optimal pathway to a -75%
in 2050 target according to our model (Fig. 4.4).
The second simulation, S&L (Short-term and Long-term objectives),
9This corroborates previous findings that in presence of inertia, efforts to reduce
emissions should not be equal to the carbon price at each point in time (Vogt-Schilb
et al., 2014b; Rozenberg et al., 2014).
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has the same short-term constraint for 2020, but takes into account the
longer-term target: a reduction by 75% of GHG emissions in 2050. In
this simulation, there are thus two emission milestones (see Eq. 4.9).
Eobj1 = E(2020) = 4.25GtCO2/yr (4.11)
Eobj2 = E(2050) = 1.25GtCO2/yr (4.12)
Our objective is to assess the difference over the short-term between
a strategy aiming at a short-term target and a strategy aiming at both
short-term and long-term targets. We find that long-term objectives
impact strongly the short-term strategy.
Figure 4.7 compares the optimal abatement strategies from 2000 to
2020 in the two cases. With both the 2020 and the 2050 objectives
(simulation S&L, panel a), the social planner starts by implementing
deep in 2006, and does not implement cheap before 2020 (as in Sec-
tion 4.1). In contrast, when the 2050 milestone is disregarded (simu-
lation SO, panel b), the social planner starts abating later (in 2010 vs
2006) and uses cheaper and lower-potential options, namely cheap and
deep instead of deep only. The discounted expenditures in abatement
measures amounts to 28 G$ against 112 G$ when the 2050 objective
is taken into account: the optimal short-term financial effort is much
higher if the long-term target is taken into account, even though the
abatement in MtCO2 is the same.
If the 2050 target was not taken into account before 2020, it may
then appear extremely costly or even impossible to achieve. In this
illustrative example, the 75% reduction in emissions becomes indeed
impossible to achieve in 2050.10
Despite short-term aggregate emissions being reduced to the same
level in SO and in S&L by 2020, the SO strategy produces a lock-in
in a carbon intensive pathway that cannot be reversed in the second
period. In other words, the optimal strategy to reach the 2020 target
is different (it uses more expensive options) if it’s a milestone to a 2050
target than if it is the ultimate target. With an ambitious long-term
objective, the short-term target needs to be achieved implementing the
options with the largest potentials and the greatest inertia, not with
10Cheap has entered in 2006. It would reach its full potential (1.5 Gt/yr) in 2030.
If deep enters in 2021, it would also reach abatement of 1.5 Gt/yr in 2050, 30 years
after (30 yr × 50 MtCO2/yr). The total would be abatement of 3 Gt/yr in 2050,
when the target is 3.75 Gt/yr.
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the cheapest solutions.
In the previous subsection, we concluded that a unique price instru-
ment may not be the best approach to trigger the right investments
in emission-reduction measures, provided that actors may not rely on
long-term signals. The same warning applies to aggregate emission
targets.
Short-term targets are a priori relevant, because there is visibility
over the short term on technology availability, macroeconomics trends
and institutional frameworks. For instance, they can be enforced with
tradable emissions permits, such as the EU ETS system. However,
if decision makers omit the longer-term target when deciding which
measures can be implemented to reach the short-term target, they will
focus on the cheapest available options (Fig. 4.6a and 4.7a).
It is therefore a good practice to announce long-term objectives
along with short-term binding policies. An example are the existing
carbon-intensity or fuel-efficiency standards for new passenger vehicles
(ICCT, 2012): governments have enacted short-term standards (e.g.
130 g/km in 2015 in Europe), and also enacted or proposed longer-term
ones (95 g/km in 2020 in Europe).
This result also sheds a new light on sector-specific mitigation tar-
gets, such as energy-efficiency standards in the automobile sector or
the 20% renewable power in the European Union. This kind of sectoral
short-term targets in favor of expensive but high-potential technologies
may be a way to ensure that aggregate targets (the 20% reductions
of greenhouse gas emissions) are not reached using only the cheapest
options (as coal-to-gas switch).
5 Conclusion
This paper investigates the design of optimal abatement strategies
using information on the cost, the abating potential and the implemen-
tation speed of a set of available measures.
Optimal abatement strategies may (i) implement expensive options
before the whole potential of cheaper measures has been exploited; (ii)
use expensive options even when cheap ones appear sufficient to meet
the climate target; or (iii) start to implement some expensive options
before cheaper ones. If the climate objective is stringent and inertia is
large, the optimal strategy would be to start implementing at the same
time a set of measures covering a wide range of abatement costs.
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Our results have policy and methodological implications. In the Eu-
ropean Union, there was a debate on whether aggregate GHG emissions
should be abated by 20% or 30% in the short-term (i.e. 2020). This
question on when to abate GHG emissions should not be separated from
the question on how these abatement have to be done (i.e., in which
sector and with which measures). Economic actors might otherwise
focus on cheap and fast-to-implement solutions to reach the short-term
target, neglecting high-potential but high-inertia options required to
meet an ambitious objective in 2050 (see also Rose et al., 1999; Sandén
et Azar, 2005; Narain et Veld, 2008; del Rio Gonzalez, 2008).
The optimal approach to achieve an emission target is not to set
a growing carbon price and to implement sequentially the abatement
options that show an abatement cost below this carbon price. Decision
makers need assessments of the speed at which various measures to
curb greenhouse gas emissions can be implemented, and they should be
informed of long-term objectives in advance. Further research could in-
vestigate how policies targeted at high-potential but long-to-implement
options, such as urban planing or deployment of low-carbon technolo-
gies, may complement a carbon price in the absence of perfect foresight
or long-term policy credibility.
There is of course a balance to maintain (Azar et Sandén, 2011):
sectoral policies should be targeted enough to distinguish differences
in inertia, but broad enough to let economic agents select the best
options and technologies to reach them (this may be the case, for in-
stance, of existing fuel economy standards in the auto industry). Be-
cause of information asymmetry and the risk of rent-seeking behavior,
micro-managing mitigation by defining over-targeted objectives can be
counter-productive (Laffont, 1999). Also, objectives need to be up-
dated when new information is available (Rodrik, 2008); for instance if
one measure turns out to be more expensive, or turns out to save less
GHG, than expected. Finally, if sectoral policies overlap, they may
come with additional costs (Braathen, 2007; Böhringer et Rosendahl,
2010) or benefits (Fischer et Preonas, 2010; Lecuyer et Quirion, 2013)
that should be analyzed carefully and taken into account (Hallegatte
et al., 2013).
Our results are based on illustrative examples. The main conclusion
is methodological: we reinforce the need to account for sector-specific
inertia when designing climate policies. To date, the literature has fo-
cused on cross-sector differences on knowledge spillovers (e.g. Manne
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et Richels, 2004; Rosendahl, 2004b). While some numerical studies
(Lecocq et al., 1998; Schwoon et Tol, 2006; Jaccard et Rivers, 2007)
and integrated assessment models (Wilson et al., 2013) factor this type
of differentiated inertias, the optimal timing and cost of emission re-
duction taking into account differentiated inertias is the object of only
few theoretical contributions (e.g, Vogt-Schilb et al., 2014b; Lecuyer et
Vogt-Schilb, 2014).
Measure-explicit marginal abatement cost curves have proved ex-
tremely effective in communicating some results from the economics
of climate mitigation to decision makers and the general public. For
instance, by reporting the cost and potential of a list of mitigation
measures, MACCs illustrate in a simple way why energy-efficiency is a
key option: it can save significant amounts of GHG at a low or neg-
ative cost. Existing MAC curves, however, do not explain why more
expensive options, such as carbon capture and storage or renewable
power, should receive significant attention today. Our answer is that
these options can abate large amounts of GHG in the future, and that
they need time to be implemented (Grübler et al., 1999). The reporting
currently carried out by MAC curves could be enhanced by supplying
assessments of the cost, potential, and implementation speed of each
option.
With this information, the optimal implementation schedule of the
various existing abating options could be assessed in a simple, transpar-
ent and accessible process, for instance using linear models like the one
proposed in this paper. Such a model certainly is less sophisticated than
state-of-the-art integrated assessment models, but can prove nonethe-
less useful for researchers from other fields, decision makers, and the
general public. This process would also provide figures to debate new
or existing sectoral policies, such as the objective of 20% of renewable
energies in Europe by 2020, the fuel economy standards in the auto in-
dustry, or proposed changes in land-use planning, building norms and
infrastructure design.
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5
Long-Term Mitigation Strategies
and Marginal Abatement Cost
Curves: A Case Study on Brazil
Various options are available to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emis-sions: fuel switching in the power sector, renewable power, electric
vehicles, energy efficiency improvements in combustion engines, waste
recycling, forest management, etc. Policy makers have to compare
and assess these different options to design a comprehensive mitiga-
tion strategy and decide the scheduling of various actions (i.e. decide
what measures need to be introduced and when). This is especially
true concerning the emission-reduction measures that require govern-
ment action (e.g., energy-efficiency standards, public investment, public
planning).
Marginal abatement cost (MAC) curves are largely and increas-
ingly used in the policy debate to compare mitigation actions (Kesicki
et Ekins, 2012; ESMAP, 2012; Kolstad et al., 2014). A MAC curve pro-
vides information on abatement costs and abatement potentials for a set
of mitigation measures. They can serve as powerful tools to communi-
cate that large amounts of emission reductions are technically possible.
They also show that some emission reductions can pay for themselves
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Figure 5.1 – A measure-explicit marginal abatement cost curve. The gen-
eral appearance of the curve makes it easy to misinterpret it as an abatement
supply curve, leading to the misguided conclusion that the “abatement de-
mand” X should be met with measures 1 to 4 only (possibly using the carbon
price Y).
due to co-benefits such as energy efficiency gains or positive impact
on health, and that many others will be inexpensive (in terms of net
present social value). This information can help governments decide
how ambitious their mitigation strategy will be, and make informed
domestic and international commitments (in the UNFCCC context,
for instance). It is also helpful for policy makers searching for synergies
and co-benefits, for instance between emission reduction and economic
development.
The academic literature on MAC curves has extensively discussed
the plausibility of energy efficiency options that would reduce emis-
sions at net negative costs. In general, MAC curves do not factor
in implementation barriers on these options, such as split incentives,
lack of information, behavioral failures, or lack of resources (Allcott et
Greenstone, 2012; Kesicki et Ekins, 2012).1 According to this literature,
overcoming such barriers may be costly enough to reduce significantly
the economic benefits from energy savings. To date, identifying spe-
cific barriers and cost-effective ways of working around them remains a
policy-relevant challenge (e.g., Giraudet et Houde, 2014).
The issue discussed here is different. Because they rank options
according to their cost — from the least to the most expensive —
MAC curves look like abatement supply curves (Fig. 5.1), and are fre-
quently interpreted as such (e.g. Haab, 2007; DECC, 2011). According
to this interpretation, the optimal emission-reduction strategy would
1The investor’s MAC curves commissioned by the EBRD are noticeable excep-
tions, as they factor energy subsidies, the high cost of capital that the private sector
faces, and positive transaction costs in their assessment of the abatement cost of
each option (NERA, 2011b, 2012, 2011a).
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be to “implement the cheapest measure first, preferring measures with
a lower total saving potential but more cost-effective than those with a
higher GHG saving potential in absolute terms” (Wächter, 2013). In
this paper we show why this strategy is not the optimal one, we propose
a new graphical representation of MAC curves that avoid this misin-
terpretation, and we derive broader policy implications on the design
of climate mitigation strategies.
In addition to the cost and potential, a key parameter of emission re-
duction options is the speed at which they can be implemented. Speed
is limited by factors such as (1) long capital turnover, (2) slow tech-
nological diffusion, (3) availability of skilled workers, (4) availability
of relevant specific capital, such as production lines, (5) availability of
funds or (6) institutional constraints.2 As a consequence, some high-
abatement-potential measures, such as switching to renewable power
or retrofitting existing energy-inefficient buildings, may take decades
to implement. While the cost and potential displayed in a MAC curve
are frequently assessed with such maximum speed in mind, the diffu-
sion speed itself is almost never displayed in the MAC curve or generally
disclosed to decision-makers.
With a simple theoretical model, Ha-Duong et al. (1997) find that
this technical inertia (using the wording by Grubb et al., 1995) means
that the optimal quantity of short-term abatement depends on long-
term objectives — an extensive literature based on integrated assess-
ment models has reached the same conclusion (e.g. Luderer et al., 2013a;
Bertram et al., 2015; Riahi et al., 2015). Using a theoretical MAC curve,
Vogt-Schilb et Hallegatte (2014) show that the quality of abatement is
also important. The authors argue short-term abatement targets should
be reached with some of the high-potential but long to implement mea-
sures that will make deeper decarbonization possible in the long term,
even if these are not the less expensive measures available in the short
term. As a consequence, focusing on short-term targets (e.g., for 2030)
without considering longer-term objectives (e.g., for 2050 and beyond)
would lead to carbon-intensive lock-ins, making it much more expensive
(and potentially impossible) to achieve the long-term objectives.3
2In this paper we assume implementation barriers make the implementation of
measures slower, without affecting their cost. In economic theory, an alternative
approach is to consider adjustment costs that capture a trade-off between imple-
menting options quickly and implementing them at low cost (Vogt-Schilb et al.,
2014b; Lecuyer et Vogt-Schilb, 2014).
3A related line of argumentation is on learning by doing and directed technical
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Figure 5.2 – A “flipped” achievable-potential MAC curves next to the
corresponding emission reduction scenario (wedge curve). By displaying
together the cost, the potential, and the time required to implement the
options, confusion on how to interpret MAC curves may be avoided.
In this paper, we apply Vogt-Schilb and Hallegatte’s method on a
MAC curve built at the World Bank for studying low-carbon devel-
opment in Brazil in the 2010-2030 period (de Gouvello, 2010). Lack
of data beyond 2030 does not allow us to investigate how using only
the 2010-2030 MAC curve to design a mitigation strategy would lead
to suboptimal choices in view of longer-term objectives (2050 and be-
yond). We can however investigate this problem by assuming that we
want to achieve an objective for 2030, and that we use the MAC curve
to design a mitigation strategy for the 2010-2020 period only.
We find that a strategy for 2010-2020 that disregards the 2030 tar-
get under-invests in clean transportation infrastructure such as metro
and train; and over-invests in marginal, cheap but low-potential op-
tions, such as heat integration and other improvements in existing re-
fineries. In other words, developing clean transportation infrastructure
in the short term is appealing only if the long-term abatement tar-
get is accounted for. In addition, we find that not developing clean
transportation infrastructure in the short term (by 2020) closes the
door to deeper emission reductions in the middle (2030) and longer
term. Loosely speaking, the 2020 strategy provides a sensible quan-
change (Gerlagh et al., 2009; Acemoglu et al., 2012; Kalkuhl et al., 2012). Many
of the technologies used to reduce emissions — for instance more efficient cars or
renewable energy — are still in the early stage of their development, such that
their cost will decrease as their deployment continues. Many authors have found
in a variety of settings that this is a sound rationale to use expensive options in
the short term (e.g., Rosendahl, 2004b; del Rio Gonzalez, 2008; Azar et Sandén,
2011). In the present work, we account for technical progress only to the (limited)
extent that it can be captured by the slow technological diffusion encompassed in
our diffusion speed constraint.
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tity of abatement by 2020, but abatement is of insufficient quality to
reach the 2030 target. These results stress the need for policymakers
to take into account long term targets and the limited speed at which
emission-reductions may be implemented when deciding on short-term
action.
We derive two conclusions from this work.
First, MAC curves do not report a very important piece of informa-
tion, namely the implementation pace of each measure and option. We
suggest that when MAC curves are produced, they should be presented
together with the corresponding emission reduction scenario — using
the graphical representation that Pacala et Socolow (2004), Williams
et al. (2012) and Davis et al. (2013) call wedge curves—making the dy-
namic aspect of the mitigation scenarios more explicit (Fig. 5.2). Note
that this proposal concerns only the graphical communication of abate-
ment measures, their impact on greenhouse gas emissions over time, and
their cost; without any prescription on the method used to assess those
numbers.
For instance, emission reduction potentials and costs are frequently
assessed from expert surveys (e.g. ESMAP, 2012). MAC curves built
this way would be greatly improved by an explicit discussion of im-
plementation barriers and factors limiting the pace at which emission
reductions may be achieved with each particular measure (see B for
suggested guidance for the experts in charge of collecting the informa-
tion to build a MAC curve). This information would be particularly
useful for decision makers if it permits identifying distinct bottlenecks
(e.g. availability of skilled workers) that can be translated into specific
policies (e.g. training).
Emission reduction scenarios, costs and potentials can also be de-
rived from energy system models (Kesicki, 2012b).4 These models ac-
count for the limited ability to implement emission-reduction measures
by building in particular on maximum investment speeds (Wilson et al.,
2013; Iyer et al., 2015), making them suitable for studying path depen-
dency in emission reduction strategies (Kesicki, 2012a). MAC curves
built this way can also be presented next to the corresponding wedge
curve, as in Fig. 5.2. In this case also, the policy debate is improved
by an explicit discussion of how the growth constraints are calibrated
4While existing MAC curves in the gray literature are mainly derived from expert
surveys, the academic literature frequently studies emission reduction pathways
with energy system models or integrated assessment models.
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in the models (Wilson et al., 2013; Iyer et al., 2015).
Second, climate change mitigation policies are designed for a rela-
tively short term horizon (e.g., 2020 or 2030), while mitigation objec-
tives go beyond this horizon (e.g., the EU has a 2050 objective). Most
importantly, stabilizing climate change and tackling other environmen-
tal threats will require a reduction in emissions to near-zero levels by
the end of the century (Collins et al., 2013; Steinacher et al., 2013);
following the wording by Sachs et al. (2014), any climate stabilization
target requires deep decarbonization.
An ideal policy would be to announce well in advance a perfectly
credible long-term target to a forward-looking market. In practice, how-
ever, governments have limited ability to commit, and markets cannot
perfectly anticipate future regulations (Golombek et al., 2010; Brunner
et al., 2012). Following the World Bank (2012, p. 153), we thus sug-
gest to combine a “synergy approach” focusing on mitigation options
that provide co-benefits in terms of development, economic growth, job
creation, local environmental quality, or poverty alleviation, with an
“urgency approach”, based on defining long-term objectives and work-
ing backward to identify which measures are needed early to achieved
stated objective.
Accordingly, sector-specific mitigation policies have two roles: (i)
to remove implementation barriers on negative- and low-cost options,
and (ii) to ensure short-term targets are met without under-investing in
the ambitious and long-to-implement abatement measures required to
achieve otherwise-difficult-to-enforce long-term targets. In other words,
these policies should ensure that the mitigation strategy reaches not
only the desired quantity of abatement at a given date, but also a
sufficient quality to make further emission reduction possible.
This second argument for sector-specific policies, in line with Wais-
man et al. (2012), remains a novelty in the academic literature: to
date, such policies have been discussed as a way to tackle several mar-
ket failures or policy objectives, including learning by doing (Sandén
et Azar, 2005; Fischer et Preonas, 2010); to correct for the effects of
misperceived energy savings (Tsvetanov et Segerson, 2013; Parry et al.,
2014); to complement an imperfect carbon-pricing mechanism (Lecuyer
et Quirion, 2013); or as a political economy constraint (Hallegatte et al.,
2013; Jenkins, 2014; Rozenberg et al., 2014).
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 1, we
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review different types of MAC curves. While the construction of MAC
curves sometimes requires to investigate the diffusion speed of emission-
reduction options, MAC curves do not report separately the long-term
abatement potential and the diffusion speed. In section 2, we reanalyze
the data from the Brazilian MAC curve. We extract the cost, long-term
potential and diffusion speed of each emission-reduction measure, and
use them in a simple optimization model to investigate the least-cost
emission-reduction schedule, depending on whether the objective is to
reach a 2030 target or the corresponding 2020 target. We conclude in
section 3.
1 Existing MAC curves
We call measure-explicit MAC curves (MAC curves for short) these
which represent abatement costs and potentials of a set of mitigation
measures.5 Measure-explicit MAC curves have been developed since
the early 1990s (Rubin et al., 1992), and have reached a wide pub-
lic after McKinsey and Company published assessments of the cost of
abatement potentials in the United States (McKinsey, 2007) and at the
global scale (Enkvist et al., 2007). This type of curve is increasingly
used to inform policy makers. For instance, McKinsey currently lists
MAC curves for 15 different countries or regions on its website. The
World Bank also uses MAC curves routinely (ESMAP, 2012), and has
recently developed the MACTool to build them (see below). Similar
depictions have been used by other institutions (e.g., Climate Works
Australia, 2010; NERA, 2011a; CE Delft, 2012; O’Brien et al., 2014)
and to analyze other climate-change related topics, such as waste re-
duction, energy savings and water savings (see Kesicki et Ekins, 2012,
who also offer a richer historical perspective).
Depending on their implicit definition of the abatement potential
of a measure, two types of measure-explicit MAC curves can be distin-
guished.
5While the literature consistently calls these curves marginal abatement cost
curves, in most occasions the cost of each option is computed as an average cost, as
the net present cost of using that option instead of the baseline option, divided by
discounted avoided emissions. Marginal and average costs are equal only if the unit
cost of abatement is constant. Note that potentials spreading over large range of
abatement costs may be split into smaller potentials of nearly constant abatement
cost (Kesicki, 2012b), for instance reporting gas for base load and gas for peak
power separately.
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1.1 Full potential MAC curves
The full-potential approach gives information on how much GHG
could be saved if the measure was used at its technical maximum. It
is calculated against a reference or baseline technology, as for instance
those used in the present (Wächter, 2013), taking into account the
carbon intensity and imperfect substitutability of different technologies.
For instance, this approach assesses what fraction of passenger vehicles
can be replaced by electric vehicles (EV), accounting for limited driving
range and exiting mobility practices. Given emissions from baseline
vehicles (e.g. 140g/km today in Europe) and emissions from EVs (say
30g/km), one can compute an amount of emissions avoidable using
electric vehicles. Rubin et al. (1992) use this approach. For instance,
they assess the potential of nuclear power (in the US) as the quantity of
GHG that would be saved if nuclear replaced all the fossil fuel capacity
used for base load and intermediate load operation in 1989.
The main value of full potential MAC curves is descriptive: they
highlight to which extent some key measures could reduce emissions in
the long-run. One weakness is that full-potential MAC curves cannot
easily represent the competition between two measures.6 Finally, full-
potential MAC curves do not require investigation of possible diffusion
constraints, but these may be assessed separately to build resulting
emission reduction scenarios (e.g. World Bank, 2013).
1.2 Achievable potential MAC curves
Achievable-potential MAC curves have a prospective dimension, as
they are built for a date in the future. This approach fully acknowledges
that large-scale diffusion of new technologies can take decades (Grübler
et Messner, 1998; Grübler et al., 1999; Wilson et al., 2013). In this
context, the abating potential of a technology is an assessment of the
abatement that could be achieved with such a technology if it was
implemented at a given speed, starting at a given date. For instance,
this approach takes into account that even ambitious fiscal incentives
in favor of electric vehicles would induce a limited increase of EV sales,
6For instance, if fuel-cell vehicles are much more expensive than EVs, but do
not suffer from limited autonomy, the optimal strategy would be to use EVs when
possible (say for 25% of the fleet), and fuel cell vehicles otherwise. In this case, the
full-potential MAC curve could depict an abatement potential of 25% of private-
mobility related emissions for EVs, and 75% for fuel cell. In the absence of EVs, fuel
cell vehicles could abate 100% of private mobility emissions, but this information
would not appear in the curve.
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resulting in a limited share of EVs in the fleet, hence limited emission
reductions from EVs by 2020 or 2030. The potential achievable by a
given date is therefore lower or equal than the full potential reported
on full potential MAC curves.
A key advantage of the achievable-potential approach is that it re-
quires investigation of reasonable assumptions regarding the possible
implementation speed of a measure (e.g. 1% of the dwellings can be
retrofitted each year). This information is key for a policy maker
scheduling emission-reduction investments. Unfortunately, assessed
diffusion speeds are not displayed in the resulting MAC curve, and
are not always discussed in the accompanying reports.
Most expert-based MAC curves published in the gray literature are
constructed this way — see for instance McKinsey (2009, p. 46), or
Pellerin et al. (2013, p. 22). The few curves built using integrated as-
sessment models are also achievable-potential MAC curves (Kesicki,
2012b).
Achievable-potential MAC curves are built from emission-reduction
pathways (Fig. 5.2), that are investigated taking into account at least
some inter-temporal dynamics and sector-specific constraints. It is thus
logically inconsistent to conclude from an achievable-potential MAC
curve that emission-reduction should be implemented sequentially in
the “merit order”, cheapest first. The original emission-reduction path-
ways already provides an answer to when and where to reduce GHG
emissions. Unfortunately, achievable-potential MAC curves have been
frequently used overlooking their caveats, in particular in the media
and policy debate (Haab, 2007; Kesicki et Ekins, 2012).
One weakness of the achievable potential is that it makes the slow
diffusion process indistinguishable from the full potential. The reader of
a MAC curve does not know, for instance, if a small potential for abate-
ment from residential building retrofit means that residential buildings
are already almost entirely retrofitted in the region (the full potential
is low), or it if means that only a small fraction of buildings may be
retrofitted during the period (the diffusion is slow).
The MAC curve we reanalyze in this paper is an achievable-potential
MAC curve. In each economic sector, emission reduction scenarios have
been assessed taking into account constraints on implementation and
maximum diffusion speeds (de Gouvello, 2010).
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1.3 MAC curves at the World Bank: MACTool
The World Bank develops and promotes a piece of software called
MACTool, which can produce achievable-potential MAC curves. One
aim of the MACtool is to provide policy makers with a common frame-
work to analyze available mitigation measures. MACTool takes as in-
puts the key socio-technical parameters of a set of large mitigation
measures, and macroeconomic variables. For instance, technology op-
tions to produce electricity are characterized by required capital and
operation expenditures, as well as their lifetime, energy efficiency and
type of fuel used. Physical constants as the carbon intensity of each fuel
are factored in. The user must also specify at least one scenario on the
future macroeconomic variables of interest, such as the price of fossil
fuels and the future demand for electricity. Finally, the user must pro-
vide scenarios of future penetration of (low-carbon) technologies and
measures, in both a baseline and at least one emission-reduction path-
way (ESMAP, 2014).
As outputs, MACTool computes the amount of GHG saved by each
measure in the long run (in MtCO2), and the cost of doing so (in
$/tCO2). This information is illustrated with two figures: an achievable
potential MAC curve, and an abatement wedge curve.
The tool itself does not provide information on what is achievable,
this information comes directly from the input scenarios. Input sce-
narios therefore need to be built taking into account the constraints
on technology diffusion and implementation speed. For instance, these
scenarios may come from integrated assessment models that factor such
constraints in, or be built by sector experts who guesstimate possible
penetration scenarios (Kesicki et Ekins, 2012).
In addition to the classical abatement cost and abatement potential,
MACTool reports the investment needed in different emission reduction
scenarios. MACTool can also compute the carbon price signal that
would be required to trigger investments from the private sector, taking
into account any private discount rate. These can be different from the
social discount rate to reflect different opportunity costs of capital in
sectors where funding is restricted, different risk premiums in different
sectors, and particular fiscal regimes.
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2 Proof of concept: Re-analyzing the case of Brazil
by 2030
In a theoretical framework, Vogt-Schilb et Hallegatte (2014) find
that using a MAC curve as a supply curve — that is disregarding con-
straints on implementation speed and focusing on short-term targets
— would lead to suboptimal strategies, making the longer-term target
more expensive to reach. In some cases, doing so would even lead to a
carbon-intensive lock-in, making the longer-term target impossible to
reach. They show how a simple optimization model that factors imple-
mentation speed in the analysis can be used to avoid this problem.
Here, we perform a proof of concept for these ideas, reanalyzing the
data used at the World Bank to create a MAC curve for Brazil with
MACTool (de Gouvello, 2010).
We first extract the long-term potential and emission-reduction
speed from the emission-reduction pathway that was provided to MAC-
Tool, and use them to calibrate the model.
We then take the point of view of a social planner who chooses in
2010 an emission-reduction schedule to comply with an emission tar-
get, in two different simulations. In the first one, an emission-reduction
target is set for year 2030 and the optimal emission strategy is derived.
Then, the quantity of abatement obtained in 2020 in this optimal strat-
egy is used as a target for 2020, and the MAC curve is used to design
a mitigation strategy between 2010 and 2020, disregarding the longer-
term objective. Finally, we investigate differences of the optimal emis-
sion reductions up to 2020 in the two simulations.
We find that because of technical inertia, using a MAC curve with-
out taking into account long-term objectives would lead to insufficient
short-term investments in metro, rail, waterways, and bullet train, all
options with high potential, large costs and slow implementation speed.
Instead, the abatement target is met by implementing marginal energy-
efficiency improvement in refineries, which provide “lower-quality” abate-
ment. Indeed, while these options are lower cost than clean transporta-
tion infrastructure, they have a much lower abatement potential in the
long term, meaning that using them in the short term not opening the
door to deeper reductions in the long-term.
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Figure 5.3 – Emission reductions achieved over time thanks to recycling.
This particular emission-reduction measure illustrates that many emission
reduction pathways (the plus signs +) may be approximated by a piecewise-
linear curve (in red). The slope of the first piece provides the diffusion speed
for that measure. The second part is interpreted as the maximum potential,
that grows over time.
2.1 Methods and data
We use a spreadsheet program based on the model proposed by
Vogt-Schilb et Hallegatte (2014). The program provides the least-cost
emission-reduction schedule that complies with the abatement target.
As inputs, it requires a list of measures, characterized by a marginal
abatement cost, a maximum diffusion speed, and a maximum abate-
ment potential (A).
Note that the abatement potential may evolve through time. For in-
stance, if available technology limits intermittent wind power to 20% of
the electricity production and electricity production is expected to grow
over time, then the abating potential of wind power grows over time.
On the other hand, if natural resources provide only few opportunities
to build dams, the abating potential of hydro power is fixed, regardless
of total electricity demand growth. We thus extend the model by Vogt-
Schilb et Hallegatte (2014) to allow for growing abatement potentials
(see below and A).
We use data collected at the World Bank to build a MAC curve
(using MACTool) for Brazil (de Gouvello, 2010). The MAC curve pro-
vides a list of emission-reduction measures, their marginal abatement
cost, and the potential achievable by 2030.
While the list of measures and their cost can be used directly in our
spreadsheet program (see the first two columns of Tab. 5.1), our pro-
gram requires the full-abatement potential and diffusion speed. Since
the diffusion speed and the full-abatement potential were not reported
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Measure MAC Diffusion speed Potential in 2010 Potential growth
$/tCO2 ktCO2 MtCO2 ktCO2
Combustion optimization -28.4 955 3.3 218
Heat recovery -59.6 168 0.6 37
Steam recovery -62.4 339 1.1 77
Furnace heat recovery -12.8 1685 9.3 701
New processes 25.8 1200 4.5 265
Other Energy Efficiency -7.5 162 0.6 35
Thermal Solar -34.8 233 0.8 53
Recycling -23.6 679 2.3 155
Natural gas 0 397 1.3 90
Biomass 4.3 716 · ·
Reforestation · · 26.9 1002
Wind 64 138 1.2 0
Comb. Heat Power -43.2 1516 5.7 241
Solar heat 83.9 18 · ·
Air conditioning 419.1 · 0 0
Residential Lightning -91.9 · 0.1 0
Cooler 5.2 79 · ·
Motor -5.8 13 · ·
Industrial Lightning -36.2 3 · ·
Commercial lightning -27.3 9 · ·
GTL 0.6 1021 · ·
New Refineries 16.4 352 · ·
Refineries Heat Integration 10.9 510 3.1 37
Refineries Fouling Mitigation 45.8 59 0.5 0
Refineries Advanced Control 79.1 59 0.5 0
Ethanol 1.8 1444 · ·
Rail and Waterways 23.3 494 · ·
Bullet train 376.3 45 0.9 0
Rapid transit bus 42 · 0 0
Metro 95.7 1007 · ·
Traffic optimization 0.2 232 · ·
Bike Lanes 2.6 120 · ·
Solid residues 2.1 · 40.5 728
Resid. wastewater 7.8 513 · ·
Indust. Wastewater 80.4 · 8 333
Restauration · 5899 · ·
Livestock and Forest 0.7 228898 229.4 6580
Tilage -0.2 2578 17.6 185
Table 5.1 – Calibrated speed, cost and potential of the measures in the
Brazilian study. A dot (·) denotes lack of reliable data.
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(a) No potential (b) No speed
Figure 5.4 – Emission reductions achieved over time thanks to traffic opti-
mization and management of solid residues. For some abatement measures,
the data needed to calibrate our model cannot be derived from the emission-
reduction pathways. Traffic optimization (a) is an example of measure for
which the long term potential is not binding because it cannot be reached
before 2030. Solid residues (b) exemplifies that for some other measures, the
diffusion speed cannot be assessed — either it was not investigated, or the
measure can reach its full potential in less than one year.
separately, we have to reconstruct them with indirect methods, using
the emission-reduction pathways that were provided to MACTool. For
each measure, the shape of the emission-reduction pathways can be
classified in one out of three cases.
In the first case, emission-reduction pathways may be approximated
by a two-phases piecewise-linear function as in Fig. 5.3. In this case,
the diffusion speed is given by the slope of the first piece, and the
second phase is interpreted as the growing full potential. About half
the measures fall in this category.
Other emission-reduction pathways may be approximated by a sin-
gle linear diffusion (Fig. 5.4a). In this case, the full potential is not
binding before 2030. We calibrate the diffusion speed from the slope
of the penetration pathway, and denote the lack of data on the full
potential with a dot (·) in the two last columns of Tab. 5.1.
In some other cases the emission-reduction pathway lacks the first
phase; abatement immediately “jumps” to a growing full-potential (Fig. 5.4b).
We denote them with a dot in the diffusion speed column in Tab. 5.1.
There is usually a handful of such cases in MAC curves exercises. One
example from the Brazilian study is solid residues management. In
the emission-reduction pathway, solid residues management is able to
reduce emissions by more than 40 MtCO2 in one year, and then grow
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at less than 1 MtCO2/yr. From the perspective of the user of a MAC
curve, it is unclear whether this should be considered as a shortcoming
in the data (if the investigation could not identify the constraints that
limit the diffusion of solid residues management), or a realistic emission-
reduction pathway (if solid residues management can actually save lots
of GHG in a short time lapse).7 To avoid this situation in the future,
we recommend that the terms of reference for the experts in charge of
collecting data on emission reductions options should explicitly ask to
report possible diffusion speeds (B).
Finally, some emission-reduction measures (reforestation, air condi-
tioning and rapid bus transit) were included in the list while lacking
either a marginal abatement cost or an emission scenario. These mea-
sures, as well as those for which the diffusion speed could not be esti-
mated, are discarded for the rest of the analysis. The remaining options
allow to reduce Brazilian emissions in 2030 by 223 MtCO2 (compared
with 812 MtCO2 in the original MAC curve).
2.2 Results
In a first simulation, we run our spreadsheet model to design the
socially optimal strategy to achieve 223 MtCO2 of emission reductions
by 2030. The optimal emission-reduction strategy has the following
characteristics.
First, all negative-cost measures are introduced at full speed from
year 2010, independently of the emission-reduction target. Indeed,
these measures are desirable per se, as they bring more benefits than
costs even in the absence of any carbon pricing or climate change im-
pacts.8
Second, the least-cost strategy is to implement the positive-cost
7Livestock and forest management is a particular example. In the emission-
reduction pathways, this measures allows to save 229 MtCO2, that is almost one
third of the total abatement potential by 2030, as soon as 2010. Since Brazil
has already managed to reduce drastically its emissions from deforestation (-80%
between 2004 and 2009), the study considered that this mitigation option is already
enforced. Sustaining such effort over a long period will require that productivity
gains in the livestock sector free-up pasture land fast enough to accommodate the
growth of the livestock-agriculture sector without deforesting, as recommended in
the Brazil Low-carbon study (de Gouvello, 2010).
8Remember that our framework accounts for implementation barriers that lower
the speed at which emission reduction options may be implemented, but do not
increase their cost.
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Figure 5.5 – Comparison of emission reduction achieved in 2020 with a
set of measures when the 2020 target is the final target vs. when it is a
milestone toward a more ambitious 2030 target. The picture shows the five
emission-reduction for which the difference between the two strategies are
the largest.
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Figure 5.6 – Two achievable-potential MAC curves, built for 2020 and
2030. The 2020 MAC curve (a) suggests that the 2020 target (D2020) can be
met using only options 1–4, disregarding option 5 before 2020. But then only
a fraction of option 5 could be implemented between 2020 and 2030. The
2030 MAC curve (b) however shows that options 1–5 should be implemented
by 2030 to meet the D2030 target. For option 5 to deliver all the abatement
listed by 2030, it should be implemented before 2020.
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measures as late as possible, to benefit from the discount rate. This
means that under climate targets expressed as an emission reduction
in one point in time, such as -30% by 2030, the two-phase penetra-
tion pictured in Fig. 5.3 is not optimal for positive-cost measures. A
better solution is to delay the implementation such that the maximum
potential is reached just in time, when the target needs to be achieved.9
Finally, the optimal emission reduction pathway to achieve 223 MtCO2
in 2030 leads to 127 MtCO2 of emission reductions in 2020.
To investigate how focusing on short-term targets may lead to sub-
optimal outcomes, we run a second simulation with the only constraint
of reducing emissions by 127 MtCO2 in 2020. We then investigate how
the “optimal” solution provided by our model in this case compares to
the first simulation.
In line with Vogt-Schilb et Hallegatte (2014), the least-cost strat-
egy for 2010-2020 uses different emission-reduction options, depending
on whether the strategy aims at a short-term target (127 MtCO2 in
2020) or at a longer-term one (223 MtCO2 in 2030). This is shown
in Fig. 5.5, which depicts emission reductions achieved by 2020 in the
two strategies, for selected emission reduction options. We chose the
five emission-reduction measures with the highest difference between
the two scenarios. The simulation that ends in 2020 uses notably less
investment in metro and other clean transportation infrastructure, and
more heat integration and other marginal improvements in existing re-
fineries than what the 2030 simulation does by 2020.
Indeed, clean transportation infrastructure is characterized by a
large abatement potential, and high cost per ton of CO2 avoided. As
illustrated in Fig. 5.6, these options are not implemented when short-
term target masks the longer-term target. In addition, clean trans-
portation infrastructure also takes a long time to implement, mean-
ing that in the 2030 scenario, it is implemented as fast as possible —
confirming the need for short term investment in clean infrastructure,
as recently advocated by Waisman et al. (2012); Framstad et Strand
(2013); Kopp et al. (2013); Lecocq et Shalizi (2014) and Avner et al.
(2014).
Moreover, because it takes so long to build clean transportation in-
9This is a downside of targets expressed in terms of reductions at one point in
time. If the climate mitigation target was expressed in terms of a carbon budget
(consistently with climate change physics, Zickfeld et al., 2009), then the two-phase
penetration target would be optimal (Vogt-Schilb et Hallegatte, 2014, section 4).
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frastructure, not starting doing it before 2020 closes the door to deeper
emission reductions by 2030. Indeed, reaching the 2030 target requires
the implementation of 95 additional MtCO2 of abatement between
2020 and 2030. However, a 2020-2030 strategy would be able to save
84 MtCO2 additionally at best, since not enough time would be left to
deploy time intensive solutions. This new low-carbon scenario would
therefore be short 11 MtCO2 or 12% in 2030 compared to the first best.
In other words, the 2030 target becomes impossible to achieve after
2020, as the limited diffusion speed prevents high-abatement-potential
options to achieve their optimal 2030 level in only 10 years. This is an
example of how delayed action in key sectors can create carbon lock-ins.
3 Conclusion
In order to put the economy on the track to deep decarbonization,
9 MtCO2 of abatement achieved with metro may be worth more than
11 MtCO2 achieved with energy-efficiency improvements in refineries;
for metro avoids locking the transportation system in carbon-intensive
patterns, while energy-efficiency improvement in refineries has limited
long-term potential.
Regardless of the process used to generate them, MAC curves cannot
communicate this type of information to decision makers: they appear
as static abatement supply curves, leaving any caveat regarding the dy-
namic aspect of mitigation strategies to method sections or footnotes.
An easy solution to mitigate this issue may be to systematically dis-
play flipped MAC curves next to the corresponding emission-reduction
pathway, also known as a wedge curve (Fig. 5.2).
More generally, the abatement potential and cost are not sufficient
information to schedule emission-reduction measures. Both a long-term
objective and the speed at which each option may deliver abatement
are instrumental in deciding on the quantity and quality of short-term
emission reductions.
With this information, decision makers can design policies aiming to
achieve two objectives. The first is to remove implementation barriers
on negative- and low-cost options. The second is to ensure short-term
targets are met with abatement of sufficient quality – that is with-
out under-investing in the ambitious abatement measures required to
achieve long-term targets.
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Appendices
A Model
We extend the model proposed by Vogt-Schilb et Hallegatte (2014).
As inputs, the model takes a set of measures (indexed by i), their
respective abatement potential Ai,t, (marginal) abatement costs ci,10
maximum diffusion speeds vi, an abatement target a⋆T , set for a date in
the future T (e.g. 2020 or 2030), and a discount rate r.
The model computes the least-cost schedule ai,t of emission reduc-
tions done with each measure i at each time t:
min
ai,t
∑
i,t
e−rtci ai,t (5.1)
The model takes into account the constraint set by maximum abate-
ment potentials:11
∀(i, t), ai,t ≤ Ai,t (5.2)
The second constraint on emission reduction is that they cannot grow
faster than the diffusion speed vi, such that:
ai,t+1 ≤ ai,t + vi (5.3)
Finally, the abatement target sets the following constraint:∑
i
ai,T ≥ a⋆T (5.4)
An Excel implementation of this model is available online.
B Information collection guidance
The following proposes guidance on how data on emission reduc-
tion measures could be collected to take into account the findings of
this paper. The objective is to collect data that can be used to build
emission reduction pathways and MAC curves in order to inform cli-
mate mitigation policies. Asking specifically to disclosure assumptions
10The model assumes that abatement costs are linear, such that marginal and
average cost coincide.
11In the model proposed by Vogt-Schilb et Hallegatte (2014), abatement poten-
tials do not evolve over time. This is the only extension we propose.
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on the diffusion speed of each option (3c) should help identify bottle-
necks preventing some measures to be implemented.
Note that collecting this data does not require more work that what
is currently done to build MAC curves from expert surveys; clarifying
the difference between implementation speed and full technical poten-
tial may actually facilitate the data-gathering process.
Of course, this sketch should be adapted to local conditions; for
instance, it should account for existing plans and projections when
defining emission baseline and abatement potentials.
1. Inventory of existing GHG emissions
(a) Provide the list of GHG emissions at a given date in the
recent past. Chose the most recent date for which data is
available .
(b) Provide a breakdown of these emissions by sector, e.g. power
generation, industry, buildings, transportation, agriculture.
Use sub-sectors where possible, for instance as provided by
the International Standard Industrial Classification.
(c) Describe current output of these sectors.
i. Use physical measures of output when possible, e.g:
A. In the transportation sector, use passenger-kilometer
and ton-kilometer.
B. In the power sector, use MWh/yr.
C. In the residential sector, use number of inhabitants
at given comfort.
ii. Express these emissions in CO2 equivalent using ac-
cepted conversion factors.
2. Prospective: provide projections of future GHG emissions re-
ported in 1 using the same breakdown. Report relevant drivers,
such as population projections, GDP growth, etc.
3. List available emission-reduction measures
(a) Full technological potentials
i. Provide emission intensity of each activity (e.g., gCO2/km).
ii. Provide maximum potential with today’s technology:
e.g. hydro power limited by river availability, electric
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vehicles limited by range. If relevant provide maximum
penetration rate given political and societal constraints
(e.g. if nuclear power is unacceptable).
(b) Costs
i. Report Capex and Opex separately
A. Report input-efficiency (e.g. fuel-efficiency and fuel
type)
B. Report input prices (report taxes separatedly)
ii. Report domestic and foreign expenses separately.
iii. Report costs used to pay domestic salaries separately
For instance, a photovoltaic power module can be imported
but the installation is paid to a local worker; avoided gasoline
use from electric vehicles means less oil imports, but also less
tax revenue.
(c) Speed at which new technologies may enter the market. This
piece of data assesses the speed at which each option can be
implemented – taking into account the required accumula-
tion of human and physical capital.
i. Report typical capital lifetimes for considered technolo-
gies and related technologies in the sector — e.g. cars
typically live 12 years.
ii. Report past penetration rates for similar technologies in
the sector — e.g. diesel sales took 30 years to go from 0
to 50% in the past.
iii. Report current bottlenecks (institutional barriers, avail-
able resources) — e.g. available workforce can retrofit
100 000 dwellings per year.
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6
Transition to clean capital,
irreversible investment and stranded
assets
For the past centuries, economic growth has involved the accu-mulation of fossil-fueled capital, such as coal power plants and
gasoline-fueled cars, which release greenhouse gases (GHG) to the at-
mosphere. To stabilize the resulting climate change and subsequent
damages, economies now have to reduce emissions to near-zero levels
(IPCC, 2014c); and doing so implies a transition from production based
on polluting capital to production based on clean, carbon-neutral capi-
tal. In principle, the optimal policy to enforce such a transition is to use
a carbon price (Pigou, 1932; Nordhaus, 1991; Pearce, 1991). Combined
with targeted innovation policies, a carbon price could redirect invest-
ment away from polluting and towards clean capital at a relatively low
cost (Acemoglu et al., 2012; IPCC, 2014b).
However, implementing substantial carbon prices may be politically
challenging. By inducing a sudden change in prices, environmental
taxes may result in the creation of stranded assets — polluting capital
that has to be discarded because its continued use is not compatible
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with climate policies.1 For instance, Johnson et al. (2014) estimate
that a carbon price consistent with the 2◦C target will strand at least
165 billion US dollars worth of coal power plants worldwide. Stranded
assets translate into a visible loss of wealth concentrated in a few vested
interests, whose owners may oppose the reform — and in some cases
may even have the power to veto it (Olson, 1977; Trebilcock, 2014).
Furthermore, absent any alternative in the short term, the carbon price
may force households and firms to temporarily reduce consumption,
resulting in a short-term drop of income for the whole economy. In other
words, the carbon price sets immediate costs on the present generation
(and present voters) to the benefits of future generations.2
This paper uses a simple model to investigate the transition to low-
carbon capital and explore how alternative policy instruments may re-
duce stranded assets and immediate costs in this transition. We focus
on the effect of instruments such as corporate average fuel economy
(CAFE) standards in the automobile industry, efficiency standards for
new power plants, buildings and appliances, feebate programs that tax
energy-inefficient equipment and subsidize energy-efficient equipment,
or subsidized loans and tax breaks for energy efficiency investment. All
these instruments are similar in that they redirect private investment
away from polluting capital and toward clean capital without affecting
the existing stock of polluting capital, for instance without providing
incentive to drive less or operate existing gas power plants instead of ex-
isting coal power plants. In this paper, we call these policies investment
instruments for short.3
1The words stranded assets are used in the literature to describe stranded fossil
fuel resources that cannot be burnt into the atmosphere if a given climate target is
to be reached (also called unburnable carbon), and man-made capital that have to
be retired early because of climate policies, such as coal power plants that become
unprofitable after a carbon price is implemented. This paper focuses on stranded
man-made capital.
2A literature on public attitudes towards environmental taxes suggests that aver-
sion to carbon taxes is partly driven by (i) the perception that they are unfair, as
their cost is perceived to fall disproportionately in a few actors ; and (ii) the percep-
tion that they are inefficient, absent clean alternatives to polluting activities (e.g.,
Dresner et al., 2006; Winslott-Hiselius et al., 2009; Kallbekken et al., 2011; Harrison
et Peet, 2012). Stranded assets are closely related to these two issues, as they are
a symptom of limited availability of clean alternatives in the short-term, and they
translate into costs concentrated on a few actors.
3A motivation for comparing these two types of instruments is that while some
governments have enacted carbon prices (World Bank, 2014), most existing climate
policies consist of clean investment instruments (IEA, 2015).
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We analyze how using either carbon prices or investment instru-
ments leads to different costs and dynamics of the transition from pol-
luting to clean capital, with a particular focus on stranded assets and
the value of existing capital. We use a Ramsey model with two types
of capital: polluting capital, which creates GHG emissions, and clean
capital, which does not (as in Acemoglu et al., 2012). We disregard
knowledge spillovers and we model the climate change constraint as a
GHG concentration ceiling.
Investment is assumed irreversible (Arrow et Kurz, 1970): existing
polluting capital cannot be converted back into consumption or trans-
formed into clean capital. We however allow for under-utilization of
existing polluting capital, a feature that is generally omitted in multi-
sector growth models. Under-utilization means that emission-reduction
effort can be divided out between two qualitatively different channels:
(i) long-term abatement through accumulation of clean capital instead
of polluting capital (e.g. agents buy electric cars instead of gasoline-
fueled cars); and (ii) immediate abatement through the underutiliza-
tion or early decommissioning of polluting capital (e.g. agents drive less
or scrap their gasoline cars).
We find that, irrespective of which type of instrument is used, the
cost of the climate change policy decomposes as a technical cost — the
cost of using clean instead of polluting capital — and a temporary legacy
cost due to the irreversibility of capital.4 The legacy cost quantifies
society’s regret for excessive past investment in polluting capital, which
becomes a liability when emission-reduction policies are implemented.
Carbon prices and investment instruments lead to the same long-
term growth path, in which most installed capital is clean and GHG
concentration is maintained at its ceiling. Investment-based instru-
ments and the carbon price however induce different short-term path-
ways in terms of emissions and costs, and in particular different levels
and distribution of legacy costs.
Unsurprisingly, the carbon price minimizes the total discounted cost
of the climate change policy. Under a carbon price, investment is redi-
rected towards clean capital until polluting capital has depreciated to a
level compatible with the concentration ceiling. In addition, part of the
existing polluting capital is stranded if climate policies are stringent —
4This result is a novelty per se, related to the explicit representation of the
irreversibility constraint. It resembles but differs from the “transition costs” due to
path-dependence in the innovation process (Acemoglu et al., 2012, 2014).
159
that is, if the carbon price is high with regard to the marginal produc-
tivity of polluting capital over its carbon intensity. Such outcomes are
part of the least-cost strategy, because stranded assets reduce legacy
costs from excessive past investment in polluting assets. But this strat-
egy sets a disproportionate cost on the owners of polluting capital (and
the workers who depend on it). Even in the absence of stranded assets,
the carbon price ties a new cost to the utilization of existing capital
and thus decreases its market value.
In contrast, investment incentives do not prompt producers to un-
derutilize existing polluting capital, and thus do not create stranded
assets. Quite the contrary: by inducing a scarcity of polluting capital,
investment instruments increase the market price of existing polluting
capital. However, investment instruments create a higher legacy cost,
compared to the carbon price: society keeps using obsolete polluting
capacities until the end of their lifetime instead of scrapping them — as
if refusing to recognize that past accumulation of polluting capital was
a mistake. This strategy imposes further abatement efforts on the next
generations and increases intertemporal welfare losses. But instead of
being paid immediately by the owners of polluting capital in the form of
stranded assets, legacy costs are now distributed over the whole society
and over time.
These results suggest a trade-off between efficiency and political
feasibility of climate change policies. While they are blunt instruments
from a welfare perspective, investment instruments may reduce the
number of opponents to mitigation policies, making them easier to im-
plement than a carbon price in the short term. And as they transform
progressively the production system, investment instruments may pre-
pare the economy and the public to easier implementation of carbon
prices in the medium term.
Finally, another important difference between the two types of in-
struments is their mere efficacy. As they do not lead to decommis-
sioning any polluting capital, investment instruments reduce emissions
slower than a carbon price, and cannot achieve too stringent GHG
concentration targets — while carbon prices could reduce emissions
arbitrarily quickly. Empirical evidence suggests that it is still tech-
nically possible to reach the 2◦C target with investment instruments
alone. For instance, Davis et al. (2010) estimate that emissions em-
bedded in existing long-lived capital and infrastructure commits us to
a warming of less than 1.4◦C. However, findings by Rogelj et al. (2013)
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and Johnson et al. (2014) suggest that the least-cost pathway toward
a 2◦C-compliant economy does involve stranding assets. These results
suggest that governments willing to limit global warming below 2◦C
still have a choice between carbon prices and investment incentives,
and that this choice implies a trade-off between minimizing discounted
costs and avoiding stranded assets.
Our paper relates to several branches of the literature. First, the
literature on instrument choice for environmental policy has long es-
tablished that the carbon price is the most efficient instrument (Pigou,
1932; Goulder et Parry, 2008; Fischer et Newell, 2008).5 The distribu-
tional impacts of climate change policies have also received attention,
but most studies focus on the distribution in terms of different income
categories (e.g., Rausch et al., 2010; Fullerton et al., 2012). Few pa-
pers explore how different policies set costs on different sectors of the
economy. One is Fullerton et Heutel (2010), who find in a two-sector
static model that the additional welfare cost of performance standards,
compared to that generated by a carbon price, is not supported by the
dirty sector, but spread over the clean one.6 We expand this literature
by introducing the dynamics and comparing carbon taxes and invest-
ment instruments in the context of a transition to clean capital, with
a focus on temporary legacy costs and stranded assets. With our dy-
namic model, we find that carbon prices and investment instruments
lead not only to different distribution of costs between sectors but also
over time. Carbon prices indeed lead to a temporary drop in income in
the short-run while investment instruments smooth costs over time.
Second, papers have studied how carbon pricing schemes can be
designed to avoid stranded assets or compensate firms for stranded
assets. Richels et al. (2009) and Williams (2011) note that a policy
phase-in, for instance announcing a carbon tax in advance, would give
economic actors the time to adjust. Goulder et al. (2010) find that un-
der a cap-and-trade system, the owners of stranded assets may be fully
compensated if a fraction of emissions allowances are grandfathered for
free; and Goulder et Schein (2013) note that the same result could be
5For instance, the extensive literature on CAFE standards stresses that they may
create a rebound effect, worsening the effect of unaddressed externalities such as
congestion or emission of local pollutants; and slow down capital turnover, reducing
the speed at which the new, energy-efficient cars enter the fleet (Anderson et al.,
2011). All these important effects are left out of our model.
6Giraudet et Quirion (2008) reach a similar conclusion in the case of policies
that promote energy efficiency.
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obtained with carefully-designed exemptions under a carbon tax.7 We
expand this literature by looking at the impact of investment instru-
ments on stranded assets. We find that investment instruments avoid
stranded assets and thereby avoid the temporary economy-wide drop
in income which happens with carbon pricing schemes despite compen-
sations.
Last but not least, our paper relates to the literature that studies the
transition to a clean economy through the lens of the directed technical
change theory (e.g. Gerlagh et al., 2009; Grimaud et al., 2011; An-
dré et Smulders, 2014). This literature focuses on the optimal policy
mix to tackle both the climate change externality and sector-specific
knowledge accumulation and spillovers, but disregards sector-specific
accumulation of physical capital. One finding highlighted by Kvern-
dokk et Rosendahl (2007) and Acemoglu et al. (2012, 2014) is that, in
the short term, the least-cost policy relies relatively more on research
subsidies in the clean sector than on carbon prices. The reason is that
the most powerful lever to reduce GHG emissions is to encourage a
structural transformation of the economy over the long term, not to
distort production decisions in the short term.8 We expand this litera-
ture by considering other policy instruments and analyzing the effect of
irreversible accumulation of physical capital on structural change. Our
findings suggest that investment instruments help trigger structural
change, like research subsidies, and that they avoid stranded assets and
associated political costs — at the expense of a higher inter-temporal
welfare cost.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 1
presents the model and section 2 solves for the laissez-faire equilib-
rium. In section 3 we analyze the least-cost growth path, that can
be obtained with a carbon price, which we compare with second-best
investment instruments in section 4. In section 5, we study the tim-
ing issues of investment instruments and risks of lock-in. Section 6
7It is well established that a potential advantage of carbon pricing schemes over
regulations — not captured in our model — is that the remaining revenues from car-
bon pricing can be used to generate a double dividend by reducing other distortive
fiscal policies (Bovenberg et Goulder, 1996; Parry et Bento, 2000; Metcalf, 2014;
Rausch et Reilly, 2015). Investment instruments do not have this feature, except
for taxes on polluting investment (if the revenues are not used to finance a rebate as
in feebate schemes). Gas-guzzler taxes provide an example of revenue-raising clean
investment instruments.
8Grimaud et Lafforgue (2008) also note that, in that framework, R&D subsidies
impose a lower cost on the present generation than a carbon tax does.
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concludes.
1 Model
We consider a Ramsey framework with a representative infinitely-
lived household, who saves by accumulating assets9, receives income on
assets at interest rt and purchases goods for consumption c(xt). Their
wealth thus evolves as:
a˙t = rt · at − c(xt) (6.1)
At time t, consuming c(xt) provides consumers with a utility u (c(xt)).
The utility function is increasing with consumption, and strictly con-
cave (u′ > 0 and u′′ < 0).
The household maximizes intertemporal discounted utility W , given
by:
W =
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt · u(c(xt)) dt (6.2)
where ρ is the rate of time preference.
Firms produce one final good yt, using two types of available capital:
polluting capital kp (e.g., coal power plants, thermal engine vehicles)
and clean capital kc (renewable or nuclear power, electric vehicles).
Production is used for consumption (c(xt)) and investment (ip,t and
ic,t).
yt = c(xt) + ip,t + ic,t (6.3)
Investment ip,t and ic,t increase the stock of installed capital, which
otherwise depreciates exponentially at rate δ:10
k˙p,t = ip,t − δ kp,t (6.4)
k˙c,t = ic,t − δ kc,t (6.5)
The doted variables represent temporal derivatives.
9Assets are capital and loans to other households.
10We assume the same depreciation rate for polluting and clean capital to keep
notations simple, but this assumption plays no particular role in the analysis.
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Investment is irreversible (Arrow et Kurz, 1970):11
ip,t ≥ 0 (6.6)
ic,t ≥ 0 (6.7)
This means that for instance, a coal plant cannot be turned into a
wind turbine, and only disappears through depreciation.12 However,
firms may use only a portion qt of installed capital kt to produce the
flow of output yt given by:
yt = F (At, qp,t, qc,t) (6.8)
qp,t ≤ kp,t (6.9)
qc,t ≤ kc,t (6.10)
F is a classical production function, with decreasing marginal produc-
tivities, to which we add the assumption that capital can be underuti-
lized. At is exogenous technical progress, and increases at an exponen-
tial rate over time.
In the remaining of this paper, qt will be called utilized capital and
kt installed capital. Although it is never optimal in the laissez-faire
equilibrium, the underutilization of installed polluting capital can be
optimal when a carbon price is implemented.13 For instance, coal plants
can be operated part-time and low-efficiency cars can be driven less if
their utilization is conflicting with the climate objective.
Polluting capital used a time t emits greenhouse gases (G × qp,t)
which accumulate in the atmosphere in a stock mt. GHG atmospheric
concentration increases with emissions, and decreases at a dissipation
rate ε:14
m˙t = G · qp,t − εmt (6.11)
Note that since emissions are a function of polluting capital and capital
has a decreasing marginal productivity, the carbon intensity of output
increases with the polluting capital stock.
11Following the wording by Arltesou (1999) and Wei (2003) capital is putty-clay.
12We leave capital retrofit to further research.
13In this paper, underutilization of clean capital is never optimal: ∀t, qc,t = kc,t.
14The dissipation rate allows maintaining a small stock of polluting capital in the
steady state. The linear relation between polluting capital and pollution emission
is not a necessary assumption but simplifies the notations.
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2 Laissez-faire equilibrium
In the laissez-faire equilibrium, intertemporal utility maximization
leads to a classical arbitrage equation which gives the basic condition
for choosing consumption over time (A):
c˙
c
=
−u′(c)
c · u′′(c) · (rt − ρ) (6.12)
As the elasticity of substitution is positive (−u′(c)
cu′′(c) > 0), consumption
grows if the rate of return to saving rt is higher than the rate of time
preference ρ.
Firms rent the services of polluting and clean capital from house-
holds at respective rental rates Rp,t and Rc,t. The flow of profit is given
by:
Πt = F (At, qp,t, qc,t)−Rc,t · kc,t −Rp,t · kp,t (6.13)
A competitive firm takes Rc,t and Rp,t as given and maximizes its profit
by using all installed capital, equalizing at each time t the marginal
productivity of polluting and clean capital to their respective rental
rates:
∂qbF (qp,t, qc,t) = Rp,t
∂qgF (qp,t, qc,t) = Rc,t
The classical equilibrium in capital markets in a Ramsey model applies:
Proposition 4. In the laissez-faire equilibrium, households are indif-
ferent between investing in polluting or clean capital or lending to other
households, so that the marginal productivities of clean and polluting
capital net of depreciation are both equal to the interest rate :
Rp,t = Rc,t = rt + δ (6.14)
In the next section, we find that the carbon price forces the marginal
productivity of polluting capital to be higher than that of clean capital.
Also, because investment is irreversible, the relative price of polluting
capital decreases during the transition. We then discuss implications
for the political economy of climate mitigation policies.
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3 Discounted welfare maximization: carbon price
In this section, we adopt a cost-effectiveness approach (Ambrosi
et al., 2003) and analyze policies that allow maintaining atmospheric
concentration mt below a given ceiling m¯:
mt ≤ m¯ (6.15)
This threshold can be interpreted as a tipping point beyond which the
environment (and output) can be highly damaged, or as an exogenous
policy objective such as the UNFCCC 2◦C target (Allen et al., 2009;
Matthews et al., 2009b). We solve for the welfare maximization pro-
gram, in which institutions internalize the GHG ceiling constraint. A
social planner maximizes intertemporal utility given the constraints set
by the economy budget, the capital motion law, investment irreversibil-
ity and the GHG ceiling. The same strategy can be decentralized by
imposing the shadow price of emissions on producers and consumers
through an optimal carbon tax or a comprehensive cap-and-trade sys-
tem (appendix C).
The social planner program is:
max
c,i,k
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt · u(c(xt)) dt (6.16)
subject to F (qp, kc)− c(xt)− ip,t − ic,t = 0 (λt)
k˙p,t = ip,t − δkp,t (νt)
k˙c,t = ic,t − δkc,t (χt)
m˙t = G qp,t − εmt (µt)
mt ≤ m¯ (d(mt))
ip,t ≥ 0 (ψt)
qp,t ≤ kp,t (βt)
We indicated in parentheses the co-state variables and Lagrangian mul-
tipliers (chosen such that they are positive): λt is the value of income,
νt and χt are the prices of polluting and clean capital, and µt is the
price of carbon, expressed in terms of utility at time t. The Hamilto-
nian associated to the maximization of social welfare can be found in
appendix B.
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The main first-order conditions of our problem are (B):
u′(ct) = λt = νt + ψt = χt (6.17)
∂kcF =
1
λ
((δ + ρ)χt − χ˙t) (6.18)
βt =
1
λ
((δ + ρ)νt − ν˙t) (6.19)
∂qpF = βt + τt ·G (6.20)
Where τ is the price of carbon expressed in dollars per ton:
τt =
µt
λt
(6.21)
Before the ceiling on atmospheric GHG is reached, a classical result
(see for instance footnote 11 in Goulder et Mathai, 2000) is that the
carbon price exponentially grows at the endogenous interest rate rt plus
the dissipation rate of GHG (B):
∀t, mt < m¯ =⇒ τ˙t = τt (rt + ε) (6.22)
The steady state is reached when mt = m¯. In the steady state, at-
mospheric emissions are stable, implying that polluting capital is con-
stant at kp,t = m¯ ε/G (m˙t = 0, eq. 6.11) and the rest of the economy
keeps growing on a balanced growth path, thanks to exogenous techni-
cal change At.
In equations 6.18 and 6.19 we recognize the rental rates of clean and
polluting capital Rc,t and Rp,t, as defined by Jorgenson (1967):
Rc,t :=
1
λ
[(δ + ρ)χt − χ˙t] (6.23)
Rp,t :=
1
λ
[(δ + ρ)νt − ν˙t] (6.24)
where χt and νt are respectively the clean and polluting capital shadow
prices (for buying one unit of capital and keep it forever). As ex-
plained by Jorgenson (1967), the relationship between the rental costs
(Rc,t, Rp,t) and the prices of capital (χt, νt) ensures private agents would
be indifferent between buying and renting capital, given the deprecia-
tion rate δ, the pure preference for present ρ, and the future price of
capital (implied by χ˙t and ν˙t).
The following proposition can be deduced from the first-order con-
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ditions:
Proposition 5. Along the optimal path, the marginal productivity of
clean capital equals the rental rate of clean capital:
∂kcF = Rc,t (6.25)
The marginal productivity of polluting capital is equal to the rental rate
of polluting capital plus the marginal cost of carbon emissions:
∂qpF = Rp,t + τt G (6.26)
Proof. Equation 6.25 derives from eq. 6.18 and 6.23. Equation 6.26 is
obtained by substituting βt in eq. 6.20, using eq. 6.24.
In the laissez-faire equilibrium, the marginal productivity of pollut-
ing capital was also equal to its rental rate. This is no longer the case
when the pollution externality is internalized, as firms have to pay the
carbon tax when they use polluting capital. Also, the rental rate of
polluting capital Rp,t is no longer equal to that of clean capital, as it is
now affected by a legacy cost:
Proposition 6. Along the optimal path, the interest rate rt that arbi-
trates between consumption and investment is given by:
rt = Rc,t − δ (6.27)
The rental rate of polluting capital can be lower than that of clean
capital:
Rp,t = Rc,t − ℓt (6.28)
Where the legacy cost ℓt is the monetary impact of the irreversibility
constraint on the rental rate of polluting capital:
ℓt =
1
λt
(
(ρ+ δ)ψt − ψ˙t
)
∈ [0, Rc,t] (6.29)
Note that ψt is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the irreversibility
constraint in (6.16).
Proof. See B for eq. 6.27. Equation eq. 6.28 is obtained by replacing
νt by χt − ψt (eq. 6.17) in eq. 6.24. Since Rp,t = βt ≥ 0 (eq. 6.19),
ℓt = Rc,t −Rp,t ≤ Rc,t.
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Because investment is irreversible, when the carbon price is imple-
mented the stock of polluting capital cannot be instantaneously ad-
justed to its long-term level. Polluting capital therefore becomes rela-
tively more abundant and its rental rate decreases.
The legacy cost ℓt quantifies the regret that society has because of
excessive past investment in polluting capital (e.g. having built a coal
power plant before the climate mitigation policy has been announced).
It allows decomposing the shadow price of emissions τt as a technical
abatement cost (e.g. renewable power plants are more expensive than
coal power plants) plus the legacy cost:
τt︸︷︷︸
Economic cost
=
∂qpF − ∂kcF
G︸ ︷︷ ︸
technical cost
+
ℓt
G︸︷︷︸
legacy cost
(6.30)
with ℓt ∈ [0, ∂kcF ]
The next proposition states that the legacy cost is necessarily strictly
positive at the moment when the carbon tax is implemented,15 but then
decreases and reaches zero once polluting capital has adjusted through
natural depreciation.
Proposition 7. Two phases can be distinguished during the least-cost
transition to clean capital:
1. A phase with strictly positive legacy costs, during which the rental
price of polluting capital is lower than the rental rate of clean
capital and no investment is made in polluting capital:
0 < ℓt ≤ Rc,t
Rp,t < Rc,t
ip,t = 0
2. A phase with zero legacy costs, during which the rental rate of
polluting capital is equal to the rental rate of clean capital and
15In the analysis by Arrow et Kurz (1970), the irreversibility constraint is bind-
ing only if the initial capital stock is higher than the steady-state level; here, the
irreversibility constraint is binding for any level of initial polluting capital because
of the new constraint on emissions.
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Figure 6.1 – Installed polluting and clean capital, and utilized polluting
capital in the least-cost transition to clean capital
Note: Before t0, the economy is on the laissez-faire equilibrium, during which
the stock of clean capital is small but not null. At t0 the carbon price is imple-
mented, investment in polluting capital stops, and polluting capital depreciates
until ti (∀t ∈ (t0, ti), ib = 0). During this period, a portion of polluting capital may
be underutilized (qp,t < kp,t), becoming stranded assets (kp,t − qp,t). The steady
state is reached at tss.
polluting investment is strictly positive:16
ℓt = 0
Rp,t = Rc,t
ip,t > 0
Proof. Appendix B.
When the transition to clean capital is enforced with a carbon price,
the maximum possible value for the legacy cost ℓt is the marginal pro-
ductivity of clean capital ∂kcF (= Rc,t): at worst, the social planner
regrets not to have invested in clean instead of polluting capital be-
fore t0. In that case, the rental rate of polluting capital falls down to
zero, reflecting that polluting capital is overabundant and should be
underused:17
16Investment in polluting capacity net of depreciation is however negative during
both phases.
17When clean capital is under-utilized, the strictly positive marginal productivity
of utilized polluting capital is transferred to households through the tax revenue
170
Proposition 8. If the carbon price is higher than the marginal produc-
tivity of installed polluting capital, polluting capital is underutilized:
τt G > ∂kpF (kp,t, kc,t) =⇒

ℓt = Rc,t
Rp,t = 0
qp,t < kp,t
∂qpF (qp, kc) = τt G
(6.31)
Proof. Eq. 6.26 implies that the rental rate of polluting capital Rp,t is
the difference between the marginal productivity of polluting capital
and the carbon price. As the rental rate of polluting capital Rp,t is
equal to the positive multiplier associated to the capacity constraint βt
(eq. 6.19 and 6.24), when the carbon price is higher than the marginal
productivity of installed polluting capital the rental rate of polluting
capital is nill and capital is underutilized.
Proposition 8 means that stopping to use some of the polluting
capital that was constructed before the climate policy is enacted can
be part of the optimal strategy to reduce the cost of the transition
to clean capital.18 In other words, stranding polluting assets allows
containing legacy costs.
Underutilization of polluting capital depends on the GHG concen-
tration ceiling m¯, on the initial stock of polluting capital kb,t0 and on
other parameters of the model such as the functional forms of F and
u, on the depreciation rate δ and the preference for the present ρ. As
illustrated in Fig. 6.2, for a given set of functions and parameters the
underutilization of polluting capital happens if initial polluting capital
is high (right end of the x-axis) and/or if the ceiling is stringent (lower
part of the y-axis).
In this section, we have found that under irreversible investment,
society has to live with past mistakes for a while, once it realizes it
has been on a non-optimal growth path. A way to limit the associated
legacy cost is to give up part of installed polluting capital in order to
τt G.
18Since in our framework all polluting capital is substitutable, this proposition
can be interpreted as an underutilization of the whole stock of polluting capital,
with the rental rate of the whole stock falling to zero. Another interpretation is
that the most polluting units of capital are decommissioned while the rest of the
stock is used at full capacity.
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Figure 6.2 – Under-utilization of polluting capital as a function of initial
emissions and the ceiling.
Note: Depending on initial emissions (i.e. initial brown capital kb,0) and on the
concentration ceiling (m¯), brown capital is underutilized or not in the first-best
optimum.
reduce emissions faster (thereby creating stranded assets). In the next
section, we find that investment instruments reduce emissions without
affecting existing polluting capital (in particular they cannot create
stranded assets), and thus increase legacy costs in the transition to
clean capital.
4 Investment instruments
Current climate mitigation policies are not limited to carbon prices;
many governments rely instead on instruments such as energy efficiency
standards, fiscal incentives for green investment (as feebates, which
impose additional fees on polluting capital and rebates for clean capital)
or direct public investment in “green” sectors (e.g. in public transport).
These instruments redirect investment towards clean capital but have
no effect on the use of existing capital — we thus call them investment
instruments.
We investigate the optimal transition to a clean-capital economy us-
ing investment incentives and find that (i) investment instruments are
less efficient than the first-best carbon price in terms of inter-temporal
welfare maximization (they impose higher legacy costs than the carbon
price); (ii) investment instruments may reach the same steady state
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than carbon prices; and (iii) investment instruments induce a full uti-
lization of polluting capital in the short run (they avoid stranded as-
sets), thereby reducing short-term income losses.
One way to trigger the transition to a clean economy is to differen-
tiate investment costs with feebate programs, i.e. fiscal incentives that
include subsidies on clean investment (θc,t > 0) and taxes on polluting
investment (θp,t > 0). With such a feebate program, pit, the flow of
firms’ net receipt at time t is equal to:
pit = F (qp,t, qc,t)− (λt − θc,t) ic,t − (λt + θp,t) ip,t (6.32)
where λt is the cost of investment (it is the opportunity cost of saving a
dollar rather than consuming it). The optimal values of θc,t and θp,t can
be obtained with a constrained maximization of social welfare given the
ceiling constraint.
The same steady state as in the social optimum is reached (at a
date tss,2 which is different than tss,1 in general). However, investment
instruments induce a different short-term transition than a carbon tax.
Over the short-run, investment in polluting capital stops, but since
firms do not pay carbon emissions directly, it is never optimal to un-
derutilize polluting capital (appendix D). As a consequence, short-term
output may be higher than in the first-best strategy:19
Proposition 9. With the second-best feebate program, short-term out-
put is equal or higher than with the first-best carbon price.
Proof. The first-best carbon price may induce underutilization of pol-
luting capital in the short-run (qp,1,t0 < kp,t0). In the second-best so-
lution, capital is not underused (qp,2,t0 = kp,t0). At t0, production is
thus higher with feebates than with a carbon price F (qp,2,t0 , kc,t0) ≥
F (qp,1,t0 , kc,t0).
Similarly to the carbon price, investment instruments differentiate
the marginal productivities of capital (appendix D):20
19Analytically, the effect on consumption is ambiguous because it involves the
offsetting impacts from an income effect (short-term output is higher) and two sub-
stitution effect (investment in clean capital is cheaper and investment in polluting
capital is more expensive).
20Note that the same investment pathways can be reached using taxes on polluting
investment alone or subsidies to clean investment alone, since what matters is the
sum of the tax plus the subsidy. A tax and a subsidy however lead to different
173
∂qpF = ∂kcF −
1
λt
(
(ρ+ δ)ψt − ψ˙t
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
ℓt
+
1
λt
(
(δ + ρ)(θc,t + θp,t)− ( ˙θc,t + ˙θp,t)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
τt,2 G
where ℓt is the legacy cost. In this second-best setting the shadow price
of carbon τt,2 is still equal to a technical abatement cost plus a legacy
cost:
τt,2︸︷︷︸
Marginal economic cost
=
∂qpF − ∂kcF
G︸ ︷︷ ︸
technical cost
+
ℓt
G︸︷︷︸
legacy cost
(6.33)
The legacy cost ℓt, however, is no longer bounded by the marginal pro-
ductivity of clean capital: it is bounded by the shadow price of carbon
τt,2 (D). With the carbon price, indeed, the maximum regret linked to
excess past installation of polluting capital was the opportunity cost
of not having invested in clean capital (and this cost was borne by
the owners of polluting capital who had to underutilize their capital).
Here, preventing underutilization is like refusing to recognize that past
accumulation of polluting capital was a mistake. When society keeps
using obsolete polluting capital instead of early-scrapping it, the legacy
cost can be as high as the cost of the carbon emissions generated by the
polluting capital. In this case, however, the legacy cost is not borne by
the owners of polluting capital, but by future households who will have
to increase future mitigation effort.21
Figure 6.3 compares the shadow cost of carbon with the first and
second-best policies. Investment instruments generate a higher emis-
sions shadow cost than the first-best carbon price, however the dynam-
ics of capital accumulation mean that the social cost of carbon at each
point in time does not translate into consumption losses at the same
point in time (Vogt-Schilb et al., 2014b). In this case, while investment
instruments set a higher shadow cost of carbon at each time t (Fig.
transfers in the society, which can play a key role on the acceptability of a particular
environmental policy (e.g Sterner et Höglund Isaksson, 2006; Fischer, 2008). As
mentioned in the introduction, subsidies and taxes also differ in that taxes alone
can be used to reduce other more distorting fiscal instruments, enhancing the overall
efficiency of the scheme.
21Or, thinking outside our cost-effectiveness framework, suffer from higher climate
change damage.
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Figure 6.3 – Shadow carbon price in the two simulations.
Note: The shadow price of emissions is higher with investment instruments than
with a carbon price.
Figure 6.4 – Output and consumption in the two simulations.
Note: On the left, output y in the two cases. In the short-run output is lower in
the first-best case because of the adjustment of polluting capital utilization. On the
right, consumption c is higher in the second-best case because of a higher output
y. tss is the date at which the steady state is reached, it is reached sooner in the
second-best case (tss,2 < tss,1).
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6.3), they lead to higher output over the short-run (Prop. 9, Fig. 6.4).
Investment instruments yield an emission-reduction pathway that
differs only temporarily from the first-best pathway, and smooth the
transition costs: they decrease effort in the short-run (Prop. 9), leave
them unchanged in the long-run (as the same steady-state is reached
at the end, Appendix D), and thus increase effort in the medium-run
(Fig. 6.4).
Moreover, feebate programs induce a different intra-generational
distribution of abatement effort from the carbon tax, since they avoid
stranded assets. By preventing new investment in polluting capital,
they even increase the value of existing polluting assets:
Proposition 10. When a feebate program is implemented, the market
price of polluting capital becomes higher than the price of clean capital.
Proof. First-order conditions for firms’ receipt maximization give:
∀t > t0, νt = χt + θc,t + θp,t − ψt (6.34)
where νt is the price of polluting capital and χt is the price of clean
capital. The policy creates a scarcity effect on polluting capital, that
increases its price while the irreversibility constraint reduces its price
in the short-run. Appendix D shows that the first effect is greater than
the second (θc,t + θp,t − ψt ≥ 0).
To provide a simple example, a gas-guzzler tax on new SUV sales
may increase the value of existing SUVs in the aftermarket, as buying
a used SUV is a way of evading the fee.
Investment instruments are not limited to feebates. Other examples
include performance standards for new vehicles, buildings, and appli-
ances.22
Proposition 11. In our model the optimal feebate program is equiva-
lent to the optimal performance standards on new capital: (1) the two
instruments induce the same investment and output pathways and (2)
they have the same impact on the price of polluting capital.
Proof. Appendix E.
22Investment instruments can also be provided through financial instruments in
favor of clean capital, as the carbon certificates proposed by Rozenberg et al. (2013).
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Similarly to feebates, performance standards induce a full utilization
of existing polluting capital in the short-run and redirect investment
towards clean capital. They also create scarcity on existing polluting
capital and increase the price of polluting capital.
With this increase in the price of polluting capital, investment in-
struments over-compensate the owners of polluting capital. A similar
over-compensation can occur through windfall profits when 100% of
carbon permits are allocated for free in a carbon trading scheme; to
avoid over-compensation, the government should allocate only a lim-
ited portion of permits for free (Goulder et al., 2010). Note that free
allowances do not avoid the other effect of stranded assets, that is a drop
in national production and income when the policy is implemented.
One solution to avoid both the income drop and over-compensation
for the owners of polluting capital would be to implement a carbon
price while subsidizing production from existing polluting capital. Such
a set-up would lead to the same investment and production pathway
as investment instruments (in particular, it avoids stranded assets)
and would maintain, not increase, the price of polluting capital in the
short run (Appendix F). Those results corroborate findings by Fischer
et Newell (2008); Holland et al. (2009); Fullerton et Heutel (2010),
who show, using static models, that performance standards and fee-
bate schemes act as the combination of a carbon tax and a production
(or emission) subsidy.23 With our dynamic model, we find that this
shadow subsidy applies only to production with pre-existing polluting
capital; it does not provide incentive to invest in new polluting capital.
The effect of the subsidy is thus only temporary since once the level
of polluting capital has decreased to a sustainable level, investment
instruments are equivalent to a carbon tax alone.
5 Timing of action and carbon-intensive lock-in
Since they maintain a full utilization of polluting capital in the
short term, investment instruments result in higher short-term emis-
sions than the carbon tax (Prop. 9 and Fig. 6.5). Investment instru-
ments may thus not be sufficient to reach stringent climate objectives
if past accumulation of polluting capital is substantive.
23In our model, production from dirty capital and GHG emissions are propor-
tional, so that a subsidy on emissions and a subsidy on production have the exact
same effects.
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Figure 6.5 – GHG emissions in the two cases.
Note: GHG emissions in the two cases. The carbon price induces decommission of
polluting capital and thus reduces carbon emissions faster than investment instru-
ments.
Figure 6.6 proposes a visualization of this issue. At low polluting
capital stocks (thus low emissions), a carbon tax does not lead to un-
derutilization of polluting capital. In this case, the first-best carbon
price leads to the exact same pathway as “second-best” investment in-
struments. This is a situation of flexibility in which a government can
enforce the optimal transition to clean capital using either a carbon
price or investment-based instruments (although the distributional im-
pacts of the two instruments remain different).
But as long as climate policies are absent or too lax, the economy ac-
cumulates polluting capital, making GHG emissions grow and reducing
the residual carbon budget for a given climate target (the conventional
growth arrow).
At one point, the threshold when the marginal productivity of pol-
luting capital is lower than the optimal carbon price is crossed (see
eq. 6.31), meaning that polluting capital should be underutilized and
output reduced along the optimal pathway. From there, a carbon
price may become even more difficult to implement because of political-
economy constraints. But the alternative option of using investment
instruments is still available to reach the same carbon budget without
immediate drop in income.
There is thus a window of opportunity, during which alternative
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Figure 6.6 – Under-utilization of polluting capital and feasibility of the
climate target with investment instruments as a function of initial emissions.
Note: Depending on initial emissions (i.e. initial polluting capital kb,t0) and on the
carbon budget (m¯ −mt0), the carbon tax and investment instruments can lead to
different or similar outcomes (for a given set of parameters, and in particular ρ and
δ). If the carbon budget is too stringent, such that waiting for polluting capital
depreciation is not sufficient, the investment instruments cannot be used. If the
carbon budget is not stringent, there is no underutilization of polluting capital in the
first-best optimum with the carbon tax and investment instruments are equivalent.
While the economy is on the laissez-faire growth path (red arrow), polluting capital
accumulates and the carbon budget is reduced for a given climate objective.
179
investment instruments may induce a smooth and maybe politically-
easier transition to a low-carbon economy. If this occasion is missed
(right hand side, Fig. 6.6), it becomes impossible to reach the climate
target without underutilization of polluting capital and investment in-
struments are not an option anymore (if the climate objective is not
revised). In this last area, not only the economic cost of reaching the
climate target is higher, but the political economy also creates a carbon
lock-in: the only option to reach the climate target involves stranded
assets and thus has a significant short-term cost, making it more dif-
ficult to implement successfully a climate policy consistent with the
target.
The zone in which polluting capital must be underutilized to remain
below the ceiling depends on the capital depreciation rate δ, the GHG
dissipation rate ε, initial GHG concentration m0 and initial polluting
capital k0. The lower blue line in Fig. 6.6 is expressed analytically in
G and can be approximated by:
m¯ < m0 +
G k0
δ
According to Davis et al. (2010), the level of existing polluting in-
frastructure in 2010 was still low enough to achieve the 2◦C target with-
out underutilizing polluting capital. They find that if existing energy
infrastructure was used for its normal life span and no new polluting
devices were built, future warming would be less than 0.7◦C. Reaching
the 2◦C target might however imply to stop investing in polluting cap-
ital soon,24 which depends on our ability to overcome infrastructural
inertia and develop clean energy and transport services (Guivarch et
Hallegatte, 2011). Also, while Davis et al. (2010) do not discuss whether
the least-cost policy would lead to underutilization — i.e. whether we
are in the top or the middle triangle in Fig. 6.6 — several studies based
on integrated assessment models find that in most 2◦C scenarios pollut-
ing capital (coal power plants in particular) are decommissioned before
the end of their lifetime (Rogelj et al., 2013; Johnson et al., 2014) —
suggesting that the global economy is in the middle zone. In other
words, empirical evidence suggests the optimal pathway to a stabiliza-
tion of the climate at 2◦C involves decommissioning existing capital,
but that we can still get there by only reducing the carbon content of
24Investment in polluting capacity has accelerated since 2010 (Davis et Socolow,
2014)
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new capital.
6 Conclusion
The present analysis should be interpreted cautiously, as we only
explored a few aspects of the transition to clean capital. In particular,
our model ignores uncertainty, limited foresight from investors, limited
ability to commit from governments and knowledge accumulation ef-
fects, all known to play a key role in the transition to a low-carbon
economy. One possibility for further research is to integrate and quan-
tify these effects in a unifying framework.
Keeping in mind these limitations, our results suggest that govern-
ments willing to limit global warming to 2◦C still have a choice between
carbon prices and investment incentives. They can arbitrate between
the cost-efficiency of the transition to clean capital and its immediate
impact in terms of stranded assets and associated political costs.
The analysis carried here may also be relevant for studying other
public economy issues. In essence, we propose a parsimonious model
able to analyze structural change triggered by policy changes, its impact
on vested interests, and policies to manage the transition.
Appendices
A Maximization of the household’s utility
The household maximizes their inter temporal utility (eq. 6.2) given
the motion law of wealth (eq. 6.1). The present value Hamiltonian is:
Hh(ct, at) = e
−ρt · {u(ct) + λt[rt · at + yt − ct]} (6.35)
where λt is the shadow cost of investment in assets at time t. The first
order conditions for a maximum of W are:
∀t, ∂cHh = 0⇒ λt = u′(ct) (6.36)
∀t, ∂aHh + d(e
−ρtλt)
dt
= 0⇒ λ˙t = (ρ− rt)λt (6.37)
The doted variables represent temporal derivatives. Differentiating
eq. 6.36 with respect to time and substitute for λ from eq. 6.37, yields
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the Euler equation:
c˙t
ct
=
−u′(ct)
ct · u′′(ct) · (rt − ρ) (6.38)
B Social optimum (section 3)
The present value Hamiltonian associated to the maximization of
social welfare (6.16) is:
Ht = e
−ρt ·
{
u(c(xt)) + λt[F (qp, kc)− c(xt)− ip,t − ic,t] + νt[ip,t − δkp,t]
+χt[ic,t − δkc,t]− µt · [G qp,t − εmt] + d(mt) · [m¯−mt]
+ ψt · ip,t + βt[kp,t − qp,t]
}
(6.39)
All multipliers are positive.
The complementary slackness conditions are:
∀t, ψt ≥ 0 and ψt · ip,t = 0 (6.40)
∀t, βt ≥ 0 and βt · (kp,t − qp,t) = 0 (6.41)
∀t, d(mt) ≥ 0 and d(mt) · (m¯−mt) = 0 (6.42)
First order conditions
First order conditions give:
∂Ht
∂ct
= 0⇒ u′(ct) = λt (6.43)
∂Ht
∂ip,t
= 0⇒ λt = νt + ψt
∂Ht
∂ic,t
= 0⇒ λt = χt
∂Ht
∂kp,t
= −d(e
−ρtνt)
dt
⇒ −νtδ + βt = −ν˙t + ρνt
∂Ht
∂kc,t
= −d(e
−ρtχt)
dt
⇒ λt∂kcF (kp,t, kc,t)− χtδ = −χ˙t + ρχt
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∂Ht
∂qp,t
= 0⇒ λt∂qpF (qp,t, kc,t)− µt ·G = βt
∂Ht
∂mt
=
d(e−ρtµt)
dt
⇒ −d(mt) + εµt = µ˙t − ρµt (6.44)
Equilibrium on the capital market and interest rate:
proof of proposition 6
If we differentiate eq. 6.43 with respect to time and substitute λt
and λ˙t, we can write:
ct · u′′(ct)
u′(ct)
· c˙t
ct
= (ρ+ δ −Rc,t) (6.45)
As in the laissez-faire equilibrium (eq. 6.38), the interest rate rt that
ensures households are indifferent between consumption and investment
is thus given by:
rt := Rc,t − δ (6.46)
Carbon price
Eq. 6.44 gives the evolution of µt. Using µ˙t = (λ˙tτt + λtτ˙t) (from
eq. 6.21), eq. 6.43, eq. 6.45 and eq. 6.46 yields:
τ˙t = τt[ε+ rt]− d(mt)
λt
We call tss the date at which GHG concentration reaches the ceiling:
∀t ≥ tss, mt = m¯
During the steady state, m˙t = 0 =⇒ G qp,t = ε m¯ (eq. 6.11).
On the long run, installed capital is not underused, polluting installed
capital is thus constant at kp,t = m¯ ε/G during the steady state.
Before tss, d(mt) = 0 (6.42). The carbon price thus exponentially
grows at the endogenous interest rate plus the dissipation rate of GHG
until the ceiling is reached:
τ˙t = τt[ε+ rt] (6.47)
These dynamics may be interpreted as a generalized Hotelling rule
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applied to clean air: along the optimal pathway, and before the ceiling
is reached, the discounted abatement costs are constant over time. The
appropriate discount rate is rt + ε, to take into account the natural
decay of GHG in the atmosphere.
The irreversibility constraint is binding in the short
run : proof of proposition 7
A binding GHG ceiling is imposed at t0. Before that, the economy
was in the competitive equilibrium, such that clean and polluting cap-
ital have the same marginal productivity and installed capital is fully
used (Proposition 4):
lim
t→t−0
qp,t = kp,t (6.48)
lim
t→t−0
∂qpF (qp,t, qc,t) = ∂kcF (qp,t, qc,t) (6.49)
We use a proof by contradiction to show that at t+0 (when the constraint
is internalized) the irreversibility condition is necessarily binding. Sup-
pose that the transition starts with a phase when the irreversibility
constraint is not binding, i.e. ψt = 0. This would lead to (Propositions
5 and 6):
lim
t→t+0
∂qpF (qp,t, qc,t) = ∂kcF (qp,t, qc,t) + τt0 ·G (6.50)
Besides, investment means that capital is a continuous function of time:
lim
t→t+0
qp,t = kp,t (6.51)
If the GHG ceiling is binding then τt0 > 0 (eq. 6.47). So from eq. 6.49
and eq. 6.50:
lim
t→t+0
∂qpF (qp,t, qc,t) ̸= lim
t→t+0
∂qpF (qp,t, qc,t) (6.52)
∂qpF is a continuous function of qp,t so eq. 6.52 implies that limt→t+0 qp,t ̸=
limt→t+0 qp,t, which is incompatible with eq. 6.48 and eq. 6.51.
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C Decentralized equilibrium with a tax on emis-
sions
In a decentralized economy, it is possible to trigger the same out-
come as in the social optimum with a lump-sum tax applied to carbon
emissions. In this case, the firm’s flow of profit at time t is given by:
Πt = F (qp,t, kc,t)−Rc,t · kc,t −Rp,t · kp,t − τt G qp,t (6.53)
With Rp,t and Rc,t the rental prices of polluting and clean capacities
respectively, and τt the carbon tax. The tax is redistributed through
the assets equation:
a˙t = rt · at + yt − c(xt) + τt G qp,t (6.54)
The Lagrangian corresponding to the firm’s maximization program is:
L(t) = Πt + βt(kp,t − qp,t) + γt(kc,t − qc,t) (6.55)
First order conditions are:
∂qgL = 0⇒ ∂qcF (qp,t, qc,t) = γt (6.56)
∂qbL = 0⇒ ∂qpF (qp,t, qc,t) = βt + τt ·G (6.57)
∂kgL = 0⇒ γt = Rc,t (6.58)
∂kbL = 0⇒ βt = Rp,t (6.59)
For all t,
γt ≥ 0 and γt · (kc,t − qc,t) = 0
βt ≥ 0 and βt · (kp,t − qp,t) = 0
(complementary slackness conditions).
With eq. 6.56 we have γt = ∂qcF (qp,t, qc,t) > 0, so qc,t = kc,t for all t.
The combination of eq. 6.56 and eq. 6.58 gives
∂kcF (qp,t, kc,t) = Rc,t
Combining eq. 6.57 and eq. 6.59, we find
∂qpF (qp,t, kc,t) = Rp,t + τt ·G (6.60)
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In the equilibrium, the rental price of clean capacities is equal to the
interest rate (plus delta): Rc,t = rt + δ, because clean capacities and
loans are perfect substitutes as assets for households. When the ir-
reversibility constraint is not binding (see eq. 6.6), and in particular
on the balanced growth path, the rental rate of polluting capacities is
equal to the interest rate as well and Rp,t = Rc,t = rt + δ.
However, when the carbon price is implemented at t0, the irre-
versibility constraint is binding (7). In this case, since the use of
polluting capacities suddenly becomes too expensive, the rental rate
of polluting capacities is endogenously reduced. As a consequence of
a lower rate of return for owners of polluting capital, households stop
investing in polluting capacities. If the carbon tax is very high, the
rental rate of polluting capacities can even become nil and polluting
capacities may be under-utilized.
D Firms’ maximization problem with differentia-
tion of investment costs (feebates)
The present value Hamiltonian associated to the firm’s maximiza-
tion program is:
Ht = e
−ρt · {F (qp,t, qc,t)− (λt − θc,t) ic,t − (λt + θp,t) ip,t
+νt[ip,t − δkp,t] + χt[ic,t − δkc,t]
+ ψt · ip,t + βt[kp,t − qp,t]}
First order conditions give:
∂Ht
∂ip,t
= 0⇒ λt + θp,t = νt + ψt
∂Ht
∂ic,t
= 0⇒ λt − θc,t = χt
∂Ht
∂kp,t
= −d(e
−ρtνt)
dt
⇒ −νtδ + βt = −ν˙t + ρνt
∂Ht
∂kc,t
= −d(e
−ρtχt)
dt
⇒ ρχt − χ˙t = λt∂kcF (kp,t, kc,t)− χtδ
∂Ht
∂qp,t
= 0⇒ λt∂qpF (qp,t, kc,t) = βt (6.61)
The complementary slackness condition ∀t, βt[kp,t − qp,t] = 0 com-
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bined with equation 6.61 gives that — if F satisfies the Inada condi-
tions — capital is never underused with investment-based instruments
∀t, kp,t = qp,t.
FOCs can be reduced to:
νt + ψt = χt + θc,t + θp,t (6.62)
∂kcF =
1
λ
((δ + ρ)χt − χ˙t) (6.63)
∂qpF =
1
λ
((δ + ρ)νt − ν˙t) (6.64)
We thus obtain
∂qpF = ∂kcF+
1
λt
(
(δ + ρ)(θc,t + θp,t)− ( ˙θc,t + ˙θp,t)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
θt
− 1
λt
(
(ρ+ δ)ψt − ψ˙t
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
ℓt
(6.65)
With ℓt the legacy cost and θt a positive term that depends on (θc,t +
θp,t).
Equation 6.65 is similar to eq. 6.78 with θt = τt,2 G, where τt,2 is the
shadow price of carbon. In the optimal pathway with a full-utilization
of capital, θt is therefore equal to the shadow price of carbon (multiplied
by G).
In this setting under-utilizing polluting capital is never optimal be-
cause firms do not pay carbon emissions directly. Instead, investment
in polluting capital is more expensive that investment in clean capital
and over the short-run, as in the social optimum the economy does
not invest in new polluting capital. Once polluting capital has depreci-
ated to a level compatible with the GHG ceiling, polluting investments
become profitable and start again.
The policy creates a scarcity effect on polluting capital, that in-
creases its price (θc,t + θp,t, eq. 6.62) while the irreversibility constraint
reduces its price in the short-run (ψt, eq. 6.62).
Along the optimal transition to the new long-term steady state,
∂kcF ≤ ∂qpF
⇐⇒ ℓt ≤ θt(= τt,2) (6.66)
⇐⇒ ψt ≤ θc,t + θp,t
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so that the price of pre-existing polluting capital is higher than that of
clean capital is the short-run.
In the steady state, the legacy cost is nill (ℓt = 0) and the marginal
productivity of polluting capital is equal to that of clean capital plus
θt. The same steady state as in the social optimum is reached and the
optimal value of θt is equal to the first-best carbon tax multiplied by
the marginal emissions of polluting capital:
∀t ≥ tss, θt = τt ·G
with tss the date at which the steady state is reached.
With investment-based instruments, the shadow price of emissions
τt,2 is still equal to a technical abatement cost plus the legacy cost:
τt,2︸︷︷︸
economic cost
=
∂qpF − ∂kcF
G︸ ︷︷ ︸
technical cost
+
ℓt
G︸︷︷︸
legacy cost
(6.67)
with ℓt ∈ [0, τt,2]
The legacy cost ℓt is now bounded by the shadow carbon price τt,2
(eq. 6.66). One interpretation is that preventing under-utilization is
like refusing to recognize that past accumulation of polluting capital
may have been a mistake. By doing so, the legacy cost can be has high
as the cost of the GHG emissions that installed brown capital produces.
E Investment regulation (performance standards)
Another equivalent possibility is to regulate polluting investment
through efficiency standards. In particular, the most polluting invest-
ments can be forbidden. Here, we crudely impose polluting investments
to be nil until polluting capital has depreciated to a level allowing to
reach the carbon ceiling without under-utilizing polluting capital.
We come back to the social planner’s program (beginning of sec-
tion 3) and remove the concentration and ceiling constraints (eq. 6.11
and eq. 6.15). To simplify the exposition, we can also remove the ir-
reversibility constraint (eq. 6.6) which will not be binding in this case.
Instead, we add a polluting investment constraint that forces ip,t to be
equal to a standard at each point in time, and we call σt its Lagrangian
multiplier:
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∀t, ip,t = sdt (σt) (6.68)
The standard sdt can be optimally set to equal polluting investments
found in the previous section and the next section. Basically, sdt = 0
until polluting capacities have depreciated to a level compatible with
the ceiling. The present value Hamiltonian associated to the maximiza-
tion of social welfare is:
Ht = e
−ρt · {u(c(xt)) + λt[F (qp, kc)− c(xt)− ip,t − ic,t] + νt[ip,t − δkp,t]
+χt[ic,t − δkc,t] + σt · (sdt − ip,t) + βt[kp,t − qp,t]} (6.69)
λt is the current value shadow price of income. νt and χt are the current
shadow values of investments in polluting and clean capital.
First order conditions can be reduced to the following equations:
u′(ct) = λt = νt − σt = χt (6.70)
λt∂kcF = (δ + ρ)χt − χ˙t (6.71)
λt∂qpF = βt (6.72)
βt = (δ + ρ)νt − ν˙t (6.73)
Here, σt is equivalent to (θc,t + θp,t − ψt) in the previous section.
The maximization of intertemporal welfare results in the same equa-
tions as in the previous sections:
Rp,t = Rc,t + nt (6.74)
with nt =
1
λt
((ρ+ δ)σt − σ˙t)
This equation is equivalent to Eq. 6.65, with nt = θt− ℓt. The variable
nt is positive, which means that the rental price of polluting capacities
is higher than the interest rate. Indeed, as with the differentiation of
investment costs the polluting investment standard creates a scarcity
effect on polluting capital, which becomes more expensive than clean
capital.
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This instrument must be thought of as temporary, since once pol-
luting capital has depreciated to a sustainable level, a carbon price can
be implemented without inducing under-utilization of polluting capital,
and thus becomes politically acceptable. Investment regulation can be
compared with existing efficiency standards on cars or electric plants,
that forbid the construction of the most polluting kinds of polluting
capital.
F Maximization of social welfare with full utiliza-
tion constraint: temporary subsidy on existing
polluting capital
The same outcome as with feebates or standards can be reached
with the same social planner program as in B and a full-utilization
constraint:
max
c,i,k
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt · u(c(xt)) dt (6.75)
subject to F (qp, kc)− c(xt)− ip,t − ic,t = 0 (λt)
k˙p,t = ip,t − δkp,t (νt)
k˙c,t = ic,t − δkc,t (χt)
m˙t = G qp,t − εmt (µt)
mt ≤ m¯ (d(mt))
ip,t ≥ 0 (ψt)
qp,t ≤ kp,t (βt)
qp,t = kp,t (αt)
The present value Hamiltonian associated to the maximization of
social welfare is:
Ht = e
−ρt · {u(c(xt)) + λt[F (qp, kc)− c(xt)− ip,t − ic,t] + νt[ip,t − δkp,t]
+χt[ic,t − δkc,t]− µt · [G qp,t − εmt] + d(mt) · [m¯−mt]
+ ψt · ip,t + βt[kp,t − qp,t] + αt[qp,t − kp,t]}
All multipliers are positive.
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Equations 6.19 and 6.20 become:
βt − αt = 1
λ
((δ + ρ)νt − ν˙t)
∂qpF = βt − αt + τt ·G
The rental price of polluting capital is therefore equal to βt − αt. The
condition on the marginal productivity of polluting capital becomes:
∂qpF = βt − αt + τt ·G (6.76)
Note that due to complementary slackness conditions, if βt > 0 then
αt = 0 and if αt > 0 then βt = 0. In the first phase when polluting
investment is nil, if the carbon tax is higher than the marginal produc-
tivity of polluting capital, the value of polluting capital is nil, βt = 0
and the equation becomes:
∂qpF = −αt + τt ·G (6.77)
αt interprets as a subsidy to the utilization of polluting capital.
Similarly to the first-best pathway, the marginal productivities are dif-
ferentiated as follows:
∂qpF = ∂kcF − ℓt + τt G (6.78)
0 < ℓt < τt G
With the legacy cost ℓt > 0 during the first phase and ℓt = 0 when
polluting capital reaches a sustainable level.
In the long run when ib > 0 the equilibrium is equivalent to the
social optimum. In the short run when ib = 0, ψt > 0 and Rp,t <
Rc,t, except that in this case Rp,t becomes negative if the carbon price
is higher than the marginal productivity of the last unit of polluting
capital (expressed in output per emissions). Thus polluting capital is
always fully-utilized.
This instrument leads to the same investments and output as the
differentiation of investment costs or standards, however it is not per-
fectly equivalent. Indeed, the carbon tax also affects polluting capital
on the aftermarket, thus the price of polluting capital does not increase
the short-run. Conversely, with taxes on investments or standards on
investments, polluting capital becomes scarce and so its price increase
on the aftermarket.
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G Second-best infeasibility zone
This zone defines the cases when the ceiling is reached before pollut-
ing capacities have depreciated to a sustainable level. If no investment
is made in polluting capacities, we have:
kp,t = k0 e
−δt
Therefore, the stock of pollution follows this dynamic:
m˙ = k0 e
−δt − ε m
The solution to this differential equation is:
mt = −G k0
δ − ε e
−δt +
(
m0 +
G k0
δ − ε
)
e−εt
This function first increases to a maximum mmax = G k0δ e−δt and then
decreases. The maximum date is
tmax = −1
δ
ln(
mmax ε
G k0
)
The expression of m at the maximum date gives the limit of the infea-
sibility zone if mmax = m¯:
m¯ = −G k0
δ − ε e
ln( m¯ ε
G k0
)
+
(
m0 +
G k0
δ − ε
)
e
ε
δ
ln( m¯ ε
G k0
)
This can be rewritten:
m¯ =
[(
m0 +
G k0
δ − ε
)(
ε
G k0
) ε
δ
(
δ − ε
δ
)] δδ−ϵ
The “clean incentives infeasibility zone” depends on the capital depre-
ciation rate, the GHG dissipation rate, initial GHG concentration and
initial polluting capacities.
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Conclusion
D’un strict point de vue théorique, les résultats de cette thèse ne per-mettent pas d’affirmer que des objectifs sectoriels (comme les 20%
de renouvelable en 2020 au niveau européen) sont nécessaires, ni que les
instruments de politiques agissant uniquement sur le capital (comme
les normes d’efficacité énergétique pour les bâtiments et les véhicules
routiers) sont plus efficaces ou plus justes qu’un prix du carbone.
En théorie, la meilleure approche pour les pouvoirs publics reste de
mettre en place un prix du carbone parfaitement crédible. Un taxe car-
bone (ou des quotas vendus aux enchères) aurait l’avantage de fournir
un revenu au gouvernement, utilisable pour réduire d’autres taxes plus
distorsives, par exemple pesant sur la masse salariale, et récolter ainsi
un double dividende (Parry et Bento, 2000 ; Bovenberg et Goulder,
1996). Une autre partie des revenus, ainsi que le fruit d’une croissance
plus soutenue grâce à ce double dividende, pourrait alors servir à com-
penser les perdants d’une fiscalité carbone, par exemple ceux qui ont
investi dans du capital inerte et polluant avant sa mise en place.25
La question de la crédibilité de cette taxe à long terme reste en pra-
tique incontournable. Pour déclencher les bonnes décisions d’investis-
sement dans le secteur de la production d’électricité, où la durée de vie
du capital varie entre 30 et 60 ans, une taxe carbone doit être crédible
sur 30 à 60 ans. Les décisions touchant à la forme des villes et aux infra-
structures de transport, elles, doivent considérer que le prix du carbone
est donné pour les cinq à vingt prochaines décennies. Ce besoin de cré-
dibilité des signaux prix sur le long terme contraste avec les exemples
25Le Chapitre 5 de cette thèse suggère qu’une cartographie des perdants face
à un prix du carbone devrait étudier l’impact sur la distribution « horizontale »
des revenus de l’économie, et en particulier identifier les secteurs de l’économie les
plus vulnérables. Une autre considération, ignorée ici mais de même importance, est
l’impact d’une taxe carbone sur la distribution « verticale » des revenus dans l’éco-
nomie, par exemple en termes de déciles de la population (Combet, 2013 ; Rausch
et al., 2011)
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Australien et Canadien, qui montrent que les gouvernements peuvent
à tout moment défaire ce qu’ont fait leurs prédécesseurs.
La question de l’acceptabilité politique d’une taxation du carbone
reste également un problème pratique. En Australie encore, ou aux
Etats-Unis, le pouvoir législatif fédéral est clair dans son refus catégo-
rique de la mise en place d’un prix du carbone. Les transferts de rente
que provoquerait un prix du carbone expliquent sans doute en partie
ce refus.
Ces difficultés politiques appellent plusieurs types de réponse de la
part des économistes. La première est de répéter, expliquer, et vulga-
riser le consensus sur le bien-fondé du prix du carbone, ses multiples
cobénéfices économiques, environnementaux, sociétaux, sa capacité à
répondre aux enjeux sociétaux contemporains, y compris en insistant
sur les solutions aux problèmes distributifs soulevés par la taxe (Com-
bet 2013). Elle peut également s’efforcer de démontrer, au cas par cas,
la supériorité théorique des prix du carbone sur les instruments de
politiques proposés par les agences gouvernementales et les décideurs
publics (Goulder et Parry, 2008). L’unanimité des économistes va peut-
être finalement convaincre la classe politique et l’opinion publique en gé-
néral du bien-fondé d’une taxe carbone qui croitrait continument dans
le temps, résolvant ainsi le problème de sa crédibilité.
Une deuxième réponse peut-être de s’intéresser en parallèle au rôle
que les politiques sectorielles peuvent jouer pour préparer l’économie et
la société en général à la transition vers une fiscalité verte (Hallegatte
et al., 2013). Cette thèse contribue à cet effort, en suggérant que les
politiques sectorielles qui redirigent l’investissement sans immédiate-
ment mettre en place un prix du carbone peuvent préparer le système
productif à une taxe carbone à moyen terme, en évitant à la racine
les problèmes distributifs, et en contournant l’absence de crédibilité de
long terme des signaux prix.
Parce qu’elle étudie l’investissement optimal dans du capital bas
carbone, cette thèse est riche en enseignements pertinents pour la cali-
bration de ce type d’instruments. Elle montre qu’exprimé en euros par
tonne de carbone évitée (calculés grâce au cout annualisé des investisse-
ment bas carbone), l’investissement optimal peut être plus élevé que le
prix du carbone ; et qu’il doit être plus important dans les secteurs qui
sont plus difficiles à décarbonner, c’est-à-dire les secteurs ou le capital
bas carbone est plus cher et les secteurs ou les émissions de gaz à effet
de serre sont plus importantes.
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Cette thèse montre aussi que le prix (ou une valeur tutélaire) du
carbone seul ne donne pas assez d’information pour évaluer des poli-
tiques visant à favoriser l’investissement optimal dans chaque secteur
de l’économie. La détermination des efforts optimaux à court terme
requiert d’anticiper une stratégie entière de décarbonisation de l’éco-
nomie. Par exemple, évaluer la pertinence du développement d’une
filière de véhicules électriques requiert de prendre en compte que la
stabilisation du climat passe de toute façon par la décarbonisation de
la production d’électricité. Arbitrer entre la construction d’une centrale
à gaz et d’un parc d’éoliennes demande de prendre en compte que la
durée de vie effective des centrales à gaz va dépendre des autres déci-
sions d’investissement : à moyen terme, les centrales à gaz peuvent être
chassées par des centrales plus propres.
Ces résultats proviennent de modèles analytiques simples, qui font
abstraction de plusieurs éléments importants. Au moins quatre pistes
me semblent prometteuses pour enrichir l’analyse à l’avenir.
D’abord, la prise en compte dans un même modèle analytique des
effets d’apprentissage et de l’accumulation de capital propre devrait
permettre de clarifier l’effet de chacun de ces facteurs. D’une part, les
modèles de changement technique dirigé utilisés actuellement donnent
parfois l’impression de décrire un monde dans lequel les chercheurs fa-
briquent le capital bas carbone (les éoliennes, voitures électriques, bâ-
timents isolés) dans la foulé de leur invention, et que les producteurs
n’ont plus qu’à s’en saisir à loisir pour les incorporer immédiatement
au capital productif (Acemoglu et al. 2012 ; Gerlagh, Kverndokk, et Ro-
sendahl 2009).26 En réalité, la recherche et développement d’un côté,
le remplacement du capital polluant par du capital propre de l’autre
côté, sont deux processus distincts, mus par des dynamiques différentes.
D’autre part, les modèles analytiques mobilisés le long de cette thèse
lient investissement optimal à court terme et valeur de marché du capi-
tal à long terme. L’effet de l’apprentissage sur le cout de remplacement,
et donc sur la valeur du capital propre à long terme, devrait donc jouer
un rôle dans le timing optimal de l’investissement bas carbone.
Ensuite, les analyses exposées ici négligent toute incertitude. Il est
bien établi que sous incertitude, les stratégies optimales évitent les dé-
cisions irréversibles. La littérature économique standard a mis en avant
26L’absence de représentation explicite du capital physique et de l’inertie associée
est d’ailleurs l’une des critiques que formulent Pottier et al. (2014) à l’encontre du
modèle utilisé par Acemoglu et al. (2012).
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que l’investissement dans du capital physique est une source impor-
tante d’irréversibilité, suggérant que le décisions d’investissement, en
particulier dans du capital propre, doivent être reportées le plus pos-
sible (Pindyck, 1991). Mais dans le domaine du changement climatique,
une autre irréversibilité d’importance est l’accumulation de gaz à effet
de serre dans l’atmosphère. Ha-Duong et al. (1997) et Ambrosi et al.
(2003) montrent que réduire les émissions de gaz à effet de serre dès
maintenant permet d’éviter les effets de cette irréversibilité. Des tra-
vaux futurs pourraient étudier dans un cadre analytique dans quels
secteurs devraient avoir lieu ces abattement précautionneux27. Le rôle
de l’inertie semble ici ambigu : elle peut augmenter le regret d’avoir in-
vesti si l’urgence de l’action climatique s’avère moins sévère que prévue,
mais également de ne pas avoir investi si elle s’avère plus urgente.
Une troisième piste concerne l’étude de la distribution optimale des
efforts de réduction de gaz à effet de serre entre pays. Des pays dif-
férents partent de stocks de capital polluant différents, et vont croitre
à des vitesses différentes. De plus, le cout du capital propre dans les
pays « suiveurs » peut dépendre fortement des efforts antérieurs dans
les pays « à la pointe ». Dans ce cadre, où doit-on investir en prio-
rité les fonds d’une épargne internationale ? Par ailleurs, des accords
internationaux portant uniquement sur les nouveaux investissements
peuvent-ils aider à lisser les couts de l’atténuation climatique et rendre
la transition moins rude pour les pays les plus intensifs en carbone ? Les
modèles développés ici peuvent servir de point de départ pour explorer
ces questions.
Finalement, les analyses exposées dans cette thèse montrent que le
cout de la transition vers du capital bas carbone s’exprime avant tout
comme un besoin de financement. Cette thèse montre donc l’importance,
pour informer au mieux la prise de décision publique comme privée, de
s’intéresser aux contraintes pesant sur ce financement. En corolaire,
elle suggère que (i) des politiques réduisant le risque pour les inves-
tisseurs, (ii) la mobilisation de nouveaux instruments financiers verts,
voire même (iii) une réforme plus radicale du système financier sont au-
tant de pistes à explorer pour faciliter la transition vers une économie
décarbonée.
27Lecocq et al. (1998) proposent une première étude cette question grâce à un
modèle numérique.
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